“Fundamental to Jacksonville University’s mission is support for an environment where divergent ideas, theories, and philosophies can be openly exchanged and critically evaluated. Consistent with these principles and the concept of Academic Freedom, this course may involve the discussion of ideas that you find uncomfortable, disagreeable, or even offensive. These ideas are intended to be presented in an objective manner, they are not intended to persuade and are not an endorsement of what you should personally believe.”
This concise guide is conceived as an introductory scholarly resource. The questions advanced herein are not central to the principal debates of this course; rather, they function as elementary points of departure. The material is presented with the utmost commitment to objectivity, while recognizing that the interpretive framework is not, and cannot be, neutral. Prof. Jorge Majfud.
Table of Contents
Questions
1. What was Cuba’s historical and current political and social context before the Cuban Revolution?
2. What is one connection between the 1954 Guatemalan coup and the Cuban Revolution of 1959?
3. What was the Cuban Revolution of 1959 about?
4. Arrange in chronological order the major events that preceded and followed the Cuban Missile Crisis.
5. What happened after the 1959 Revolution?
6. What was the U.S. policy known as “wet-foot/dry-foot”?
Fulgencio Batista dictatorship
The Paradise of Others



Havana held over 60% of the doctors and 80% of the hospital beds.
There are countries that export sugar, and there are countries that export themselves. In the 1940s and 1950s, Cuba did both. On March 10, 1952, three months before an election he was going to lose, general Fulgencio Batista decided that democracy was too ineffective. He took the presidency the way one takes a table at a restaurant: by arriving first and with enough armed men. Washington, which always cares so much about elections in other people’s countries, recognized him immediately. Order was restored. That is, order for some.
What followed was not exactly a government. It was a business plan. In 1955, the Batista government passed a law granting a gaming license to anyone who invested one million dollars ($12 million today, adjusted for inflation) in a hotel or $200,000 in a new nightclub. It was called Hotel Law 2074, and it had a beautiful legal sound, the way all robberies do when they are written by lawyers. It offered tax incentives, government loans and casino licenses. In other words, the Cuban state lent public money to private capital so that private capital could collect profits that would never return to the public. Under this arrangement, Havana became ripe for foreign investment, especially for the illegal earnings that Lansky and his associates had accumulated from bootlegging, numbers and other rackets. Money laundering received a new name: tourism.
“The brothel of the Caribbean” became a popular expression to refer La Havana since then. Llike all nicknames invented by those who visit, it said more about the clients than about the city. Was the reputation deserved? History does not deal in nicknames, but it does keep receipts. And the receipts show that the brothel was not Batista’s invention but he put it on the payroll.
In 1912, there were about 4,000 prostitutes in Havana. By 1931, there were 7,400. The Republic, born under the supervision of Washington and the Platt Amendment, grew up alongside its brothels, as if both were part of the same development plan. Prohibition in the United States (Dry Law, or the Eighteenth Amendment of 1919) accelerated and reshaped Havana’s vice economy. By the late 1950s, the capital had some 270 brothels and more than 11,500 women working in them. A modern economy, as the economists say, is one that knows how to diversify its exports.
Nothing was hidden. Brothels appeared in tourist guidebooks with the same naturalness as cathedrals and beaches. There were sex shows and live pornographic theaters, like the famous Shanghai, where the stage offered what the hotel lobby only implied. The English novelist Graham Greene, a man who knew a good deal about sin and even more about empires, described that scene in his memoirs and turned Havana into fiction in Our Man in Havana in 1958. Literature, as always, arrived before the historians and after the victims.
By then, tourism was Cuba’s second-largest source of foreign currency, with some 350,000 visitors a year. Many of them were Americans who took a short flight from Miami for the weekend, the way one crosses the street to the corner store. On Friday they were respectable citizens. On Saturday they were in Havana. On Monday they were respectable citizens again in the US. The island stayed where it was, with the same poverty and the same women, waiting for the next flight.
From the beginning Batista invited the gangsters, helped fund their enterprises and took a large chunk of the proceeds for himself. This was not a secret whispered in dark corners. In March 1958, Life magazine published a story on mobsters moving in on troubled Havana and splitting rich gambling profits with Batista. It was Al Capone’s Chicago with palm trees and an army: the casino paid the politician, the politician paid the police, and the police paid the casino with silence. The difference was that in Chicago, at least, someone eventually went to prison for taxes.
That is what a playground is: a place where some come to play and others are the toys. The protagonists were not mysterious. They had names, addresses, and FBI files. Meyer Lansky, the accountant of the American underworld, and the Italian-American families of Santo Trafficante Jr. and their partners. Since the famous 1946 meeting of mob bosses at the Hotel Nacional, Havana had been the syndicate’s offshore headquarters. Now it had legal paperwork. Trafficante built the Hotel Deauville in 1957, and Lansky’s luxurious Riviera opened in late 1957. The Riviera cost about (then) $18 million and the Hotel Continental $20 million; the $14 million Capri, which housed Trafficante’s Red Room nightclub, was the only one that received no government money. So the generosity of the Cuban treasury was the rule, not the exception.
In July 1955, CIA director Allen Dulles wrote to Batista approving his decision to let the CIA train agents in the island. The agency helped build and train Batista’s repressive apparatus as part of a declared «anti-communist strategy.» When Batista became a liability, it tried to replace him with a friendly junta. It never backed democracy for its own sake. What it wanted was a Cuba that would be stable, anti-communist, and friendly to US big business, and Batista was useful only as long as he could deliver that.
Of course, a paradise needs bodies. It is estimated that by the end of the 1950s Havana had 270 brothels. The sex industry of that decade was primarily based on the provision of sexual services by black and mixed-race women to predominantly white North American men. Colonialism has always had a geography of the body. First it was sugar cane, then it was rum, then it was the women who cut the cane and their daughters.
Meanwhile, the rest of Cuba waited outside the hotel. There was no state-sanctioned segregation, but private businesses disenfranchised Afro-Cubans and mulattos, and clubs, casinos, pools, beaches and schools selectively excluded non-white Cubans. The irony reached the very top: Batista himself had been rejected from membership in the Havana Yacht Club for being mixed-race. The dictator could rent his country to Lansky, but he could not rent a chair at the yacht club. Racism is the only aristocracy that money cannot always buy. omekaWikipedia
In the countryside, where the true wealth of the island was produced, the numbers tell a story that no postcard ever printed. Between 1956 and 1957, a Catholic organization not exactly suspected of communism, the Agrupación Católica Universitaria, surveyed rural workers. Only 4% mentioned meat as part of their usual diet; fish was reported by less than 1%; just 2.12% ate eggs and only 11.22% drank milk. The average monthly income of agricultural workers was 45.72 pesos. These workers represented 34% of Cuba’s population but received only 10% of the national income. The survey’s authors gave thanks to Providence for the black bean, which saved the peasants from worse diseases. In Havana, the drinks at the Riviera were on the house.
To keep this arrangement in place, a business also needs security. Since the 1952 coup, the military had been dumping bullet-riddled corpses on the streets of Havana. In 1955, CIA director Allen Dulles wrote to Batista approving the dictator’s decision to allow the CIA to train agents of the BRAC, the Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities. Detainees were interrogated in three stages, beginning with persuasive talk and moving to psychological and then physical torture. CIA official Lyman Kirkpatrick reported, euphemistically, that the bureau might be “too enthusiastic” in some interrogations. Enthusiasm: the bureaucratic word for screams.
The CIA itself later did the math. In a document titled Political Murders in Cuba: Batista Era Compared with Castro Regime, the agency wrote that most of the deaths occurred in 1957 and 1958, as Castro’s revolutionary threat grew and the Batista regime responded with a campaign of terror; the regime’s terror got out of control, and Havana probably had no clear idea how many killings the police and army were committing. The estimate of 20,000 deaths for political reasons during the Batista era included only a relatively small number killed in actual military clashes. The rest were not soldiers. They were students, workers, suspects, people found at the wrong door at the wrong hour. ciacia
And Washington? Washington sold the weapons and asked for elections. In late 1957, the State Department authorized Ambassador Earl Smith to tell Batista that the delivery of 20 armored cars, ordered in June 1957, was proceeding on schedule. Only when the scandal threatened Congress’s foreign aid budget, on March 14, 1958, did the United States officially suspend arms shipments. The justifications were the misuse of military aid by Cuban forces in Oriente province and the uproar over Batista using American weapons against the insurgency. Underlying the decision was the belief that the United States would have to do business with whoever succeeded Batista. That last sentence is not mine, but it could serve as the epitaph of a century of policy in the hemisphere: not democracy, not freedom, but business with whoever comes next.
On the night of December 31, 1958, Batista boarded a plane with his family and a fortune that historians estimate in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The croupiers at the casinos kept spinning the roulette wheels for a few more hours. Then the people came down to the streets and smashed the slot machines. It was not ideology. It was memory.
In 1958, Cuba was a success story–tin he averages. But averages are like hotel lobbies: they show what the owners want the visitors to see. Outside Havana, nearly half of rural Cubans could not read, a peasant could expect to live 45 or 50 years, and one in ten babies died before their first birthday. The capital kept more than 60% of the doctors and 80% of the hospital beds, while the entire countryside shared a single hospital with ten beds. The rural workers, received a tenth of its income because most of them didn’t own the land they worked: about 1.5% of landowners controlled nearly half of all farmland. The sugar economy also employed them for only three months a year, during the harvest, leaving them jobless or in debt for the rest of the year; in 1946, just 11% of farm laborers had permanent jobs and much of the profit went to large landowners and foreign, mostly American, sugar companies, which owned about a quarter of the farmland, and whatever wealth stayed in Cuba was concentrated in Havana rather than the countryside.
There were two Cubas, and statistics, like tourists, only visited one of them.
Some got rich in Havana. Others simply got older. History calls the first group investors and the second group the population.

Audiovisuals and Documents

Fidel Castro and Richard Nixon
On April 19, 1959, in an office in the Capitol, a forty-six-year-old man gave a thirty-two-year-old man a lesson in democracy. The older man was Richard Nixon, Vice President of the most powerful nation on earth, a man who would leave the White House fifteen years later to avoid being impeached for crimes against the very democracy he was now explaining. The younger man was Fidel Castro, who had come down from the Sierra Maestra a few months earlier and still believed, or pretended to believe, that he could talk to the empire as an equal.
The photograph shows them smiling. Photographs always smile. History rarely does.
Castro had not been invited by the government. He had been invited by newspaper editors, which tells us something: in the United States, the press could receive a revolutionary, but the President could not. Eisenhower preferred golf. In Augusta, Georgia, the ball went where it was supposed to go, which is more than could be said for Latin America.
The young Cuban came to sell an idea, not to ask for money. He even forbade his own economists from asking for loans, a gesture of pride that Washington never forgives in its southern neighbors. Debtors are understood; the proud are suspected. He spoke at universities, laid flowers before Lincoln, filled Central Park, and repeated, as many times as he was asked, that he was not a communist. He was not believed, of course. In the Americas, the accusation of communism has never needed proof, only a reformist.
In that office, the Vice President asked about elections. Odd concern. For years, Washington had armed and embraced Fulgencio Batista, a general who had come to power not through the ballot box but through a coup, and whose police left the bodies of students on the streets of Havana. No one in the Capitol had asked Batista about elections with such urgency. Democracy, it seems, is a requirement demanded only of those who threaten someone’s property.
Nixon also spoke of freedom of the press, of fair trials, of the dangers of communists. And he spoke of private investment. That was the heart of the matter. Everything else was decoration. Cuba should not frighten capital. Five years earlier, in Guatemala, a democratically elected president named Jacobo Árbenz had made the mistake of an agrarian reform that touched the idle lands of the United Fruit Company. The CIA took care of the rest. The lesson was clear, and it was taught again in that office in 1959: you can have any revolution you want, as long as nothing changes.
Nixon wrote in his memo that Castro was either naive about communism or under its discipline. It did not occur to him that there might be a third possibility: that a Latin American could want sovereignty without asking permission from Moscow or from Washington. That option did not exist in the imagination of the Cold War, just as for centuries it had not existed in the imagination of the empire. The South could only be a backyard or an enemy.
A few weeks later, Cuba passed its agrarian reform law. Some land changed owners, and some of those owners were American. From then on, the script was written. The Vice President became one of the most enthusiastic promoters of arming Cuban exiles. Two years later, the plan ended on the beaches of Playa Girón.
The photograph remains. Two men smiling at the door of history, each certain that he had understood the other. Perhaps they had. That was precisely the problem.



Peter Pan Flew North


In the story, Peter Pan takes children to a land where they never grow up. In Cuba, between 1960 and 1962, he took about 14,000 of them to Miami, and many grew up far too fast. Children left because of a rumor. Someone (now we know who) circulated a draft law, supposedly signed by the revolutionary government, announcing that the State would take away parental authority, the patria potestad, and send children to indoctrination camps or to the Soviet Union. Radio stations backed by Washington repeated it until it became truth.
Decades later, Cuban CIA agent Antonio Veciana and founder of terrorist group Alpha 66, told the story without blushing. His handler, “Maurice Bishop,” whom he identified as David Atlee Phillips, knew that Veciana had been responsible for spreading “the rumor that led to the exodus of thousands of Cuban children.” “We had invented,” he said, “that the new government was going to kidnap minor children to send them to Russia.” The same man admitted setting fire to one of Havana’s most famous department stores, a fire in which a young mother of two burned to death. Some confessions come late (2017), but they come with a résumé.
The operation had a priest, a headmaster, and a budget. Father Bryan Walsh, of Miami’s Catholic Welfare Bureau, received broad authority to issue visa waivers, a privilege no Haitian or Guatemalan child fleeing US right-wing brutal dictatorships (among dozens) ever enjoyed. James Baker, headmaster of a private school in Havana, organized the departures. The US government paid each child’s $25 plane fare. Most were between 12 and 15 years old, and seven out of ten were boys. On paper they were classified as orphans. They had parents. What they no longer had was a country that would let them see them.
About 40 percent went to relatives. The rest went to camps in Florida, and when those overflowed, to some 100 cities in 35 states and Puerto Rico. Some found loving homes. Others found long lines for the showers, foster homes where Cuban girls were used as servants, and in Louisiana, the American custom of separating Black boys from white boys. They had been saved from communist indoctrination so they could learn segregation.
Then the airplanes stopped. After the Missile Crisis of October 1962, the flights ended. From 1962 to 1965, parents and children could not see each other. Three years is not long in the history of nations, but it is an eternity in the life of a twelve-year-old. By 1966, about 90 per cent had been reunited. Many reunions were between strangers who shared a last name. Many parents never left the island.
Of the rest, the archives speak quietly. In some facilities, nuns beat children. A priest, later defrocked, was accused of sexually abuse some of them. So did a foster father and employees of the schools that took them in. A former Pedro Pan, Alex Lopez, said he was abused by priests at a camp and moved to an orphanage after he protested. Boys who seemed gay were abused by other boys. How many? It depends on who counts. One researcher reviewed 1,750 records and found 10 cases of mistreatment. Another study found one complaint among 500 interviews. Children, it must be remembered, rarely file complaints, especially when they are alone, in a foreign language, in the hands of those who are supposed to be saving them.
In 1961, the revolution also sent about a thousand Cuban students to study in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Not children, but young adults. They came back as they finished their degrees. That was called indoctrination. Fourteen thousand children flown north under a lie fabricated by an intelligence agency was called freedom. The difference is not in the children. It is in the dictionary.
Peter Pan never grew up. The Pedro Pan children did. Many of them, in their sixties, say they are grateful that their parents sent them. Perhaps they are right. But gratitude does not erase the lie that made the journey necessary. Just as the CIA has never fully opened its files on the operation, history keeps one page closed: the one where someone decided that frightening thousands of parents was a reasonable price for weakening a government. In the Cold War, children were not children. They were propaganda with luggage.
The US government has never admitted inventing the rumor that Cuba’s revolutionary government would strip parents of custody (patria potestad) and send children to the Soviet Union. Washington did acknowledge organizing and funding the airlift: the State Department authorized visa waivers, and the government paid each child’s plane fare. It is also on record that the CIA owned Radio Swan, a station that broadcast the rumor. A direct admission comes from Miami: Antonio Veciana, a former CIA collaborator and founder of Alpha 66, who was shot in Miami but survived. In his 2017 memoir Trained to Kill, he said he had spread the rumor himself from La Havana, stating that “we had invented that the new government was going to kidnap minor children to send them to Russia.”
The Firing Squad and the Miami Mirror
Revolutions, like empires, also keep their own accounts. And like empires, they prefer to count the dead of others.
In the first months of 1959, the new Cuba set up revolutionary tribunals to judge the soldiers, police officers, and informers of the Batista regime accused of crimes. The charges were torture and murder, and few in Cuba doubted that there had been plenty of both. The CIA, which had trained Batista’s police agents four years earlier, now noted in a report that some 500 executions had been publicly announced by the new regime. The exile group Cuba Archive counts 658 between January and June. The bloodiest episode did not even wait for the tribunals: on January 12, on San Juan Hill in Santiago, 71 men were shot on Raúl Castro’s orders, most of them Batista’s police and soldiers accused of major crimes. The same hill where, 60 years earlier, Theodore Roosevelt had won his glory in a so called war that kidnapped the Cuban revolution of independence against Spain in 1898. Then came the trial of Major Jesús Sosa Blanco, judged in a sports stadium before a cheering crowd and television cameras.
On January 3, Fidel Castro named an Argentine doctor commander of La Cabaña fortress. Ernesto Guevara did not usually preside over the trials. He did something more decisive: he reviewed the appeals. The last word belonged to him. As presiding judge he appointed his aide Orlando Borrego, a 21-year-old accountant with no legal training. The number of executions under his jurisdiction ranges from 55, according to his biographer Jon Lee Anderson, to 105, according to his enemies, and the difference depends on whether one counts the appeals he denied. Che did not hide. In a February 1959 letter, he wrote that the firing squads were a necessity for the Cuban people. In Miami, the exiles repeated until the great northern press believed it that Guevara was a cold-blooded killer. They rarely mentioned who else had been standing by the wall.
Humberto Sorí Marín, a lawyer, drafted the revolution’s penal law in the Sierra Maestra and in 1959 was the chief judge of the war crimes trials in Havana. At Sosa Blanco’s retrial, he pronounced the death sentence again, and it was carried out within hours. A year later, he moved to Miami. In the United States he received the support of CIA officer E. Howard Hunt (one of the mastermind of the Guatemalan’s Coup of 1953), the same Hunt who would later break into the Watergate offices on behalf of Richard Nixon, the vice president who had given Castro a lesson in democracy in 1959. Sorí Marín returned to Cuba secretly to prepare the ground for the Bay of Pigs, was captured, and on April 20, 1961, was shot by a firing squad, the same punishment he had imposed on others two years earlier.
Famous José Dionisio Suárez went further. He had been one of Fidel’s guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra. In 1959 he sat on revolutionary tribunals and stood in firing squads. In Miami, witnesses remembered him as one of the executioners of men accused of murder and torture under Batista. He remembered it too. In March 1959, Lieutenant Colonel Armando Suárez Suquet, accused of ordering a recent massacre, was taken from the military hospital in Camagüey to face the tribunal. “Don’t play crazy, I told him,” Suárez recalled in a conversation recorded in Miami on July 18, 2016. “Behave like a man… He was tried by a tribunal and executed by a firing squad, as he should have been… It’s possible that I was part of the firing squad, but I’m not sure I was there… I’m almost sure I was part of the tribunal that condemned him.” Later, feeling sidelined by the revolution, he deserted to Miami. In 1961, the CIA recruited him for the Bay of Pigs invasion. He missed the first flight to the training camp in Guatemala because he arrived late at the airport. After the defeat, he became a leader of the Cuban Nationalist Movement and earned the nickname “Charco de Sangre,” Pool of Blood. On September 21, 1976, in Washington, D.C., he took part in the car bombing that killed former Chilean minister Orlando Letelier and his American colleague Ronni Moffitt, a few blocks from the White House. When he was arrested, his wife said he was innocent and that he just sold used cars. Miami radio and television stations organized a marathon to raise money for his defense. In his spare time, like Posada Carriles and Orlando Bosch, he painted idyllic landscapes of Cuba, admired as works of art in Miami. Only in Miami.
The same man who sent Batista’s officers to the wall in the name of the revolution later planted bombs in the name of freedom. The judge became the accused, the executioner became the freedom fighter, and the CIA, which had trained Batista’s torturers, ended up recruiting the men who had shot them. Nor was the traffic one-way. José Miguel Battle, a police officer under Batista and an employee of Meyer Lansky, also joined the CIA’s invasion brigade and later built a gambling and drug empire in New Jersey and Florida. In Miami, the revolution’s executioners and the dictatorship’s police finally found something in common: an employer.
That is perhaps the only lesson that both sides refused to learn. Every power that kills in the name of justice ends up needing someone to kill in its name. And every empire that preaches human rights ends up giving refuge to those who violated them, as long as they violated them on the right side.
False flags
(CIA declassified):
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. WASHINGTON 25, D.C.. UNCLASSIFIED. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. Subject: 13 March 1962.


The Bay of Pigs Invasion and Cuba’s Shift into the Soviet Sphere
“Los líderes de las principales organizaciones de exiliados cubanos que la Agencia intentaba organizar eran básicamente egoístas y ego-maníacos; estaban más preocupados por cuáles serían sus posiciones en Cuba una vez que Castro fuera derrocado que por trabajar por la causa común”.
Investigación interna de la CIA en Bahía de Cochinos

After the fall of the Washington-backed dictatorship of Batista in January 1959, the Cuban Revolution did not immediately declare itself communist. Its first great confrontation with the old order was economic. On May 17, 1959, Castro’s government passed the Agrarian Reform Law, limiting large landholdings and expropriating excess land, including properties belonging to US companies. The objective was to redistribute some lands and reduce the concentration of ownership that had characterized Cuba’s economy. For Washington, however, land reform meant that American property was no longer protected or given special treatment.
The conflict deepened in 1960. Cuba began purchasing cheaper Soviet oil (one dollar instead of 2.80 dollars per barrel), and the three foreign companies operating the principal refineries —Esso, Texaco, and Shell— were asked to refine it. They refused. Cuba responded by taking control of the refineries, beginning with Texaco.
What followed was much larger: during the summer of 1960, the government nationalized sugar mills, oil companies, banks, telephone and electric utilities, insurance companies, hotels, airlines and other major enterprises. The stated logic was to place strategic resources under Cuban control and dismantle an economy heavily dependent on foreign capital; Washington saw the measures as attacks on American property.
The sequence matters. First came land reform; then the confrontation over cheaper Soviet oil and the refineries; then the broader nationalization of the economy. When Fidel Castro visit New York for the second time in September 1960, Washington had already decided that his government had to be removed.
In March 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to organize an operation to overthrow Castro; Kennedy inherited the plan and authorized the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. Thus, the Cuban confrontation cannot be reduced to a simple story in which Washington invaded because Cuba had already become communist. The revolution’s political radicalization, the struggle over property and economic sovereignty, the old and persistent American interventions in Cuba since 1898, and the Cold War confrontation developed simultaneously.
In April 1959, only three months after Batista’s fall, Fidel Castro visited the United States and met Vice President Richard Nixon in his office in Washington. Castro was still presenting the Revolution as nationalist and independent rather than communist, but Nixon came away convinced that he was “incredibly naive about Communism,” while acknowledging that Castro possessed exceptional qualities as a popular leader.
The meeting became meaningful because at that precise moment Washington was already planning how to contain a disobedient revolution or redirect it to its own interest: before the major nationalizations had even occurred, U.S. officials were discussing Castro’s land reform and the possibility that American-owned properties would be affected. Castro, meanwhile, increasingly concluded that Washington would not accept a Cuba exercising economic sovereignty on its own terms. Che Guevara was even more distrustful of the United States, arguing that U.S. policy toward Cuba would remain aggressive regardless of which president was in the White House and, by late 1960, he was publicly saying that it made little difference to the Revolution whether Kennedy or Nixon governed Washington.
By March 17, 1960, more than a year before the Bay of Pigs, President Eisenhower had authorized the CIA to organize, train, and equip Cuban exiles for a covert operation aimed at overthrowing Castro. By April 1961, when the CIA-backed invasion landed at the Bay of Pigs, Castro had still not publicly declared himself Marxist-Leninist; the invasion preceded his May declaration that Cuba was socialist and his December 1 declaration, “I am a Marxist-Leninist.” Cuba had already begun receiving Soviet help in 1960, but the failed invasion intensified Havana’s search for Soviet military support as protection against another U.S. attack, pushing the new government of Cuba into the Soviet sphere.
During these three years, approximately 250,000 Cubans went into exile in the United States, the first and mostly upper-class wave of the post-revolutionary Cuban exodus.
Washington feared that Castro might become communist; Castro feared that Washington would never accept a genuinely independent Cuba; and the conflict over land reform, expropriations, oil refineries and nationalization transformed those mutual suspicions into an open Cold War conflict.
Che Guevara was in Guatemala in 1954 when the CIA-backed coup overthrew democratically elected Jacobo Árbenz, and he blamed Árbenz for not arming the people. In his diary, he wrote that Árbenz “could have given the people weapons and refused, and this is the result,” and that “a people in arms is an invincible power.” He also concluded that the old army was inherently treacherous and had to be dismantled. Cuba applied these lessons after 1959: it (1) dissolved Batista’s army, (2) tried his officers, and in 1959 (3) created popular militias that eventually armed hundreds of thousands of civilians and helped defeat the Bay of Pigs invasion. (4) The media also played a key role in Guatemala, where a clandestine CIA radio station spread panic and helped break the army’s will to fight. The lesson Cuba drew on the media was the opposite of openness: by 1960, the independent press had been closed or taken over by the state.
CIA repeated that they wanted «to make Cuba another Guatemala». Coincidently, Ernesto Che Guevara said: «Cuba is not going to be another Guatemala». It was not.
Related
Che Guevara radicalization
«[…] just after that tour around Latin America, where he first began to develop a pan-American consciousness, [Ernesto «Che» Guevara] wound up in Guatemala, a country that at the time was undergoing a profound democratic revolution. Che practiced social medicine in the country’s rural highlands, ministering to the country’s most marginal. He was in Guatemala during the CIA’s 1954 coup that ended that country’s democracy, and he saw firsthand the U.S. role in restoring a regime that would go on to kill hundreds of thousands of its citizens. He always cited his experience in Guatemala as a turning point. Prior to the coup, the Latin American left, including Communist groups, still believed it was possible to work with a country’s national bourgeois to achieve social democratic reform. Afterwards, it was increasingly difficult to do so. Che himself would go on to taunt the United States, saying “Cuba will not be another Guatemala” to justify the restrictions of civil liberties in Cuba, since it was through the subversion of the press, the Church, and independent political parties that the CIA did its work in Guatemala, and subsequently elsewhere.
La Coubre 1960
HAVANA, March 4 — Explosions on a French freighter loaded with ammunition and explosives for the Cuban Army rocked Havana today. Seventy-five to 100 were killed and more than 200 injured by the series of blasts.
La Coubre 1960 Cuba NYT.pdf – Alternative Formats

CIA report on Cuba (1963)
CIA on Cuna 1963.pdf
“It should be noted that, in 1975, when on a visit to Cuba, the American scientist Charles Henry Calisher investigated and found evidence of the existence of antibodies to dengue in the Cuban population and the lack, among Cuban people of at least 45 years of age, of antibodies to the dengue type 2 virus. “At his trial in 1984 in the United States, Eduardo Arocena, ringleader of the terrorist organization Omega 7, publicly confessed to having introduced germs into Cuba and admitted that haemorrhagic dengue fever had been introduced into the island via groups of family relatives of Cuban origin, based in the United States. “In order to determine whether or not this confession by the head of the notorious Omega 7 terrorist organization is true, regarding the groups used to introduce the haemorrhagic dengue epidemic into Cuba, we have provided below an exhaustive explanation and description of who these groups are, who organized them and in whose service they were operating.
Bioterrorism
BACTERIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS (UN Arocena).pdf
United States embargo against Cuba
Pigs of Bay aftermath
“En esa época, todo parecía razonable, hasta el asesinato”.
Mariana Callejas
“En esta guerra no hay civiles. Todos son combatientes”.
Luis Posada Carriles
“Esta es una guerra global. No hay civiles ni inocentes. Todos son com-batientes y deben ser tratados como tales”.
Orlando Bosch
“Yo no me arrepiento de nada. Si tuviese que matar 273 de lugar de 73, lo volvía a hacer. Que sufran como sufrimos nosotros”.
Ricardo Morales
“De lo único que no nos han acusado es de haber matado a Jesús”
Ignacio Novo Sampol
“Si realmente son tan anticomunistas y de verdad tienen cojones, debe-rían estar en Cuba peleando como hombres. Los cubanos viven aquí por el dinero, pero se hacen los patriotas. Si de verdad odian tanto a Castro, ¿qué mierda hacen aquí? Todos ellos son como perros ladrando del otro lado de la verja”.
Mariana Callejas
“Si Posada Carriles fuera miembro de la Unión Nacional de Escritores y Artistas Cubanos en vez de terrorista, no pudiera aspirar a entrar a Esta-dos Unidos. El Departamento de Seguridad Nacional les niega las visas a los poetas y artistas cubanos, pero le concede libre entrada al país a los terroristas”.
José Pertierra
“Nadie está interesado en la libertad de expresión aquí, en Miami. Sólo en La Habana”.
Bernardo Benes
“Las guerras modernas son, sobre todo, guerras psicológicas; el objetivo es torcer la opinión pública… Nunca se debe dejar huellas de nuestras ac-ciones; si esto no es posible, siempre y bajo cualquier circunstancia se debe negar cualquier participación en los hechos. Siempre. Incluso cuando lo contrario es lo más obvio…. Si los intereses de los otros se ali-nean con los nuestros, entonces son aliados; si no tienen ningún interés, son instrumentos; si se oponen a nuestros intereses, son enemigos”.
Antonio Veciana
“Odio a Estados Unidos. Nos han traicionado. Cada día que pasa quiero agarrar un fusil y disparar contra este país”.
José Alfredo Pérez San Román, comandante de la fallida invasión de la CIA a Cuba.
Sources
- Jacobin: The CIA Trained Fulgencio Batista’s Torturers in Cuba
- Bunk History: The CIA Trained Batista’s Torturers
- NPR: The American reaction to Castro’s victory
- Mary Ferrell Foundation: Tipping Point
- Cuban Relations (on CIA internal history)
- FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VI, Doc. 164
- FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VI, Doc. 173
- FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VI, Doc. 453
- CIA FOIA Reading Room: Bay of Pigs Declassified Documents
- National Security Archive: Bay of Pigs — 60 Years Later (George Washington University)
- U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
- Encyclopædia Britannica: Cuban Revolution
- JSTOR — Latin American Research Review: The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered (Samuel Farber)
- Oxford Reference: A Dictionary of Contemporary World History — Cuban Revolution entry
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1616 (XV): The Situation in Cuba (1961)
- Latin American Studies Association (LASA): Cuba Resources and Scholarly Statements

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