Puntos a considerar
- El ejemplo contra la invulnerabilidad del Tecnofascismo.
- Oxígeno ideológico y moral. Una izquierda popular sin miedo ni pudor, que no pida permiso al poder.
- El líder y su capital político. Basta de «outsiders«, los perfectos fuisibles políticos de los poderes financieros.
- La democracia y su dependencia de una estrategia propagandística o comunicativa.
- Plataformas digitales y sus dueños de las plataformas y el resto deben extremar el ingenio. Debe haber una política de regulación.Regular no es censurar. Es (1) hacer claras las reglas de juego para todos y (2) democratizar el poder de comunicación y de creación de opinión.El exceso de confianza en las elecciones es una forma de poner en los poderes financieros el poder de extorsión al tiempo que desmovilizan a los pueblos
- Desparlamentarizar/desinstitucionalizar la política.
- El aspecto estratégico: hace años que Pablo B lo ha mencionado.
Pero ganar no es todo. La demostración está en la diferencia entre Lula y Orsi.
Posdata:
El éxito de la campaña de Lula luego de la primera vuelta solo me recuerda que desde hace años hay por lo menos dos expertos en comunicación política digital extremadamente subvalorados. Son el argentino alemán Martín Gak @DrMartinGak y el colombiano español Pablo Bohorquez @bohorquez_pablo . Si Iván Cepeda hubiese escuchado a Pablo como Lula escuchó a André Janones hoy no tendríamos a De a Espriella en Casa de Nariño. En nuestras conversaciones le insistí en que si no sacaban a la gente a votar, Iván Cepeda perdía y lo mismo con Lula. Pablo mencionó (y lo viene haciendo desde hace años) que era necesario “quebrar el algoritmo”.
No le dieron pelota.
Espero que para campañas futuras consideren esos nombres: Martín Gak y Pablo Bohorquez.
Jorge Majfud, octubre 27, 2026.
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(0:00) Good morning, friends of the Centenary. (0:03) I would like to leave you, at the request of Hernán and his colleagues, (0:07) a brief summary of the elections, (0:13) not only of Brazil, but of the previous ones, (0:16) which we have been following, like all of you, for many years. (0:19) First, very quickly, we can say that it is the example (0:24) against the invulnerability of technofascism, of the great technology.
(0:28) This is what the last election of Brazil has proven, (0:32) and it is of enormous importance to have an example. (0:35) Examples are fundamental in almost all aspects of life, (0:39) but above all in politics and society. (0:43) And this is a great example that technology and Zionist trumpism are not invincible.
(0:49) Peoples also count. (0:51) It is important to have this example as a reference, (0:53) and we hope that it is the great turning point that we are waiting for. (0:57) And if it is not that great turning point, (1:00) then it is the great trench that stops the arrogant and sectarian wave (1:07) of the great financial capital.
(1:12) The second point, I would say, is that these elections give us oxygen, (1:17) ideological and moral oxygen. (1:19) And there is a great learning, which I think is nothing new, (1:23) because it is something that has been repeated for a long time, (1:27) and it was even seen in the elections for Al-Qaeda in New York with Mamdani (1:33) and many others here in the United States, (1:34) which is the danger of warm leftist policies. (1:38) And even worse, not only strategic danger, but ideological betrayal, (1:45) the support and reproduction of neoliberal policies.
(1:49) But that would give for everything a discussion in a separate program. (1:52) But I want to insist on the problem of bias, (1:57) both narrative and political itself. (2:01) And Lula’s triumph has an ideological, political, geopolitical, (2:06) moral and strategic meaning.
(2:07) That is another point that must be noted. (2:10) He is the only candidate, Lula, at this time, (2:13) who has managed not only to win, but to reverse a lost election, (2:17) mobilizing people without withdrawing from their first anti-genocide and anti-imperialist position. (2:25) It was precisely the great powers who wanted this, (2:28) to show that it is okay that people do not love them, but they must fear them.
(2:35) Well, they neither love nor fear them. (2:37) This is one of the great examples. (2:39) The third point, I would say, is the example, the value of the leader.
(2:44) Individuals alone cannot make history, (2:46) but history, through a much larger complex, (2:51) ranging from the people, the population, to the chronological processes, (2:56) chooses these individuals. (2:59) And in the case of Brazil, if we compare it with all the previous elections in Latin America, (3:04) I am simply referring to the last four or five years in particular, (3:09) it became clear that in the short term, individuals make a difference, (3:15) but the great figure with that great historical and political capital, (3:20) as in the case of Lula, is irreplaceable. (3:24) And we already explained at another time the value and what we should remember, (3:30) the example of Lula’s trade union struggles in the 1970s, (3:36) not out of unconsciousness, but precisely expressing certain fears (3:43) and even certain fears at the time of the struggle and moving forward.
(3:47) That is the definition of a hero. (3:50) It is not, and it was never part of a true democracy, (3:54) the fact that a triumph depends on a propaganda or communicative strategy. (3:58) That is clear, but it has always been a fact.
(4:02) For at least a couple of centuries, in the case of liberal democracies, (4:07) it is part of the electoral ecosystem of liberal democracies. (4:10) Therefore, we have to play with those rules, (4:12) regardless of whether philosophically or ideologically we question the democratic value (4:17) of elections that depend on certain communication strategies, (4:23) which is a very kind expression, but it could also be a propaganda strategy, (4:29) of communication and mobilization. (4:31) But even so, I would say that I personally have my reservations (4:37) that a democracy functions in this way, but it is like that.
(4:41) Therefore, they are the rules of the game and they are the ones we have to play with. (4:45) And here comes point 5, which are digital platforms. (4:48) What is the difference here? (4:50) It is that the powerful are the owners of the platforms.
(4:54) When I say the powerful, I am talking about a fundamentally financial micro-elite. (4:58) And in the second term, technological. (5:01) And much lower down are governments like Trump’s (5:06) and the governments of world powers.
(5:10) So, for this reason, the rest must exhaust their ingenuity and strategies (5:14) to respond using those same platforms, (5:19) which are inevitable, they are the ecosystem. (5:22) In the same way that a guerrilla used the weapons of the imperialist, (5:25) of the colonizer, of the invader who ruled them, (5:29) is what the left must do, the new world left. (5:34) There must also be a policy, as Lula even announced, (5:39) a policy of regulation.
(5:41) Rules that reduce that abuse of the powers (5:44) that are based on freedom of expression, (5:47) that disproportionately benefit those who have money. (5:52) Even here in the United States, there was a failure of a court (5:57) establishing that donations cannot be limited to politicians (6:00) because that limits freedom of expression. (6:03) That is to say that freedom of expression is being able to buy politicians.
(6:07) So it has become, first of all, an excuse (6:10) and an instrument that disproportionately benefits those who have power, (6:14) financial and economic, media, etc. (6:19) So regulation, in this case, is fundamental (6:21) so that everyone has the same rules of the game (6:25) and it has nothing to do with censorship. (6:27) Just as there are laws in civil life, it does not mean that there is censorship.
(6:31) That there are laws in traffic does not mean that drivers are censored. (6:35) It is a way of establishing rules that allow a functioning (6:40) or a common language. (6:43) It is a way of democratizing the power of communication.
(6:46) Regulation and even the creation of opinion. (6:52) Excessive confidence in elections is a way of putting (6:56) in the financial powers the power of extortion (7:00) while the people are demobilized. (7:03) This is another fundamental point.
(7:05) It has been remarked in recent generations (7:08) that everything is reduced to elections. (7:11) Well, if they vote differently, no, it’s not that simple. (7:16) Elections are fundamentally an instrument, (7:19) just as freedom of expression, (7:22) disproportionately favorable to those who have the power.
(7:24) Why? (7:25) Because just as platforms are bought, (7:26) just as platforms have private owners, (7:29) just as the media, the great media of creation of opinion, (7:33) are concentrated, according to those who have great capitals, (7:37) the same is true of elections. (7:39) Especially in many countries in the world, (7:42) but also even in Latin America, (7:44) those who have money, power, (7:46) have a disproportionate power in buying elections. (7:51) So we must lower the excess, as peoples, (7:55) the excess of confidence in elections.
(7:57) First point. (7:58) The second point is to deparliamentarize politics. (8:02) And in this, it is also an idea that my friend (8:06) Boaventura de Sousa Santos studied, (8:09) studied, wrote decades ago.
(8:11) The problem he saw was that after the Second World War, (8:15) everything was reduced to politics being in parliament (8:18) or in political institutions. (8:20) And that obviously was a way of, (8:23) connecting it with the previous points, (8:25) a way of demobilizing. (8:27) That is, what we said at the beginning was removed, (8:31) that value that Lula used, (8:34) not from the political institutionality, (8:40) but from the union mobilization, (8:42) which was also prohibited.
(8:44) Let’s even remember Socrates’ Corinthian democracy (8:48) in Brazil, etc. (8:50) They were prohibited. (8:51) And for that very reason, (8:53) mobilization had an effect beyond the institutional.
(8:56) It was a popular mobilization. (8:58) Therefore, we must return to the fact that politicians, (9:00) and here in Uruguay I see few politicians (9:02) who are candidates for that. (9:03) I have said it openly, (9:06) each one will have their preference.
(9:08) The profile I see the most in this regard is Oscar Andrade. (9:11) There are others, but hey, (9:13) that is a topic that Uruguayans should look at (9:18) and a political class must emerge, (9:24) not simply as outsiders of the day for the night, (9:28) which are the perfect puppets of power (9:31) that they buy, put on and take off. (9:33) Be careful with outsiders.
(9:34) Uruguay is filling up with outsiders (9:36) who one day are there and the next day disappear. (9:39) It is necessary that people, (9:40) not only that they live from politics, (9:43) but that they have political capital, (9:45) political history, (9:46) and above all, (9:48) connected with popular movements, (9:51) not simply in a bank of the parliament, (9:54) of the congress, or whatever. (9:56) And I finish here.
(9:58) Winning is not everything. (9:59) Winning is not enough. (10:00) Because if we don’t, (10:02) we are losing the North.
(10:06) Well, I don’t want to extend myself too much. (10:08) I promised Hernán a very short audio, (10:11) and I hope it serves for something, (10:13) some of the points I have mentioned. (10:15) There is a lot to reflect on (10:17) and to discuss going forward, (10:20) considering the latest experiences in Latin America (10:22) and the latest in Brazil.
(10:25) A hug to everyone, (10:27) and well, may everything be for the best, (10:28) and at another time, (10:29) we will meet in person (10:30) for a more fluid dialogue.

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