“Fundamental to Jacksonville University’s mission is support for an environment where divergent ideas, theories, and philosophies can be openly exchanged and rigorously evaluated. Consistent with these principles and the concept of Academic Freedom, this course may involve the discussion of ideas that you find uncomfortable, disagreeable, or even offensive. These ideas are intended to be presented in an impartial manner, they are not intended to persuade and are not an endorsement of what you should personally believe.”
-This guide is meant to serve as a basic introductory tool. The questions that follow are not meant to be central to the debates in this course but rather to serve as basic points of departure. I intend to provide a neutral presentation of the material, recognizing that the very approach to the material is not and cannot be neutral. Prof. Jorge Majfud.
Table of Contents
Questions
- What was AFRICOM established for in 2007, and what function did it play in Africa?
- How did foreign military intervention affect stability in the Sahel region?
- Why did public backing for Western-backed security policies decline in some African countries?
- What were some of the main traits of Gaddafi’s Jamahiriya system?
- What happened to Libya after the 2011 NATO intervention and the fall of Gaddafi?
- How did Libya change from a destination country for migrants into a major transit route to Europe?
- What factors contributed to the emergence of human trafficking and slave markets in post-2011 Libya?
How the West Destroyed Libya and the Pan-African Project

The United States focused its military power on Afghanistan and Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001. But a different front in the global «War on Terror» opened up, largely unnoticed by the media, in Africa over the subsequent two decades. This vast area, stretching from North Africa down to the Lake Chad Basin, was transformed into a region of ongoing conflict.
The stated goal of the foreign troops in Africa is to assist local governments in eradicating terrorist networks before they can establish safe havens. However, after twenty years of foreign boots, drone bases, and air strikes on African soil, the results have been less than stellar. Rather than stabilizing the region, foreign military intervention has eroded national sovereignty, created more unstable states, and increased mistrust among Africans that the foreign troops are there to safeguard them.

AFRICOM and the Machine of Invisible War
In 2007, the U.S. formalised its military presence across the continent by creating AFRICOM (United States Africa Command). The official press releases framed it as a benevolent Partnership —offering joint training, intelligence sharing, and assistance to reinforce local armies in countries like Kenya, Niger, Somalia, and Mali.
Yet beneath the security rhetoric, AFRICOM represented a steady, structural militarization of African politics. Local militaries began relying heavily on American funding and direction, subtly diverting their loyalty and priorities toward foreign strategic ambitions rather than domestic necessities.
Some leaked documents on this topic have been published by WikiLeaks (Julian Assange). I cannot reproduce them for a class.
By the end of the 2000s, the US stopped sending massive boots-on-the-ground deployments and started pushing buttons from thousands of miles away. The Sahel and the Horn of Africa became live-fire testing grounds for long-range drones.
The US began using drones to hammer Al-Shabaab in Somalia in 2009 during the Obama presidency. Then, after Gaddafi was captured and lynched in 2011, air strikes tracked the surge of ISIS in the region. This group —allegedly linked to Western interests— moved into Libya following Gaddafi’s execution, mirroring almost exactly what transpired in Iraq right after Saddam Hussein’s fall. Washington sold the public on the idea that drones were clean, precise, and protected American troops. But for those on the ground, that «precision» still brought civilian death, turning every Western mistake into an easy recruitment boon for local extremists.
During the Obama administration, the US significantly scaled up its drone warfare program, launching strikes across Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. Washington claimed that between 2009 and 2015, counterterrorism strikes outside active war zones killed somewhere between 64 and 116 civilians. Independent watchdogs like the Bureau of Investigative Journalism presented a wildly different picture, estimating nearly 4,000 total casualties. Much of that gap comes down to how the military defines a «combatant» versus a civilian in remote, hard-to-verify conflict zones.
How Western Strategy Backfired
If you want to see where this security policy failed most spectacularly, look at the Sahel —the semi-arid belt stretching across Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mauritania.
The region was already straining under real pressures: extreme poverty, desertification, ethnic tension, and fragile government presence. Instead of addressing those core issues, foreign powers treated the Sahel primarily as a policing problem. They deployed military hardware at complex socio-economic crises, irrationally assuming lasting peace to follow.
The Structural Failure: By framing deep-rooted economic and environmental hardship purely through a counterterrorism lens, Western intervention fueled the exact grievances that drive young people toward armed uprisings.
Predictably, extremist groups didn’t diminish; they multiplied.
- Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Evolved from an Algerian rebel faction into a cross-border syndicate operating across Mali and Niger.
- Boko Haram & ISWAP: Devastated northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, gaining international infamy with events like the 2014 Chibok schoolgirl kidnappings.
- ISIS Franchises: Exploited vast, ungoverned desert expanses to recruit displaced, angry youth.
The Coup Belt: Public Backlash and the Anti-Western Wave
By the 2020s, the patience of everyday citizens in West Africa ran out. People watched foreign troops set up base after base while their own towns grew less safe by the year.
The political dam broke between 2020 and 2023. A cascade of military coups swept through Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These junta leaders didn’t seize power in a vacuum —they were met with crowds celebrating in the streets.
The message from the public was unmistakable: Western-backed security models had failed, and decades of French and American influence were no longer welcome. In country after country, newly installed military governments expelled French forces, revoked U.S. base agreements, and pursued new security arrangements on their own terms.
Gaddafi, the Jamahiriya, and the Collapse of Libya
To understand how the region fell apart so fast, you have to look back to October 2011 and the fall of Muammar Gaddafi.
Gaddafi took power in Libya through a 1969 military coup, eventually establishing his own political system known as the Jamahiriya («state of the masses»). To his critics, he was a ruthless autocrat who crushed internal dissent and backed international militant groups. To his supporters, he was a fierce Pan-Africanist who transformed Libya’s vast oil wealth into tangible material prosperity for his people.
Whatever your view of his politics, the state he built was undeniably wealthy by regional standards:
| Key Sector | The Jamahiriya Model |
|---|---|
| Resource Distribution | Oil revenues directly funded universal healthcare, free education, and subsidized fuel and housing. |
| Infrastructure | Built the Great Man-Made River, a massive engineering effort pumping fossil water from desert aquifers to coastal cities. |
| Financial Ambitions | Championed an African Gold Dinar—a proposed gold-backed currency designed to free African trade from reliance on the US dollar and French CFA franc. |


The 2011 NATO Intervention
In April 2011, the New York Times reported that US government-financed groups, including the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute and Freedom House, had trained some activists who later became prominent, such as members of Egypt’s April 6 Youth Movement. The training covered organizing, digital tools and election oversight. A Serbian group linked to the movement that ousted Milošević also coached Egyptian activists.
Tools and information. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube helped protesters coordinate, and in Tunisia, US diplomatic cables leaked by WikiLeaks about the ruling family’s graft added fuel. Military intervention after the uprisings began. NATO bombed Libya in 2011 under a UN Security Council directive, which led to Gaddafi’s downfall. In Syria, the US and Gulf states later supplied some rebel groups.
When the Arab Spring protests reached Libyan cities in early 2011, Gaddafi responded with heavy military force. Fearing a humanitarian massacre, the UN passed Resolution 1973 authorizing a «no-fly zone.»
What followed went far beyond civilian protection. Led by France, Britain, and the US. NATO turned the mandate into an aggressive regime-change operation, bombing Gaddafi’s forces into submission and clearing the path for rebel forces to take Tripoli. When Gaddafi was captured and executed near Sirte in October 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton famously quipped to a reporter, «We came, we saw, he died.»
It was a triumphant moment for Western foreign policy circles —and a catastrophic disaster for the region.
The Fallout: A Shattered Continent
The moment Gaddafi died, the central authority holding Libya together evaporated. The country dissolved overnight into a patchwork of warring militias, rival governments, and human trafficking operations.
NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya toppled Gaddafi but left a power vacuum that armed factions quickly filled. ISIS occupied the city of Sirte from 2015 to 2016, and migrants were traded in slave markets along the smuggling corridors to Europe. At the same time, heavy armaments and Tuareg mercenaries who had served Gaddafi poured south, stoking Mali’s 2012 rebellion and the jihadist insurgencies that later spread to Niger and Burkina Faso. Many analysts regard the intervention as a major accelerant of the region’s turmoil, alongside the failure to stabilize Libya after the war and long-standing local grievances in the Sahel.
The destabilization didn’t stay inside Libya’s borders. Gaddafi’s massive armories were raided, sending heavy weaponry, shoulder-fired missiles, and thousands of seasoned mercenaries pouring southward across the Sahara. This influx acted as high-octane fuel for existing insurgencies in northern Mali, initiating the ongoing collapse of the broader Sahel.
The Legacy of Foreign Intervention
The story of the modern War on Terror in Africa isn’t a story of tactical military failures—it’s a story of a fundamentally flawed doctrine.
By prioritizing drone bases, special operations, and top-down regime change over genuine diplomatic and economic development, foreign interventions accomplished the exact opposite of their stated goals. They shattered a major North African state, created a power vacuum that unleashed weapons across a continent, and left an entire generation of Africans to endure the resulting chaos.
The core question hanging over the continent today isn’t whether terror groups are dangerous. It is whether decades of foreign military meddling were ever intended to solve the problem—or if they simply ensured that Africa would remain in a state of permanent instability.
The Price of a Human Being
In 2017 the world learned, through a CNN camera, that a young African man could be sold in Libya for about four hundred dollars. The UN migration agency had already put a range on it: between two hundred and five hundred. Less than a used phone, more than a goat. There were statements of outrage, emergency meetings, solemn declarations. Then the cameras moved on, as they always do, because indignation also has a short shelf life.
Nine years later, the market has not closed. It has only become more efficient. In 2025 the same agency counted 928,839 migrants in Libya, people who crossed the desert fleeing wars, droughts and economies drained for generations. Nobody knows how many of them have been bought, sold or held for ransom, because slaves, by definition, do not appear in statistics. A UN report in February 2026 described the system in a sentence worthy of a business school: those who cannot pay “are passed along, sold, or erased.” Even the language of barbarism has learned to speak like a supply chain.
The real business, however, is not the sale but the ransom. A captive is worth more as hostage than as merchandise. A man is told to pay four hundred eighty dollars for his freedom, then nine hundred seventy. A woman’s husband pays seven thousand five hundred, and the kidnappers, satisfied with the transaction, ask for seven thousand five hundred more. A father sells the family house to buy back his son. In the old slave trade, the profit was made in the plantations of the Americas. In the new one, it is extracted from the poorest families of Gambia, Nigeria or Eritrea. Capital, as we know, always finds its most efficient form.
None of this fell from the sky. In 2011 NATO bombed Libya in the name of human rights and left behind a country without a state, where weapons are cheaper than bread and human beings are cheaper than weapons. Europe, which once filled its ports with ships carrying Africans in chains, now pays Libyan forces to stop Africans before they reach its shores. Two centuries ago, the slaves were taken to Europe. Now Europe pays so they will stay away. The direction has changed, but the logic has not: in both cases, the African body is a problem of logistics. History does not repeat itself. It simply changes its price.
Since Gaddafi’s fall, militias dominate territory, roads, ports and oil facilities, and migrants are one more source of income. Many militias are on government payrolls, and some officials are accused of managing the trade from the inside.

Gates of the Desert: Gaddafi, European Migration, and the Libya Slave Market Crisis
Before 2011, Libya was not a corridor but a destination. People did not cross it on their way to Europe. They went there to stay. Oil had made it rich, and its wages were higher than almost anywhere else in the region. Workers came from Egypt and Sudan, from Niger and Chad, from much of sub-Saharan Africa, to build its buildings, harvest its fields and pump its oil. Depending on the year, foreigners made up between a tenth and a fifth of the population. Wealth has always attracted the poor, just as gold once attracted conquerors. The difference is that the poor come to work.
Muammar Gaddafi managed this crowd with an iron hand and a strategist’s eye. Migrants were not treated well under his rule. They suffered discrimination, arbitrary arrests and expulsions, the kind of treatment the powerful reserve for those who are indispensable and invisible at the same time. But the state controlled its borders, its ports and its criminal networks.
In 2004, Libya admitted to 600,000 legal workers, about one in ten residents in a country of some six million, and to between 750,000 and 1.2 million more without papers, which raised the share to between a fifth and almost a third. Other estimates spoke of 1.35 to 2.5 million. The UN migration agency counted 2.5 million on the eve of the war, a million of them Egyptians, which would have meant nearly four foreigners for every ten inhabitants. Whatever the true figure, Libya was not a corridor of misery but a magnet of work, a rich country built in large part by the hands of the poor.
Gaddafi also understood geography better than many diplomats. Libya was the door between Africa and Europe, and he held the key. When Western leaders criticized him or delayed their payments, he reminded them that the door could open. In 2010, in Rome, he warned that without billions of euros from the European Union, Europe could “turn black.” The phrase was brutal, and Europe understood it perfectly. It paid. The same governments that spoke of human rights in Brussels signed agreements with the colonel so that he would keep Africans on the other side of the sea. Europe did not fear the dictator. It feared the people the dictator was holding back. In 2011, when NATO’s bombs began to fall, more than 796,000 of them fled. Those who stayed, or who came later, found that the country that had once hired them was now ready to sell them.
A year later, NATO bombed that dictator in the name of freedom. The door did not open in an orderly way. It was blown off its hinges. The jailer was gone, and with him the monopoly. In its place came a hundred small jailers, each with his own key and his own price. Those who had come to work in a rich country found themselves crossing a broken one. The migrant, who had been a worker, became merchandise. History, once again, did not free the slaves. It only privatized them.
When the NATO-backed intervention toppled Gaddafi in 2011, that entire regulatory apparatus vanished overnight. The central state collapsed, leaving behind a power vacuum quickly occupied by rival militias, warlords, and organized criminal syndicates.
Without a unified government to police the coast or desert borders, Libya transformed into the primary launchpad for migrants aiming to cross the Central Mediterranean into Italy and Malta. Human smuggling evolved from an underground trade into a multi-million-dollar industry. Armed groups realized that human beings were as lucrative a commodity as oil or weapons.
The nightmare peaked in 2017, when investigative journalists captured undercover footage of open-air «slave markets» in Libya, where young African men were being auctioned off for farm labor and construction work for a few hundred dollars.
Europe’s Dilemma and the Legacy of Intervention
In 2011, when NATO’s bombs began to fall, more than 796,000 foreign workers fled Libya. They left the way the poor always leave a war that is not theirs: on foot, in trucks, in boats, with whatever they could carry. Egyptians crossed back into Egypt and Tunisians into Tunisia. Those who had come from Niger, Chad or Mali crossed the desert again, this time in the opposite direction, carrying not savings but stories. The ones who could not leave learned quickly that in a war, a foreigner is always a suspect, and a Black foreigner is a suspect twice over.
Rumors spread that Gaddafi was using African mercenaries, and the color of a man’s skin became evidence. Human rights organizations documented lynchings, arbitrary arrests and beatings of sub-Saharan migrants by rebel militias. The whole town of Tawergha, home to tens of thousands of Black Libyans, was emptied by fighters from Misrata. Freedom had arrived, but not for everyone. As so often in history, liberation began by deciding who did not deserve to be liberated.
When the dictator fell, the state fell with him. The man who had held the keys to the desert was gone, and in his place appeared a hundred militias, each with its own checkpoint, its own prison and its own price. The worker who had once been hired was now captured. By 2017 the cameras showed what many already knew: young Africans auctioned for about four hundred dollars, sometimes less. A human being was worth less than a rifle, because in Libya rifles were in short supply and the poor were not.
Europe, meanwhile, was not worried about the slaves. It was worried that they might reach its shores. So it did what it had done with Gaddafi: it paid. It trained and financed the Libyan coast guard to catch migrants at sea and return them to the same detention centers where, according to the United Nations, they were tortured, raped and enslaved. In 2023 a UN mission concluded that this support had “aided and abetted” crimes against humanity. The language was diplomatic, as it always is when the accused are respectable.
Today there are close to a million migrants in Libya, and some of them are still being bought, sold and ransomed while their families sell their houses to buy them back. The bombs that were supposed to bring freedom left behind a market. That is the oldest lesson of empires: they never destroy anything without building something else in its place. The problem is that what they build is rarely meant for those who have to live in it.
Further readings
Voices from Histroy

“The United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf surpasses the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein. The United States should seek to establish and maintain a strong strategic presence in the region.”
“Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a prolonged one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event — like a new Pearl Harbor.”
Kagan, Robert, and William Kristol, editors. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century. Project for the New American Century, September 2000.
Hillary Clinton Email Archive
On March 16, 2016 WikiLeaks launched a searchable archive for over 30 thousand emails & email attachments sent to and from Hillary Clinton’s private email server while she was Secretary of State. The 50,547 pages of documents span from 30 June 2010 to 12 August 2014. 7,570 of the documents were sent by Hillary Clinton. The emails were made available in the form of thousands of PDFs by the US State Department as a result of a Freedom of Information Act request. More PDFs were made available on February 29, 2016, and a set of additional 995 emails was imported up to February 2, 2018.



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