As a consequence of the recent attack on Venezuela and the kidnapping of its president by unilateral resolution of the White House, academics, artists, and politicians from different countries are calling on the Global South to awaken to the accelerated process of “Palestinianization of the world.”
Venezuela: The cause of the problem will never be the solution
What is happening in Venezuela today is neither an anomaly nor an unexpected deviation from the international order. Nor can it be interpreted as a temporary reaction to a specific government or as an isolated episode of diplomatic tension. It is, once again, the reappearance of a historical logic that Latin America knows with painful precision: that of being treated as a wild frontier, a territory where the rules that govern the “civilized world” are suspended without scandal and violence is exercised as if it were a natural right.
Total economic blockades, confiscation of property, covert military operations, explicit threats of intervention, and kidnappings presented under a new version of the Monroe and National Security doctrines, which more closely resemble the myth of “living space” wielded by the Third Reich a century ago. These are not deviations from the international system: they are part of its historical functioning when it comes to the Global South and Latin America in particular.
What happened on January 3 marks, however, a new threshold. It was not just a reiteration of known practices, but an obscene demonstration of impunity before any law and a confirmation of the current “Palestinization of the world.” The violation of Venezuelan sovereignty, carried out without a declaration of war and publicly presented as a demonstration of power, did not suspend the international order: it declared it dispensable. Where diplomatic euphemisms, legal ambiguities, or humanitarian alibis once operated, there appeared the direct assertion that force alone is sufficient to legitimize itself. What was shown was not an excess, but a pedagogy of domination directed at the entire world. The names of governments change, ideolexics are updated, moral excuses are recycled, but the script remains intact. Latin America reappears as a space available for exemplary punishment, political experimentation, and the pedagogy of fear.
Regional history is too clear to feign surprise. Military invasions, prolonged occupations, coups d’état, proxy wars, economic blockades, sabotage, kidnappings, and systematic media demonization campaigns have accompanied every attempt at political autonomy, social redistribution, or sovereign control of resources for two hundred years. These were never isolated mistakes or correctable excesses, but rather a persistent policy, sustained by a hierarchical conception of the world that reserves full rights for some peoples chosen by Manifest Destiny and permanent exception for others.
Thinking of Latin America as a savage frontier does not imply accepting an imposed identity, but rather denouncing the imperial gaze that constructed it as such. That imperial gaze not only constructs available territories: it also produces human hierarchies. It decides which lives deserve mourning, which acts of violence deserve scandal, and which can be administered as collateral damage. The international order does not limit itself to regulating conflicts: it distributes sensitivity, legitimizes indifference, and organizes silences. That is why aggression does not begin with missiles, but with the normalization of a language that makes the unacceptable acceptable and renders invisible those who are left out of the distribution of rights. It is a view that naturalizes violence towards the global south with the complicity of its local hangers-on, that racializes conflicts and that shamelessly suspends the principles of international law when they hinder strategic interests. What in other territories would be considered a crime, an act of war, or a flagrant violation of sovereignty, here becomes a “measure,” “pressure,” “preventive operation,” or “assistance for stability.” To a certain extent, brutality has become more overt, and the old excuse of “democracy” has lost its usefulness and appeal. What remains is the defense of “freedom,” the freedom of masters and merchants, and the fear and morality of slaves.
In this sense, Venezuela is not an exception but a dress rehearsal. When a power acts in this way and faces no effective sanctions, the message is unequivocal: the exception becomes the rule. What is tolerated today as a singular case is incorporated tomorrow as an operational precedent. International law does not fall suddenly; it is emptied by an accumulation of silences. A scenario where the limits of what can be done without generating a significant reaction from the international community are tested. What is tolerated today as a singular case will be invoked tomorrow as a precedent.
None of this implies ignoring internal conflicts, discussions, profound conceptions of what democracy is or should be, or social debts, an endemic problem in Latin American countries. We cannot deny this, just as we cannot accept that these tensions enable external aggression—in fact, history repeatedly shows that these imperial aggressions and interventions have been the greatest fuel for social conflicts and underdevelopment in these countries. No internal criticism justifies an invasion. No political disagreement legitimizes the collective punishment of a people. Sovereignty is not a reward for virtue or a moral certification granted from outside: it is the minimum threshold for societies to decide their destiny without a gun on the negotiating table.
Faced with this escalation, the response of much of the international community has been silence, ambiguity, diplomatic lukewarmness, and a lack of concrete measures. This is language that does not seek to stop violence, but to manage it. Words that never name the aggressor, that dilute responsibilities and place the harasser and the resistor on the same level. Latin American history teaches us that great tragedies did not begin with bombings, but with words and excuses that made them tolerable. When aggression becomes normalized, violence advances without resistance.
Defending Venezuela’s sovereignty today does not mean defending a government or closing the internal debate. It means rejecting a logic that reinstates war as a legitimate instrument of international order based on the interests of the strongest. It means affirming that Latin America is not anyone’s backyard or front yard; it is not a sacrifice zone or anyone’s wild frontier. And it also means assuming a basic intellectual responsibility: breaking the historical amnesia before it is rewritten, once again, with the blood of others.
Because remaining silent in the face of aggression has never been neutral. When history finally speaks, it is not usually forgiving those who looked the other way. For many, this is unimportant. For us, it is not.
Signed by
Abel Prieto, Cuba Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Argentina Andrés Stagnaro, Uruguay Atilio Borón, Argentina Aviva Chomsky, Estados Unidos Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Portugal Carolina Corcho, Colombia Débora Infante, Argentina Eduardo Larbanois, Uruguay Emilio Cafassi, Argentina Federeico Fasano, Uruguay Felicitas Bonavitta, Argentina Gustavo Petro, Colombia Jeffrey Sachs, Estados Unidos Jill Stein, Estados Unidos Jorge Majfud, Estados Unidos Mario Carrero, Uruguay Óscar Andrade, Uruguay. Pablo Bohorquez, España Pepe Vázquez, Uruguay Ramón Grosfoguel, Estados Unidos Raquel Daruech, Uruguay Stella Calloni, Argentina Víctor Hugo Morales, Argentina Walter Goobar, Argentina
In a 2007 back cover of Página12, we reflected on the ideolexical concept of beingright-wing: «Twenty or thirty years ago in the Southern Cone, it was enough to declare yourself a leftist to go to prison or lose your life in a torture session (…). Being right-wing was not only politically correct but also a necessity for survival. The assessment of this ideolexical concept has changed dramatically. This is demonstrated by a recent trial taking place in Uruguay. Búsqueda has filed a lawsuit against a senator of the republic, José Korzeniak, because it defined him as ‘right-wing…’»
Ideolexics (and, with them, ideological crystallizations) seem to show cycles of 30 years—a generation. But these cycles, beyond a possible social dynamic or psychological nature, such as “the dynamics of the four generations,” are also affected, distorted, and even determined by the gaze of empires (see “The logic of reactionary waves in Latin America”).
Differently, at the epicenter of the Empire, this ideological dynamic has longer cycles (60 years), because they do not depend on external interventions. They depend on the relative power of their ruling class—not on the ruling class of another country. In any case, laws are the expression of the power (plutocracy) or powers (democracy) of a society. In capitalist societies and, even more radically, in the plutocracies of neoliberal and neo-feudal capitalism, power lies in the concentration of money, which is why millionaires buy politicians and their corporations directly write the laws, as in the United States, or decide governments in banana republics.
Since no legal system recognizes the right of one country to write the laws of other sovereign countries, empires and supremacist governments write doctrines, such as the Monroe Doctrine and other treaties, for other peoples to obey as long as it serves the owners of the gun. But these doctrines and this re-ideologization of the colonies have always been dressed up in some sacred excuse, such as God, race, freedom, private property, or democracy. Something that, in the United States, is beginning to dry up, leaving the true reasons for its violence bare and undisguised, such as President Trump’s acknowledgment of invading Venezuela to «make a lot of money with (our) oil«―in his press conference after the kidnapping of President Maduro, he mentioned the word oil 23 times and not once democracy, which is in line with Project 2025 and neo-monarchists like Curtis Yarvin.
American imperialism stems from the Protestant, Calvinist, and privatizing fanaticism of four centuries ago, since the plundering of the “savages who attacked us without provocation” began. Today, its violent behavior of intervention and dispossession is repeated with the same nakedness as in the beginning, as when James Polk ordered an emissary to find a river in Mexico with the same name as the then border, or, if he could not find one, to name another river with the same name in order to provoke a “war of defense” against Mexico and thus take half of its territory. Trump did exactly the same thing by accusing Maduro of drug trafficking and then decreeing that fentanyl was a “weapon of mass destruction,” a decoration used for the invasion of Iraq, the kidnapping of Saddam Hussein, and the appropriation of oil.
Until then, emperors like Bush and Obama kept their tuxedos fairly well ironed. With the Tea Party and then Trump’s first presidency, being fascist, racist, and misogynistic began to be considered a source of pride. That was the beginning of “the rebellion of the masters,” fought, as in medieval battles, by faceless, nameless pawns with nothing to gain or lose except their lives.
In his early years in the White House, Trump still denied being sexist, racist, or imperialist. In his second term, he remained the same as always, but no longer hid it. At a conference in the Oval Office, the mayor-elect of New York was asked if he still thought Trump was a fascist, to which Trump said it was okay: “Tell them yes.”
Mamdani replied yes, to the president’s satisfaction.
A few years ago, we proposed the formula P = d.t, which relates power (P), tolerance (t), and diversity/dissent (d), according to which unchallenged empires have a high tolerance for diversity and dissent when their power (P) is unchallenged, and become intolerant of diversity and dissent when their power begins to decline, a relationship that keeps the equation P-d.t = 0 in equilibrium. Currently, the growing intolerance of dissent, criticism, books and courses on slave and imperial history, or the acceptance of equal rights for different ethnicities, genders, sexes, or social classes is an unmistakable sign of the growing weakness of the American Empire.
Masks and tuxedos are no longer necessary. The CIA launched its operation to kidnap President Maduro to be tried for drug trafficking three weeks after President Trump ordered the release of former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, sentenced to 40 years in prison by a federal jury in the same state for drug trafficking, and 24 hours after meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu, wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Palestine.
In response to the harassment and then bombing of Venezuela (which has already cost the lives of dozens of people and will, over time, lead to more violence), the UN and several presidents have said the same thing: heartfelt statements from foreign ministries that “the US military attack sets a dangerous precedent.”
Haven’t we been setting dangerous precedents for more than 200 years? What is happening that has not happened before? (1) Imperial invasion out of greed for natural resources, only now the excuses are not important; (2) cowardly and submissive local servility; (3) timidity of the region’s leftist leaders; (4) lack of consensus in the face of the most serious violations of international law…
Is this something new? We continue to move toward the “Rebellion of the Masters” through the “Palestinization of the world” like a driver who slowly falls asleep at the wheel. This is just another chapter in a process that will become more radical.
The kidnapping of disobedient leaders is an old imperial practice. Empires have always violated the laws of others, but they were careful to do so within their own fiefdoms (which is why the Guantanamo prison is in Cuba and not in Illinois), but this too has changed. Now, the masked ICE and National Guard agents have extended the Palestinianization of the world within the borders of the United States, accustoming its population to brutality, fear, and the violation of human rights.
The reactionary conflicts of the supremacist and decadent Western empires will continue to add to the old-style interventions: invasions, coups d’état, revolts, and civil wars instigated by secret agencies (CIA-MI6-Mossad). We will continue to see a scenario of growing violence by the United States and Europe-Israel in their backyards—Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.
The goal is to crush the rise of China and the Global South, but this struggle will bleed the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America more than China, until China has no choice but to intervene in a massive war.
For now, Russia cares about Ukraine and China cares about Taiwan. That is why their reactions to the supremacist re-colonization of the Global South are merely symbolic.
En agosto de 2004, el Embajador describió la estrategia de 5 puntos del equipo de país para guiar las actividades de la embajada en Venezuela durante el período 2004-2006 (específicamente, desde el referéndum hasta las elecciones presidenciales de 2006). Los enfoques de la estrategia son: 1) Fortalecer las instituciones democráticas, 2) Penetrar la base política de Chávez, 3) Dividir el chavismo, 4) Proteger empresas estadounidenses vitales y 5) Aislar a Chávez internacionalmente.
(S) A continuación, se presenta una breve descripción de las actividades de USAID/OTI durante el período mencionado en apoyo a la estrategia:
(S) Este objetivo estratégico representa la mayor parte del trabajo de USAID/OTI en Venezuela. La sociedad civil organizada es un pilar cada vez más importante de la democracia, un pilar sobre el que el presidente Chávez aún no ha podido ejercer un control total.
(S) La OTI (*) ha apoyado a más de 300 organizaciones de la sociedad civil venezolana brindándoles asistencia técnica, desarrollo de capacidades, conectándolas entre sí y con movimientos internacionales, y con un apoyo financiero superior a los 15 millones de dólares. De estas, 39 organizaciones dedicadas a la incidencia política se han formado desde la llegada de la OTI; muchas de estas organizaciones son resultado directo de sus programas y financiación.
(S) Derechos Humanos: La OTI apoya el programa «Derecho a Defender los Derechos Humanos» de Freedom House (FH) con 1,1 millones de dólares. Simultáneamente, a través de Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), la OTI también ha otorgado 22 subvenciones a organizaciones de derechos humanos, por un total de 726.000 dólares. FH brinda capacitación y asistencia técnica a 15 organizaciones de derechos humanos, pequeñas y regionales, sobre cómo investigar, documentar y presentar casos en situaciones de impunidad judicial mediante un software especializado y técnicas probadas. A continuación, se presentan algunos logros específicos de este proyecto, que han permitido una mejor comprensión a nivel internacional del deterioro de la situación de los derechos humanos en el país:
Observatorio Penitenciario Venezolano: Desde que comenzó a trabajar con la OTI, el OVP ha llevado un caso con éxito ante el sistema interamericano, logrando una sentencia que exige medidas especiales de protección a la BRV para la cárcel «La Pica». Asimismo, del 7 al 12 de noviembre lanzarán el Observatorio Penitenciario Latinoamericano, consolidando su trabajo con una red regional. El OVP recibe apoyo técnico de FH, así como apoyo económico de la Fundación Panamericana para el Desarrollo (FUPAD). Debido al éxito del OVP en visibilizar el problema, la BRV ha ejercido presión sobre ellos mediante declaraciones públicas, anunciando investigaciones y acusándolos de presuntos delitos, así como amenazas de muerte.
Centro de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Central de Venezuela: Este centro se creó a partir del programa FH y una subvención de DAI. Han logrado visibilizar la Ley de Cooperación Internacional y la situación de los derechos humanos en Venezuela, y han servido como portavoz a nivel nacional e internacional.
Red de Abogados de Derechos Humanos del Estado Bolívar: Este grupo se creó a partir del programa FH y una subvención del programa de pequeñas subvenciones de DAI. Actualmente apoyan a las víctimas de la masacre de 12 mineros en el Estado Bolívar, presuntamente perpetrada por el Ejército venezolano. El propio Chávez se vio obligado a admitir que los militares hicieron un uso excesivo de la fuerza en este caso. Presentarán su caso ante la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en febrero de 2007.
(S) PROCATIA: La OTI se ha asociado con un grupo que la población del gran barrio de Caracas percibe como opositor. Debido a la incompetencia de los líderes electos locales, el problema de la basura en Catia es un asunto complejo para todos los habitantes. Este grupo ha organizado brigadas para recolectar y reciclar basura, presionando al gobierno para que proporcione servicios básicos y reposicionándolo como un aliado respetado del barrio.
(S) Finalmente, mediante el apoyo a una campaña de impacto social positivo en cooperación con PAS, la OTI financió 54 proyectos sociales en todo el país, con más de 1,2 millones de dólares, lo que permitió al Embajador visitar zonas pobres de Venezuela y demostrar la preocupación de Estados Unidos por el pueblo venezolano. Este programa fomenta la confusión en las filas bolivarianas y contrarresta el intento de Chávez de utilizar a Estados Unidos como «enemigo unificador».
Aislar a Chávez
14. (S) An important component of the OTI program is providing information internationally regarding the true revolutionary state of affairs. OTI,s support for human rights organizations has provided ample opportunity to do so. The FH exchanges allowed Venezuelan human rights organizations to visit Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Washington DC to educate their peers regarding the human rights situation. Also, DAI has brought dozens of international leaders to Venezuela, university professors, NGO members, and political leaders to participate in workshops and seminars, who then return to their countries with a better understanding of the Venezuelan reality and as stronger advocates for the Venezuelan opposition. 15. (S) More recently, OTI has taken advantage of the draft law of International Cooperation to send NGO representatives to international NGO conferences where they are able to voice their concerns in terms that global civil society understands. So far, OTI has sent Venezuelan NGO leaders to Turkey, Scotland, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Chile, Uruguay, Washington and Argentina (twice) to talk about the law. Upcoming visits are planned to Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia. CARACAS 00003356 004.2 OF 004 OTI has also brought 4 recognized experts in NGO law from abroad to Venezuela to show solidarity for their Venezuelan counterparts. PADF supported visits by 4 key human rights defenders to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission meetings in Washington in October of 2006. These have led to various successes: Civicus, a world alliance of NGOs, has put the Venezuela issue on their Civil Society Watch short list of countries of concern. Gente de Soluciones, a Venezuelan NGO presented their «Project Society» to the OAS General Assembly. While there, they met with many of the Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers of OAS member states to express concern about the law. Uruguayan parliamentarians met with NGOs at a special session of the Foreign Affairs commission, and have promised to help where they can. The Human Rights Commission of the OAS has made several public statements and sent private letters to the National Assembly expressing concern with the law. The most prestigious law faculty in Buenos Aires, Argentina has committed to hosting an event to deal with the draft law. The Democratic Observatory of MERCOSUR plans to hold an event early next year to discuss the draft law. So far the Venezuelan National Assembly has received many letters and emails of opposition to the law from groups all over the world. A private meeting between 4 Venezuelan human rights defenders and Secretary General Jose Miguel Inzulsa during the October 2006 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (please protect). The press, both local and international, has been made aware of the proposed law and it has received wide play in the US as well as in Latin America 16. (S) OTI has also created a web site which has been sent to thousands of people all over the world with details of the law in an interactive format. ——- Comment ——- 17. (S) Through carrying out positive activities, working in a non-partisan way across the ideological landscape, OTI has been able to achieve levels of success in carrying out the country team strategy in Venezuela. These successes have come with increasing opposition by different sectors of Venezuelan society and the Venezuelan government. Should Chavez win the December 3rd presidential elections, OTI expects the atmosphere for our work in Venezuela to become more complicated.
BROWNFIELD
(*) OTI, Office of Transition Initiatives, una división de USAID
One evening in 1997, I disembarked from a small wooden boat on an island in the Indian Ocean between Quisanga and Pangane, Mozambique. I was accompanied by the renowned author of Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984), now retired from the Open University in England. Joe was a renegade American, author of several books and articles against apartheid in South Africa. I had met him in the most inaccessible province of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, thanks to the globetrotter Nevi Castro and after sharing a few dinners with Ntewane Machel, son of the founding father of Mozambique, Samora Machel (who died in another of those mysterious plane crashes of the 1980s), and Graça Simbine, who months later became Nelson Mandela’s wife.
After a hundred moves, I have lost my notes, but something remained in my second book, Critique of Pure Passion, 1998. I also remember the names, with the freshness of youth: Ibo Island, Matembo, Qurimba…
On different islands we were greeted by the explosive joy of the children.
“Que crianças tão simpáticas,” Joe, who spoke perfect Portuguese, commented to me.
“Sim,” I replied. “Simpáticos e bastante inteligentes. Cumprimentaram-nos com ‘Bem-vindos, estúpidos homens brancos’.” (“Friendly and quite intelligent. They greeted us with ‘Welcome, stupid white men’.”)
In my notes, I tried to reflect on the fact that these expressions did not mean (I did not feel them to be) an insult, as it might mean if we called them “stupid blacks,” as Theodore Roosevelt wrote. In that case, it would be confirmation of racist and colonialist oppression. The conclusion was quite obvious: there was a clear disproportion of power. The children’s insult (which, moreover, was meant as a joke) was a counter-narrative of resistance. The expression “stupid white man” (which, purely by coincidence, was later used by Michael Moore in one of his documentaries, “Stupid White Men,” in 2001) barely qualified as cultural resistance. As individuals, we were very well received. Currently, there is no translator or dictionary from Makua (or Macua, a variation of Bantu) to Spanish, but from what I remember of my workers at the Pemba shipyard, from whom I learned some Macua and Maconde, it sounded like “nkuña nuku.”
Surrounded by marijuana fields (zuruma) that the natives neither consumed nor trafficked, we had long conversations. Joe knew more about Latin American politics than I did, a newly graduated architect and amateur writer who, like any writer, had arrived in Mozambique with my own prejudices. Like almost any Uruguayan, he detested racism, but he was convinced that he had a lot to teach my workers about construction technologies. I left something behind, stories that are irrelevant, but when I left, hiding my tears, I had been humbled: the poorest natives had taught me that there is something about happiness that we Westerners do not know, cannot know, and do not want to know.
Let’s jump across the Atlantic and almost a third of a century. On October 29, 2025, during an event organized by Turning Point USA (a right-wing political organization founded by influencer Charlie Kirk at the age of 18 to “promote the principles of free markets, limited government, and individual liberty”), the Vice President of the United States stated: “When the colonists arrived in the New World, they found widespread child sacrifice.” Abolishing this monstrous practice was “one of the great achievements of Christian civilization.” Vice President J.D. Vance was the same person who said, at another conference, that “teachers are the enemy.”
Not only is the term New World a gross Eurocentric distortion, but the claim about human sacrifices in North America is a confusion of rituals of some Mesoamerican peoples, usually chronicled by conquering soldiers such as Bernal Díaz del Castillo who sought to justify not only the conquest but their own methods based on violence and cruelty. Del Castillo was a semi-illiterate soldier, author of Historia verdadera de la conquista de la Nueva España (The True History of the Conquest of New Spain), published in 1632. The famous letters of Hernán Cortés that precede it are a historical confession of the terrorism applied in the conquest of the “barbarian peoples.” When Father Bartolomé de las Casas appeared with a counter-narrative, he was discredited and diagnosed with mental problems a few centuries later.
This horror rivals the brutality that was practiced in Europe at the time against children and adults. Tortures such as sitting a person accused of heresy naked on a sharp wooden pyramid (Judas Chair) or torturing and executing people in public squares as rituals of political-religious power were not only common, but are much better documented—and at the same time ignored. This political-religious fanaticism left tens of thousands of witches executed as a popular spectacle. But the only horror is always the horror of others.
In contrast, Native Americans used to educate their children without resorting to physical punishment, a method that we Americans inherited from European cultures and which, until not long ago in schools, was summed up as “spare the rod and spoil the child.” Not to mention brutal child labor, which was abolished by law less than a century ago thanks to union and feminist struggles in the United States, which took more than half a century to become law (Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938). Not to mention the sexual abuse of minors, which until recently did not even exist as a legal concept, as the practice remained in the shadows. What’s more, until shortly before the turn of the 20th century, the sexual abuse of minors had to be challenged by resorting to laws prohibiting animal cruelty.
In the cultural production of past centuries, and especially in the 20th century, as was the case with commercial novels and Hollywood films, the conquered were radically dehumanized. Even in decent films such as The Mission (1984), which defend the natives (Guaraní), they are always portrayed as naive, as “noble savages,” as passive supporting actors suffering the conflicts of the conqueror, the white man, and the European empires. The natives are depicted as toothless, while the Europeans have white smiles, when in reality it was exactly the opposite, since it was the civilized Europeans who had an aversion to hygiene, not the savages.
Popular culture has fossilized several myths, such as: “the natives were naive and superstitious”; “the natives blindly followed their chiefs”; “today we have democracy and cell phones thanks to the West.” “If Columbus had never discovered America, we would still be jumping around a campfire, half-naked and with feathers on our heads.”
When the expropriators did not invent fantasies about the evil and inferiority of others, they accused without seeing the beam in their own eyes. For example, one of the Jesuits who described his experiences in North America with greater objectivity wrote: the natives “invent different stories about the creation of the world.” (Joseph de Jouvancy. Relations des Jésuites contenant ce qui s’est passé de plus remarquable dans les missions…, Vol. 33, 1610-1791, p. 286.)
Now, tell me how we stupid white men have evolved—including here squires and sepoys who are white only in name. The answer usually focuses on technological evolution, which has been overwhelmingly based on thousands of years of civilizations, now marginal, of “stupid blacks.”
Das Latin American Memorial, eine Kulturstiftung in São Paulo, die sich der Förderung der Vielfalt und Integration der lateinamerikanischen Völker verschrieben hat, lud mich ein, in einem kurzen Video die Frage „Was bedeutet es, Lateinamerikaner zu sein?“ zu beantworten. Nur wenige Dinge sind so anregend wie Fragen, und nur wenige Fragen sind so schwer zu beantworten wie die einfachsten.
Ich beginne mit der Schlussfolgerung: Wir müssen den Begriff „Identität“ durch den Begriff „Bewusstsein“ ersetzen. Keiner dieser Begriffe hat oder wird jemals eine endgültige epistemologische Auflösung finden, aber sie haben eine ziemlich klare soziale, historische (und vor allem politische) Bedeutung.
Dieses Bewusstsein ist keine metaphysische, abstrakte und universelle Realität, sondern eine spezifische, konkrete und vielfältige. Ich beziehe mich auf das Bewusstsein für die Situation, für Zugehörigkeit und für das Sein, wie zum Beispiel Klassenbewusstsein, Geschlechterbewusstsein, das Bewusstsein, eine Kolonie zu sein, das Bewusstsein, ein Lohnempfänger zu sein, das Bewusstsein, Lateinamerikaner zu sein, das Bewusstsein, sich mit einem Etikett zu identifizieren, das von den Machthabern auferlegt wurde…
Jahrzehntelang war die Suche nach und die Bestätigung der Identität die Wunderlampe, die die Befreiung jeder sozialen Gruppe und jedes Einzelnen im Besonderen ermöglichen sollte. Aber Identität ist, wie Patriotismus, ein kollektives Gefühl und daher ideal für die Manipulation durch jede Macht. Dies gilt umso mehr, wenn es um die Dynamik der Fragmentierung geht. Für ihre Feinde und Förderer ist sie ein Projekt der Ablenkung.
Die herrschenden Mächte manipulieren Emotionen besser als Ideen. Wenn diese Ideen vom Lärm der Leidenschaften befreit sind und sich in ihren eigenen Spiegeln widerspiegeln, nicht in den Spiegeln der Macht, die sie nicht haben, beginnen sie sich einem konkreten Bewusstsein anzunähern.
Der jüngsten Besessenheit von ethnischer Identität (und damit auch von verschiedenen Gruppen, die marginalisiert oder der Macht untergeordnet sind) ging vor mehr als einem Jahrhundert die Besessenheit von nationaler Identität voraus. In Lateinamerika war sie das Produkt der europäischen Romantik. Ihre Intellektuellen schufen lateinamerikanische Nationen auf dem Papier (von Verfassungen über Journalismus bis hin zur Literatur). Da die Vielfalt der Republiken chaotisch und willkürlich erschien, mit Ländern, die aus dem Nichts durch Teilungen und nicht durch Vereinigungen entstanden waren, wurde eine vereinigende Idee benötigt. Religionen und Rassenkonzepte waren nicht stark genug, um zu erklären, warum eine Region von einer anderen unabhängig wurde, also musste die Kultur diese künstlich einheitlichen Wesen schaffen. Selbst später, als das spanische Imperium 1898 seinen langen Niedergang mit dem Verlust seiner letzten tropischen Kolonien an die Vereinigten Staaten beendete, versank das Land (oder vielmehr seine Intellektuellen) in Selbstreflexion. Diskurse und Veröffentlichungen über die Identität der Nation, darüber, was es bedeutete, Spanier zu sein, lenkten von dem Schmerz der offenen Wunde ab. Dies ähnelt dem, was heute in Europa geschieht, jedoch ohne Intellektuelle, die in der Lage sind, etwas Neues zu verarbeiten und zu schaffen.
Abgesehen von der verzweifelten Suche nach oder Bestätigung einer Identität (wie ein Gläubiger, der jede Woche seinen Tempel besucht, um etwas zu bestätigen, das nicht in Gefahr ist, verloren zu gehen), werden Identitäten oft von einer externen Macht auferlegt und gelegentlich von denen beansprucht, die sich ihr widersetzen. Afrika nannte sich selbst nicht Afrika, bis die Römer es so tauften und ein Universum verschiedener Nationen, Kulturen, Sprachen und Philosophien in diese kleine Schublade steckten. Das Gleiche gilt für Asien: Heute werden die Chinesen, Inder und Araber, die durch Ozeane, Wüsten und die höchsten Berge der Welt voneinander getrennt sind, als Asiaten definiert, während die weißen Russen im Osten Europäer und die weniger kaukasischen Russen im Zentrum Asiaten sind, ohne dass sie durch eine große geografische Besonderheit oder gar eine radikal andere Kultur voneinander getrennt sind. Für die Hethiter war Assuwa der Westen der heutigen Türkei, für die Griechen hingegen das vielfältige und unbekannte menschliche Universum östlich von Europa. Dasselbe gilt, wie jeder weiß, für Amerika.
Im Allgemeinen ist Identität ein Spiegelbild des Blicks anderer, und wenn dieser Blick entscheidend ist, dann ist es der Blick der Macht. In jüngerer Zeit sind die Bedeutungen von „Hispanic” und „Latino” in den Vereinigten Staaten (und damit auch im Rest der Welt) Erfindungen Washingtons, nicht nur als eine Möglichkeit, diese vielfältige Andersartigkeit bürokratisch zu klassifizieren, sondern auch als eine reflexartige Reaktion seiner eigenen Gründungskultur: die Klassifizierung menschlicher Hautfarben, die Spaltung im Namen der Einheit, die Sichtbarmachung von Fiktionen, um die Realität zu verbergen. Eine Tradition mit einer klaren politischen Funktionalität, die Jahrhunderte zurückreicht.
Die Identitätspolitik war aus zwei gegensätzlichen Gründen relativ erfolgreich: Sie drückte die Frustrationen derjenigen aus, die sich ausgegrenzt und angegriffen fühlten – und die es tatsächlich waren –, und andererseits war sie eine alte Strategie, die weiße Gouverneure und Sklavenhalter in den Dreizehn Kolonien bewusst praktizierten: die Förderung von Spaltungen und Reibungen zwischen machtlosen sozialen Gruppen durch gegenseitigen Hass.
Obwohl es sich um eine kulturelle Schöpfung handelt, eine Schöpfung kollektiver Fiktion, ist Identität eine Realität, ebenso wie Patriotismus oder fanatische Hingabe an eine Religion oder eine Fußballmannschaft. Eine strategisch überschätzte Realität.
Aus den oben genannten Gründen wäre es besser, wieder über Gewissen zu sprechen, wie wir es vor einigen Jahrzehnten getan haben, bevor die Oberflächlichkeit uns kolonisiert hat. Einwandererbewusstsein, Verfolgungsbewusstsein, stereotypisches Bewusstsein, rassifiziertes Bewusstsein, sexualisiertes Bewusstsein, kolonisiertes Bewusstsein, Klassenbewusstsein, Sklavenbewusstsein, ignorantes Bewusstsein – obwohl Letzteres wie ein Oxymoron erscheint, habe ich als junger Mann bescheidene und weise Menschen getroffen, die dieses Bewusstsein erlangt hatten und mit einer Umsicht handelten und sprachen, die man heute unter denen, die auf dem Höhepunkt der Dunning-Kruger-Kurve leben, nicht mehr findet.
Das Bewusstsein für eine bestimmte Situation ist weder spaltend noch sektiererisch, genauso wenig wie Vielfalt im Widerspruch zur Gleichheit steht, sondern eher das Gegenteil davon ist. Es ist das Gold und das Schießpulver einer Gesellschaft auf ihrem Weg zu jeder Form von Befreiung. Identität hingegen ist viel leichter zu manipulieren. Es ist besser, daran zu arbeiten, das kollektive und individuelle Bewusstsein zu klären und zu schärfen, als einfach eine Identität anzunehmen, wie zum Beispiel ein stammesähnliches, sektiererisches Gefühl, das über jedem kollektiven, menschlichen Bewusstsein steht. Natürlich erfordert das Erreichen von Bewusstsein moralische und intellektuelle Arbeit, die manchmal komplex ist und im Widerspruch zu dem steht, was in der Psychologie als „Intoleranz gegenüber Mehrdeutigkeit” bezeichnet wird – 1957 nannte Leon Festinger dies „kognitive Dissonanz”.
Um hingegen eine Identität anzunehmen, reicht es aus, sich auf Farben, Flaggen, Tätowierungen, Symbole, Eide und Traditionen zu stützen, die für den Konsumenten angepasst, überflüssig oder von jemand anderem erfunden wurden, der letztendlich von all dieser Spaltung und Frustration anderer profitiert.
Identität ist eine symbolische Realität, die strategisch überschätzt wird. Wie Patriotismus, wie ein religiöses oder ideologisches Dogma ist sie, sobald sie erst einmal versteinert ist, viel anfälliger für Manipulationen durch andere. Sie wird dann zu einer Zwangsjacke – konservativ, da sie die Kreativität verhindert oder einschränkt, die aus einem kritischen und freien Gewissen entsteht.
Um diese Manipulation zu erkennen und zu überwinden, bedarf es größerer Anstrengungen. Es erfordert die Kontrolle der primitivsten und destruktivsten Instinkte, wie z. B. des ungezügelten Egos oder des Hasses eines Sklaven auf seine Brüder und der Bewunderung für seine Herren – die fieberhafte Moral der Kolonisierten.
Em 29 de setembro de 2025, o New York Times noticiou a reunião na Casa Branca entre o presidente Trump e o primeiro-ministro israelense Netanyahu. A manchete de capa dizia: “Trump e Netanyahu dizem ao Hamas para aceitar seu plano de paz, ou então…”. O subtítulo esclarecia as reticências: “O presidente Trump afirmou que Israel teria sinal verde para ‘completar a missão’ se o Hamas se recusasse a aceitar o acordo de cessação das hostilidades”.
Cessação das hostilidades… Não é que a história rime — ela se repete. Desde o século XV, todos os acordos assinados pelos impérios europeus foram sistematicamente ignorados quando deixavam de lhes servir ou quando conseguiam avançar suas linhas de fogo. Destruição e pilhagem temperadas com alguma boa causa: civilização, liberdade, democracia e o direito do invasor de se defender. Durante séculos, essa foi a história recorrente da diplomacia entre povos indígenas e colonos brancos — não muito diferente do caso mais recente do “Acordo de Paz” proposto e imposto sob ameaça por Washington e Tel Aviv à Palestina. Foi a mesma história de violação de todos os tratados de paz com as nações nativas de ambos os lados dos Apalaches, antes e depois de 1776.
Naquela época, o que os historiadores chamam de “Compra da Louisiana” (1803) não foi uma compra, mas uma desapropriação brutal das nações indígenas, proprietárias ancestrais daquele território — tão vasto quanto toda a nascente nação anglo-americana. Nenhum povo indígena foi convidado à mesa de negociações em Paris, um lugar distante dos despossuídos. Quando algum desses acordos incluía um “representante” dos povos atacados, como no caso da desapropriação dos Cherokee em 1835, tratava-se de um falso representante — um Guaidó inventado pelos colonos brancos. O mesmo aconteceu com a transferência das últimas colônias espanholas (Cuba, Porto Rico, Filipinas, Guam) para os Estados Unidos. Enquanto centenas de Sioux tingiam a neve de Dakota de vermelho, exigindo o pagamento do tratado que os obrigava a vender suas terras, um novo acordo de paz para os povos tropicais era assinado em Paris. Nenhum representante dos despossuídos foi convidado a negociar o acordo que tornaria possível sua “libertação”.
Para Theodore Roosevelt, “a guerra mais justa de todas é a guerra contra os selvagens (…) os únicos índios bons são os índios mortos”. Mais ao sul, escreveu e publicou: “os negros são uma raça estúpida”. Segundo Roosevelt, a democracia havia sido inventada em benefício da raça branca, a única capaz de civilização e beleza.
Durante esses anos, o grupo étnico anglo-saxão precisava de uma justificativa para sua brutalidade e seu hábito de roubar, lavando seus crimes com acordos de paz impostos pela força. Como o paradigma epistemológico da ciência havia substituído a religião na segunda metade do século XIX, essa justificativa passou a ser a superioridade racial.
A Europa havia subjugado a maior parte do mundo por meio de seu fanatismo e vício em pólvora. As teorias sobre a superioridade do homem branco andavam de mãos dadas com sua vitimização: negros, pardos, vermelhos e amarelos se aproveitavam de sua generosidade enquanto ameaçavam a minoria da raça superior com a substituição pelas raças inferiores. Isso soa relevante hoje?
Como essas teorias biológicas não eram suficientemente fundamentadas, voltaram-se para a história. No final do século XIX, teorias linguísticas e, posteriormente, antropológicas sobre a origem pura da raça nobre (ariana, iraniana) — a raça branca —, originária dos Vedas hindus, proliferaram na Europa. Essas histórias rebuscadas, juntamente com símbolos hindus como a suástica nazista e o que hoje se conhece como Estrela de Davi (usada por diferentes culturas séculos antes, mas também originária da Índia), tornaram-se populares como símbolos raciais impressos.
Não por coincidência, foi nessa época que as teorias supremacistas e o sionismo foram fundados e articulados em seus conceitos históricos — no norte da Europa, branca, racista e imperialista. O próprio fundador do sionismo, Theodor Herzl, acreditava que os judeus pertenciam à “raça ariana” superior.
Até a Segunda Guerra Mundial, esses supremacistas coexistiram com certos atritos, mas não o suficiente para impedi-los de firmar acordos — como o Acordo de Haavara, entre nazistas e sionistas, que durante anos transferiu dezenas de milhares de judeus brancos (de “bom material genético”) para a Palestina. Os primeiros antissionistas não foram os palestinos que os acolheram, mas os judeus europeus que resistiram ao acordo de limpeza étnica. Ao mesmo tempo em que os palestinos eram colonizados e despojados de suas terras, o judaísmo era colonizado e despojado de suas tradições.
Quando os soviéticos exterminaram os nazistas de Hitler, ser supremacista tornou-se uma vergonha. De repente, Winston Churchill e os milionários americanos pararam de se gabar de serem nazistas. Antes disso, a Declaração Balfour-Rothschild de 1917 havia sido um acordo entre brancos para dividir e ocupar um território de “raças inferiores”. Como disse o racista e genocida Churchill, então ministro da Guerra: “Sou totalmente a favor do uso de gás venenoso contra tribos incivilizadas.”
Mas a irracionalidade brutal da Segunda Guerra Mundial também liquidou a Era Moderna, baseada nos paradigmas da razão e do progresso. A ciência e o pensamento crítico deram lugar à irracionalidade do consumismo e da religião.
É assim que os sionistas de hoje não insistem mais na ONU e na Casa Branca em sua superioridade racial como arianos, mas sim nos direitos especiais de serem os semitas escolhidos por Deus. Netanyahu e seus escudeiros evangélicos citam a sacralidade bíblica de Israel mil vezes, como se ele e o rei Davi fossem a mesma pessoa — e como se os semitas de pele escura de três mil anos atrás fossem os mesmos cazares do Cáucaso que adotaram o judaísmo na Europa medieval.
O acordo de Washington entre Trump e Netanyahu, para ser aceito pelos palestinos, é ilegítimo desde o início. Não importa quantas vezes a palavra “paz” seja repetida — assim como não importa quantas vezes se diga “amor” enquanto uma mulher é estuprada. Será para sempre um estupro, assim como a ocupação israelense e o apartheid da Palestina.
Na terça-feira, 30 de setembro, o secretário de Guerra dos EUA, Pete Hegseth, reuniu seus generais e citou George Washington: “Aquele que anseia pela paz deve se preparar para a guerra”, não porque Washington “quisesse a guerra, mas porque amava a paz”. O presidente Trump concluiu: seria um insulto aos Estados Unidos se ele não recebesse o Prêmio Nobel da Paz.
Em 1933, em seu discurso no Reichstag, o candidato ao Prêmio Nobel da Paz Adolf Hitler declarou que a Alemanha ansiava apenas pela paz. Três anos depois, após militarizar a Renânia, insistiu que a Alemanha era uma nação pacifista em busca de sua segurança.
Mesmo que o novo acordo entre Washington e Tel Aviv seja aceito pelo Hamas (uma das criaturas de Netanyahu), mais cedo ou mais tarde será violado por Tel Aviv. Porque, para a raça superior — para os povos eleitos —, não há acordos com seres inferiores, apenas estratégias de pilhagem e aniquilação. Estratégias de demonização do escravo, do colonizado e de vitimização do pobre homem branco — aquele viciado em pólvora, agora em pólvora branca.
«Race mixing is communism» (1958). Cohabitation multiethnique c’est propagande déculturée et sans projet (2004).
2000 ans d’Historie qui nous ont civilisés
Hace un tiempo, en un ensayo anterior, critiqué la valoración ética del patriotismo. Un lector francés que leyó una traducción de este artículo hecha por el escritor Pierre Trottier —La maladie morale du patriotismo[1]— Escribió un largo alegato a favor de las fronteras nacionales. Su fundamentación giró en torno a la siguiente idea: Los países tienen distintas culturas, cada uno concibe diferente la «libertad» y, por lo tanto, no es posible considerar el mundo como una «tabla rasa», ignorando las diferencias culturales. De las diferencias culturales se concluye en la necesidad de las fronteras y, más aun, de los valores «patrióticos».
[…] c’est à que servent les frontières: à defender des espaces de liberté dont la valeur diffère d’un côté et de l’autre. L’abolition des frontières viendra quand l’humanité se sera dissoute dans le même moule culturel universel, unique, et total (Oulala/Le Monde, 29 de agosto de 2004).
Sin negarle el derecho voltaireano, entiendo que este lector no comprendió que mi crítica al «patriotismo» —tal como es entendido hoy y creo ha sido bandera nacionalista en toda la Era Moderna— no ignoraba las diferencias culturales sino, precisamente, las tenía en cuenta. Cosa que no hace el autor de estas palabras en su respuesta, cuando dice que no todas las libertades valen igual, lo cual es bien sabido en los países con conflictos étnicos y culturales, menos por «nous, pauvres français idéalistes décérébrés par la propagande de la cohabitation multiethnique et culturallment diverse, festive et altermondiste, métisse et deculturée, déracinée et sans projet».
En otro lugar hemos analizado cómo la retórica ideológica procura identificar unos símbolos con otros, unas ideas con otras sin una relación causal o necesaria entre ellas, de forma que se logra una valoración negativa del adversario identificándolo con un concepto negativo. Es el ejemplo de las pancartas que en los años cincuenta, en el sur de Estados Unidos, podían leerse en contra de la integración racial: «Race mixing is communism» (es decir, literalmente, «integración racial es comunismo»).
Aquí estamos ante al mismo método, el cual se podría resumir de esta forma, aunque esta vez en francés: «cohabitation multiethnique» es (1) «propagande», (2) «déculturé», (3) «et sans project».
Por si la asociación arbitraria con el objetivo de identificar al adversario —o, en el mejor caso, a la idea adversaria—, no hubiese sido suficiente, el método ideológico cierra su retórica con una frase que, sin nombrarlo, alude a una expresión acuñada por el nazi Hermann Wilhelm Goering hace sesenta años: «Peut-être avez-vouz envie de sortir votre revolver quand vous entendez le mot ‘Culture’?» (En español, la intolerante frase traducida del alemán sería: «cuando oigo la palabra ‘cultura’ saco el revólver»)
No obstante, luego de haber atacado el mismo concepto de diversidad cultural, al final mi lector francés pretende identificarse a sí mismo con los defensores de la ‘Culture’, en general, cuando en su caso omitió, deliberadamente, escribir el adjetivo «française» al lado del sustantivo en singular. (El criminal Goering sólo podía concebir «Cultura», con mayúscula y en singular; mientras que nosotros preferimos el plural «culturas»; la diferencia no es simplemente gramatical, sino de vida o muerte, tal como lo demuestra la historia.) De acuerdo con el conjunto de su artículo, lo único que ha demostrado defender, antes que nada, es su propia cultura, en el entendido que los demás harán lo mismo porque el mundo es «un combat que je suis prêt à embrasser face à la menace du totalitarisme intellectuel, celui qui joue au révisionnisme des 2000 ans d’Historie qui nous ont civilisés».
Mi tribu es el centro del mundo
No me voy a detener recordando estos arbitrarios y simplificados «dos mil años de historia» europea, cruzados por una multitud de culturas «impuras» —de Oriente y de Occidente, del Norte y del Sur—, de intolerancia religiosa, de totalitarismo francés —dentro y fuera de fronteras— y de libertad y derechos humanos, también franceses.
Ahora demos un paso más allá. Observemos que la «otredad» no tendría mucho sentido si el «otro» fuera un reflejo especular de nosotros mismos. El desafío y la virtud de nuestro mundo consiste, entonces, no en enfrentarnos con otras culturas y otras sensibilidades éticas sino en aprender a dialogar con las mismas. Ninguna de ellas podría fundamentar un derecho superior o natural sobre la otra, tal como lo sostienen explícitamente algunos intelectuales del centro, como Oriana Fallaci. Sólo la fuerza es capaz de establecer esta diferencia jerárquica, pero recordemos que en un mundo que se ha cerrado en su geografía, la fuerza puede lograr victorias económicas y militares, pero no la justicia necesaria para la paz y el progreso sostenido de la humanidad. Para no hablar sólo de justicia como fin en sí misma.
Por supuesto que en esta diversidad cultural —a la cual no estamos tan acostumbrados como presumimos; aún nos pesa la sensibilidad moderna de «mi tribu como centro del mundo»— es posible siempre y cuando unos y otros sen capaces de compartir ciertos presupuestos morales. Para entenderme con un chino, con un norteamericano o con un mozambiqueño no necesito exigirle que se vista como yo, que acepte mi preferencia de Sartre sobre Hegel, o de Buda sobre John Lennon o que modifique su política impositiva. Incluso no debería ser necesario, para reconocer al «otro», que el otro comparta mis tendencias sexuales, mi heterosexualidad, por ejemplo. Sí es rigurosamente necesario que ambos, el otro y yo, compartamos algunos axiomas morales como alguno de aquellos que se encuentran resumidos en la Segunda tabla del Decálogo de Moisés: «no matarás; no robarás; no calumniarás…»
Pero observemos que estos preceptos —que también son prejuicios que podemos llamar positivos o fundamentales, ya que no necesitan ser confirmados por un análisis o pensamiento— no son propios únicamente de la tradición judeo-cristiano-musulmana. Muchas otras religiones, en muchas otras civilizaciones que se desconocían mucho antes de Moisés, ya observaban estos mismos mandamientos. Si bien el psicoanálisis nos advierte que «se prohíbe aquello que se desea»[2] también es cierto que podemos reconocer una «cultura común» que ha ido consolidado normas interiorizadas que se reflejan en una determinada conducta individual y social que nos pone a salvo de la incomunicación y la destrucción. Además, que la tendencia a la conservación de la vida es mayor que la tendencia humana a la destrucción y al genocidio se demuestra con la misma existencia de la raza humana. Sería inimaginable concebir una ciudad de diez millones de habitantes, por «monstruosa que parezca» controlada por el miedo y una fuerza represiva infinita. Es decir, sería inimaginable concebir apenas una avenida en Nueva Delhi, en Estambul, en París o en Nueva York sin una «conciencia ética» fuerte y compleja que facilitara la vida y la convivencia, mejor que cualquier sistema de tránsito facilita el flujo vertiginoso de los vehículos por una red compleja de autopistas.
Las culturas no necesitan fronteras
Ahora, si estos argumentos no fueran suficientes para contestar a las observaciones de mi lector francés, procuraría expresarme con un ejemplo tomado, precisamente, de una gran ciudad cualquiera. Pongamos una que suele ser paradigmática por su cosmopolitismo: mi admirada Nueva York. Para este análisis, dejemos de lado por el momento consideraciones geopolíticas —de las cuales ya nos hemos ocupado varias veces y nos seguiremos ocupando en otros ensayos—. Observemos sin prejuicios ideológicos esta región del mundo, como un laboratorio, como un experimento posible de ser extendido a una posible sociedad global sin fronteras nacionales. No hablo aquí de exportar una ideología —¡sálveme Dios!— sino de advertir una situación humana posible, que no se diferencia mucho de otros ejemplos como la Bagdad de las Mil y una noches o la Alejandría egipcia que albergó la biblioteca más grande del mundo antiguo, además de africanos, romanos, griegos, semitas, judíos y comerciantes de todo el mundo —hasta que las masacres de algunos césares, que nunca faltan, terminaron con la población y con su ejemplo.
En Nueva York podremos reconocer una gran variedad de culturas conviviendo en un área relativamente pequeña, donde se hablan más de una docena de idiomas, donde hay más restaurantes italianos que en Venecia o más restaurantes chinos que en Xi’an, sin contar sinagogas, mezquitas, e iglesias de todo tipo. En un artículo anterior anoté que muchas veces esta convivencia no resulta en un conocimiento del «otro», pero creo que sigue siendo un valioso progreso el hecho de que sean capaces de convivir sin agredirse por sus diferencias.
Ahora ¿qué rescato de esta metáfora llamada Nueva York? Muchas cosas. Pero para estas reflexiones, entiendo que resulta un ejemplo en que una gran diversidad cultural —política, económica, ética, religiosa, filosófica o artística— es totalmente posible en un área tan pequeña como Manhattan. Y, no obstante, ni el barrio chino, ni el italiano ni el irlandés necesitan de ningún sentimiento patriótico para sobrevivir como comunidad barrial ni para salvaguardar la existencia pacífica de la ciudad entera. Lo único que necesitan es compartir unos pocos principios morales, muy básicos, como aquellos que anotamos más arriba. Principios que, por supuesto, no compartían quienes estrellaron los aviones en el World Trade Center en el 2001[3] ni aquellos higiénicos jefes y soldados que violaron prisioneros en Irak o suprimieron aldeas en Viet Nam «porque molestaban demasiado». Pero observemos que una confusión también criminal se produce cuando el mundo musulmán es identificado con este tipo de mentalidad intolerante, «terrorista». De esa forma, identificamos al enemigo en el otro, en la otra cultura y, por lo tanto, justificamos nuestro pulcro, higiénico y estúpidamente orgulloso patriotismo, echando de esa forma más basura sobre la humanidad.
Por supuesto que el mundo no es Nueva York, y muchos lo festejarán. No obstante, con este ejemplo no me refiero a ciertos «valores nacionalistas» que deberían ser extendidos por el mundo sino todo lo contrario: la superación de estos valores arbitrariamente sectarios, tribales que amenazan a la «otredad» y, con ello, a la raza humana.
El ensayo en cuestión —La enfermedad moral del patriotismo— ha sido reproducido en muchos medios y ha sido recibido de muchas formas. Con elogios y con insultos, con comprensión y con «rabia y orgullo». Mientras tanto, procuro repetir sobre el teclado lo que fue capaz de hacer el francés Philippe Petit, aquel francés que, con cierto aire delicado, caminando sobre el vacío, de una torre a la otra nos dejó una lección para la posteridad: el equilibrio y el miedo, la serenidad y el vértigo desesperado, todo, está en la mente humana. De ella depende dejarnos caer en el imponente vacío o sonreírle a los pájaros.
Jorge Majfud
The University of Georgia, agosto de 2004
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[1] Centre des medias alternatifs du Québec, julio 2004
[2] Sigmund Freud, Tótem y Tabú, La interpretación de los sueños; C. G. Jung, Man and His Symbols, etc.
[3] Precisamente allí donde en los ’70 el francés Philippe Petit realizó, a mi entender, una de las más perfectas metáforas del espíritu humano: cruzar de una torre a la otra, caminando por una cuerda, recostándose sobre la misma, sobre el absorbente vacío, para mirar el cielo y los pájaros con una sonrisa en los labios.
« Race mixing is communism » (1958). Cohabitation multiethnique
c’est propagande déculturée et sans projet (2004).
2000 ans d’Histoire qui nous ont civilisés.
Il y a quelque temps, dans un essai antérieur, je critiquai l’évaluation éthique du patriotisme. Un lecteur français qui lut une traduction de cet article faite par l’écrivain Pierre Trottier – La maladie morale du patriotisme[1] – écrivit un long plaidoyer en faveur des frontières nationales. Ses fondements tournaient autour de l’idée suivante : les pays possèdent différentes cultures, chacune d’entre-elles conçoit la « liberté » et, pour le moment, il n’est pas possible de considérer le monde comme une « table rase », ignorant les différences culturelles. Des différences culturelles, on conclue dans la nécessité des frontières et, plus encore, des valeurs « patriotiques ».
[ …] c’est à ce que servent les frontières : à défendre des espaces
de liberté dont la valeur diffère d’un côté et de l’autre. L’abolition
des frontières viendra quand l’humanité se sera dissoute dans le
même moule culturel universel, unique, et total ( Oulala/ Le
Monde, 29 août 2004 ).
Sans nier le droit voltairien, je comprends que ce lecteur n’a pas compris que ma critique du « patriotisme » – tel qu’on l’entend aujourd’hui, et dont je crois qu’il a été la bannière nationaliste dans toute l’Ère Moderne – n’ignorait pas les différences culturelles mais, précisément, les prenait en compte. Chose que ne fait pas l’auteur de ces paroles dans sa réponse, lorsqu’il dit que ce ne sont pas toutes les libertés qui sont égales, ce qui est bien connu dans les pays vivant des conflits ethniques et culturels, moins pour « nous, pauvres français idéalistes décérébrés par la propagande de la cohabitation multiethnique et culturellement diverse, festive et altermondiste, métissée et déculturée, déracinée et sans projet ».
En une autre occasion, nous avons analysé comment la rhétorique parvient à identifier des symboles avec d’autres, des idées avec d’autres, sans une relation causale ou nécessaire entre elles, de façon qu’on obtient une évaluation négative de l’adversaire, l’identifiant par un concept négatif. C’est l’exemple des pancartes sur lesquelles, dans les années cinquante dans le sud des États-Unis, on pouvait lire le refus de l’intégration racial : « Race mixing is communism » ( c’est-à-dire, littéralement « l’intégration raciale est du communisme » ). Dans le contexte où se produisaient ces manifestations, « communisme » avait une connotation avec le mal et, à ce moment, on établissait un lien entre les significations consolidées d’une idée – le communisme – et les significations instables d’une autre idée en discussion – l’intégration raciale -. Cependant, dans un autre contexte ou pour d’autres personnes, ce qui devait représenter une offense « l’intégration raciale et le communisme » avait une évaluation opposée : pour un marxiste, le communisme était inconcevable sans une intégration raciale, pour lequel l’accusation pouvait – devait – se comprendre comme la révélation d’une vertu de son idéologie. La même simplification porta, du temps de la Guerre Froide, à ce que quelconque soldat puisse justifier une mort ou un massacre d’un dissident avec la fabrication d’un texte marxiste, quoique aucun d’eux n’eut lu un seul paragraphe de Marx ou connu l’un de ses proches. C’est donc dire que la pire politique se prévalait de ses méthodes simplificatrices afin de commettre et justifier les pires crimes contre l’humanité.
Ici nous sommes devant la même méthode, laquelle se pourrait résumer de cette façon, quoique cette fois en français : « cohabitation multiethnique » est (1) propagande, (2) déculturée, (3) et sans projet.
Par cela, l’association arbitraire avec l’objectif d’identifier l’adversaire – ou, dans le meilleur des cas, l’idée adversaire -, n’eut pas été suffisante, la méthode idéologique boucle sa rhétorique par une phrase qui, sans la nommer, fait allusion à une expression rendue célèbre par le nazi Hermann Wilhelm Goering il y a soixante ans : « Peut-être avez-vous envie de sortir votre révolver quand vous entendez le mot ‘’ Culture ‘’ ? » ( En espagnol, la phrase intolérante traduite de l’allemand serait : « cuando oigo la palabra ‘’ Cultura ‘’ saco el revolver » ).
Cependant, à la suite d’avoir attaqué le même concept de diversité culturelle, en finissant mon lecteur français prétend s’identifier lui-même avec les défenseurs de la ‘’ Culture ‘’, en général, lorsque dans son cas il omit délibérément d’écrire l’adjectif « française » à côté du substantif au singulier ( le criminel Goering pouvait concevoir seulement la « Culture » avec une majuscule et au singulier; pendant que nous, nous préférons le pluriel « cultures »; la différence n’est pas simplement grammaticale, mais de vie ou de mort, telle que le démontre l’histoire). En accord avec l’ensemble de son article, ce qu’il nous semble défendre uniquement, avant tout, est sa propre culture, sous-entendant que les autres feront la même chose parce que le monde est « un combat que je suis prêt à embrasser face à la menace du totalitarisme intellectuel, celui qui joue au révisionnisme des 2000 ans d’Histoire qui nous ont civilisés ».
Ma tribu est le centre du monde
Je ne vais pas m’arrêter à rappeler ces arbitraires et simplifiés « deux mille ans d’histoire » européenne, traversées par une multitude de cultures « impures » -d’Orient et d’Occident, du Nord et du Sud, – d’intolérance religieuse, de totalitarisme français – à l’intérieur comme hors des frontières – et de liberté et de droits humains, aussi français.
Mais, faisons un pas de plus. Nous observons que « l’autreté » n’aurait pas beaucoup de sens si « l’autre » n’était un reflet spéculaire de nous-mêmes. Le défi et la vertu de notre monde consiste alors, non à nous affronter à d’autres cultures et d’autres sensibilités éthiques, mais d’apprendre à dialoguer avec ces mêmes. Aucune d’entre-elles pourrait fonder un droit supérieur ou naturel sur l’autre, tel que le soutiennent quelques intellectuels du centre, comme Oriana Fallaci. Seule la force est capable d’établir cette différence hiérarchique, mais rappelons que dans un monde qui s’est formé par sa géographie, la force peut obtenir des victoires économiques et militaires, mais non pas la justice nécessaire afin d’obtenir la paix et le progrès soutenu pour l’humanité. Pour ne pas parler seulement de justice comme fin en soi.
Bien sûr que cette diversité culturelle – à laquelle nous ne sommes pas aussi accoutumés que nous le présumons, encore que la sensibilité moderne de « ma tribu comme centre du monde » nous pèse – est toujours possible lorsque les uns et les autres sont capables de partager certains présupposés moraux. Pour m’entendre avec un chinois, avec un nord-américain ou avec un mozambiquien, je n’ai pas besoin de lui exiger que sa vision soit comme la mienne, qu’il accepte ma préférence de Sartre sur Hegel, ou de Bouddha sur John Lennon, ou qu’il modifie sa politique d’imposition fiscale. Même, il ne devrait pas être nécessaire, afin de reconnaître « l’autre », que l’autre partage mes tendances sexuelles, mon hétérosexualité, par exemple. Il est nécessaire que tous deux, l’autre et moi, partagions quelques axiomes moraux comme certains de ceux que l’on trouve résumés dans la Seconde table du Décalogue de Moïse : « tu ne tueras point; tu ne voleras point; tu ne calomnieras point…».
Mais, remarquons que ces préceptes – qui aussi sont préjugés que nous pouvons les appeler positifs ou fondamentaux, qui n’ont même pas besoin d’être confirmés par une analyse ou une réflexion – ne sont pas uniquement le propre de la tradition judéo-christiano-musulmane. Beaucoup d’autres religions, dans beaucoup d’autres civilisations qui ne se connaissaient pas, bien avant Moïse, déjà observaient ces commandements. Si bien que le psychanaliste nous avertit « qu’on interdit celui qui se désire »[2] de telle sorte qu’il est certain que nous pouvons reconnaître une « culture commune » qui a été consolidée par des normes intériorisées qui se reflètent dans une conduite individuelle et sociale déterminée, et qui nous préserve de l’incommunication et de la destruction. De plus, que la tendance à la conservation de la vie est plus grande que la destruction et le génocide, se démontre par l’existence même de la race humaine. Il serait inimaginable de concevoir une ville de dix millions d’habitants, aussi monstrueuse qu’elle paraisse, contrôlée par la peur et une force répressive infinie. C’est dire, il serait inimaginable de concevoir une personne à New Delhi, à Istanbul, à Paris ou à New York sans une « conscience éthique » forte et complexe, qui faciliterait la vie et la cohabitation, plus grande que quelconque système de circulation facilitant le flux vertigineux des véhicules sur un réseau complexe d’autoroutes.
Les cultures ne nécessitent pas de frontières
Maintenant, si ces arguments n’ont pas été suffisants pour répondre aux observations de mon lecteur français, j’essayerai de m’exprimer par un exemple pris, précisément, dans une grande ville quelconque. Prenons-en une qui a l’habitude d’être paradigmatique par son cosmopolitisme : mon admirée New York. Pour cette analyse, laissons de côté, pour le moment, les considérations géopolitiques – desquelles déjà nous nous sommes occupées souvent et dont nous continuerons à nous occuper dans d’autres essais -. Observons sans préjugés idéologiques cette région du monde comme un laboratoire, comme une expérience susceptible d’être étendue à une éventuelle société globale, sans frontières nationales. Je ne parle pas ici d’exporter une idéologie – Dieu m’en préserve! – mais de faire remarquer une situation humaine possible, qui ne se différencie pas beaucoup de d’autres exemples, telle la Bagdad des Mille et une nuits ou de l’Alexandrie égyptienne qui abrita la bibliothèque la plus grande du monde antique, en plus des africains, des romains, des grecs, des sémites, des juifs et des commerçants de tout le monde – jusqu’à ce que les massacres des quelques césars, qui jamais ne manquent, en terminent avec la population et avec leur exemple.
Dans New York, nous pourrons reconnaître une grande variété de cultures vivant en commun dans une aire relativement petite, où l’on parle plus d’une douzaine de langues, où il y a plus de restaurants italiens qu’à Venise ou plus de restaurants chinois qu’à Xi’an, sans compter les synagogues, les mosquées et les églises de tout type. Dans un article antérieur, je notai que souvent cette cohabitation ne résultait pas en une connaissance de « l’autre », mais je crois que cela continue d’être un progrès précieux du fait qu’ils soient capables de convivre sans s’agresser pour leurs différences.
Maintenant, que tirer de cette métaphore de New York? Plusieurs choses. Mais, pour ces réflexions, j’entends que cet exemple de grande diversité culturelle -politique, économique, éthique philosophique ou artistique – est totalement possible dans un espace aussi petit que Manhattan. Et cependant, ni le quartier chinois, ni l’italien, ni l’irlandais n’ont besoin d’aucun sentiment patriotique afin de survivre comme communauté de quartier, ni afin de sauvegarder l’existence pacifique de la cité entière. Ce qu’ils ont besoin est de partager quelques rares principes moraux, très basaux, comme ceux que nous avons évoqués plus haut. Principes, bien sûr, que ne partageaient pas ceux qui lancèrent leurs avions sur les Tours Jumelles en 2001[3], ni ces hygiéniques chefs et soldats qui violèrent les prisonniers en Irak ou supprimèrent des villages au Vietnam « parce qu’ils dérangeaient trop ». Mais nous observons qu’une grande confusion aussi criminelle se produit lorsque le monde musulman est identifié à ce type de mentalité intolérante, « terroriste ». De cette façon, nous identifions l’ennemi dans l’autre, dans l’autre culture et, à ce moment, nous justifions notre propre, hygiénique et stupide orgueil patriotique, déversant de cette façon plus d’ordures sur l’humanité.
Bien sûr que le monde n’est pas New York, et beaucoup s’en réjouissent. Cependant, par cet exemple, je ne me réfère pas à certaines « valeurs nationalistes » qui devraient être étendues de par le monde mais, au contraire : au dépassement de ces valeurs arbitrairement sectaires, tribales, qui menacent « l’autreté » et, avec cela, la race humaine.
L’essai en question – La maladie morale du patriotisme – a été reproduit dans plusieurs médias et a été reçu de plusieurs façons. Avec des éloges et des insultes, avec compréhension et avec « rage et orgueil ». Entre-temps, je vais tâcher de reproduire sur le clavier ce que fut capable de faire le français Philippe Petit, ce français qui, avec un certain air délicat, cheminant sur le vide, d’une tour à l’autre, nous laissa une leçon pour le postérité : l’équilibre et la peur, la sérénité et le vertige désespéré, tout, est dans l’esprit humain. De cela dépend de nous laisser tomber dans l’imposant vide ou de sourire aux oiseaux.
[1] Centre des Médias Alternatifs du Québec, juillet 2004
[2] Sigmund Freud, Totem et Tabou, L’interprétation des rêves; C.G. Jung, L’Homme et ses symboles, etc.
[3] Précisément là où, dans les années 70, le français Philippe Petit réalisa, selon moi, une des plus parfaite métaphore de l’esprit humain : traverser d’une tour à l’autre, cheminant par une corde, se renversant sur le dos, sur l’absorbant vide, regarder le ciel et les oiseaux avec un sourire sur les lèvres.
Desde principios de este siglo venimos denunciando, en conferencias y en la letra impresa, que la forma más razonable de reducir el exitoso negocio de las drogas en un sistema capitalista es atendiendo a la ley de la oferta y la demanda. No existen mafias intentando vender algo ilegal que nadie quiere comprar. Desde Nixon, todos esos billones de dólares que Washington invirtió en una guerra que sólo ha multiplicado los muertos al sur de la frontera, nunca solucionó el problema. La ley de la oferta y la demanda es clara y simple: si se reduce el consumo (en Estados Unidos) los carteles se desfinanciarían. ¿Cómo? Invirtiendo en salud pública, en educación, en cultura (no en cultura consumista), en casas para los sintecho, recuperando programas sociales destrozados por el neoliberalismo de los 90s. La reducción del narcotráfico sería radical y sin disparar un solo tiro.
¿Por qué no se procede de esta forma racional? Tal vez no se quiere eliminar el narco. Nunca se quiso.
El mercado de las drogas ilegales en Estados Unidos produce un beneficio de hasta 600 mil millones de dólares por año, toda la economía de Chile y de Irán sumadas. Si se intentase enviar todo ese dinero a los carteles de las drogas de América Latina, se necesitarían cada año 5.000 camiones blindados y 60.000 lanchas como la que ordenaste hundir en el Caribe, asesinado a once personas.
¿Por qué, con la policía más poderosa, con la tecnología más avanzada, con el ejército más caro de la historia de la Humanidad no son capaces de interceptar ninguno de estos camiones, ninguna de estas lanchas? Eso sin contar el brutal tráfico de armas ilegales que cada día cruza la frontera sur hacia México.
¿No será que el dinero del narco de Estados Unidos no regresa en efectivo, sino que se lava en el sistema bancario?
¿Por qué las agencias secretas más poderosas del mundo, esas que saben qué marca de vino preferiremos los críticos de aquí y del otro lado del mundo, no pueden averiguar en qué bancos se lavan 500 o 600 mil millones de dólares?
La CIA y otras agencias siempre estuvieron implicadas en al narco. Las mismas que (según la historia oficial) fueron burladas por un puñado de estudiantes extranjeros el 11 de setiembre de 2001. Las mismas que, al decir de George Bush, se equivocaron con Sadam Hussein. O son idiotas o se hacen, para cobrarla bien.
Como sea, detectar alguno de estos camiones, alguna de estas lanchas llenas de dólares, alguno de los bancos que lavan capitales del narco, no puede ser Misión Imposible. ¿O sí? ¿Para qué las agencias secretas succionan tantos millones de dólares de los impuestos (70 mil millones en 2025) si se dedican a chusmear en la vida privada de los disidentes y a organizar complots en otros países, y ni siquiera pueden acertar una cuando se los necesitan de verdad?
¿Incompetencia o conveniencia?
Marco, ¿por qué tienes tan claro cómo llega la droga a Estados Unidos, pero ni puta idea de cómo salen los dólares para pagarla?
¿Por qué no hay narcotraficantes detenidos por ICE? ¿Por qué nunca, o casi nunca, capturan a los narcos (estadounidenses) que distribuyen las drogas ilegales en todo el vasto territorio nacional? ¿O es que, luego de cruzar la frontera, la droga se distribuye por precipitación pluvial y los dólares suben a las nubes por evaporación?
Hemos visto hombres enmascarados y sin identificación secuestrando gente hasta por publicar un artículo. Van detrás de trabajadores pobres de aspecto no caucásico, como si fuesen los criminales más peligrosos del mundo. Ahora están ofreciendo visa y residencia a inmigrantes para perseguir a inmigrantes. Interesante eso de invertir miles de millones para reprimir la producción.
¿Por qué no detienen, golpean y arrojan al piso a los europeos, canadienses y australianos que son indocumentados? Pasan el medio millón. Igual sería repugnante, pero queda la pregunta.
¿Por qué culpan a los consumidores de armas de la violencia y nunca a los productores?
¿Por qué culpan a los productores de droga de la adicción y nunca a los consumidores?
¿Por qué asesinaste a once personas en el Caribe sin saber quiénes eran y sin el debido proceso para llevarlas ante la justicia de cualquier país?
¿Por qué repites las palabras de tu jefe, de que matando a algunos con un misil servirá de ejemplo a otros criminales, como antes se linchaba a un negro libre para prevenir la desobediencia entre los negros esclavos? Práctica que continúa, bajo otras formas y otras excusas.
Poner una bomba o tirar un misil fue, por décadas, el método de los cubanos de Miami que sembraron de ejecuciones Estados Unidos y el Caribe. ¿Los conoces? Narcos y terroristas protegidos como Posada Carriles, Bosh, Morales, Ross Díaz, Arocena, Novo Sampol, Battle, Suárez, Masferrer… Mataban de forma impune, con explosivos de la CIA, el C4, porque “una bomba siempre es titular”.
Siguiendo este viejo ejemplo, Marco ¿por qué la policía de Estados Unidos no tira una granada en un apartamento de Nueva York donde se supone que se esconden narcotraficantes, sólo para darle un buen susto a los narcotraficantes?
¿Por qué no lanzaron un misil para derribar el Lolita Express de Epstein? ¿Sería muy cruel? Bueno, eso hicieron los terroristas cubanos de Miami con el avión de Cubana 455, matando a 73 personas, casi todos jóvenes atletas cubanos, hará, en un mes, 49 años. Como entonces, tampoco nadie iría preso. ¿Te imaginas cuántas violaciones de menores y cuántas guerras se habría ahorrado la humanidad con un misil en el Lolita Express?
Colombia produce la cocaína que entra en Estados Unidos (un cuarto de todas las drogas), pero, a pesar de que ahora tiene un gobierno de izquierda, todavía mantiene entre 6 y 10 bases militares estadounidenses. Claro, no posee la principal reserva de petróleo del mundo, como Venezuela. ¿Sabías, Marco?
El 98 por ciento del fentanilo procede de China, ¿por qué no derribas con un misil un avión o un bote de pescadores chinos? O de Ecuador, donde el narco se multiplicó bajo la presidencia de Noboa, un estadounidense nacido en Miami.
¿Por qué no pueden detener la producción de metanfetamina, psicodélicos, LSD y otras drogas sintéticas en las granjas de Estados Unidos?
¿Por qué no se bombardea algún avión de Canadá, de Bélgica o de Holanda para detener el ingreso de éxtasis al país? ¿Demasiados blancos para tanta crueldad? ¿Demasiado ricos para no tratarlos bien?
Luego del último acto terrorista en el Caribe (regreso al Gunboat diplomacy del siglo XIX), dijiste: “No me importa lo que digan las Naciones Unidas”. Lo mismo dijeron los cubanos del exilio, como confesó El Mono Ricardo Morales en la televisión de Miami, en 1981, sobre las bombas en el avión de Cubana 455: “No me arrepiento de nada. Si tuviese que matar 273 de lugar de 73, lo volvía a hacer”.
¿Por qué aclaras algo tan obvio? ¿Cuándo a vos, Marco, o al lobby de Washington, les importó lo que diga el mundo? ¿Cuándo se hizo lo que el mundo había votado por unanimidad por alguna causa (Cuba, Irak, Palestina)? Siempre bastó con el voto o el veto del embajador de Estados Unidos.
En menos palabras, ¿por qué te molestas en aclarar que te importa una mierda lo que pueda pensar el planeta entero, si quien decide sobre la vida y la muerte de los humanos no es Dios, sino Washington?
Todavía, claro. No vayas a pensar que la Humanidad y las colonias van a ser dóciles y estúpidas forever and ever.
Para producir un impacto «suficientemente espectacular» en Japón, Oppenheimer favoreció el «objetivo real de las estructuras construidas». Un informe preliminar de las Fuerzas Aéreas del Ejército ofreció una «estimación conservadora» de 100.000 muertos en Hiroshima. Interceptaciones de mensajes diplomáticos japoneses y registros internos japoneses arrojan luz sobre el debate sobre la decisión de rendición. La génesis del Proyecto Manhattan se explora en los registros del Comité de Política Militar.
Washington, D.C., 5 de agosto de 2025 – El primer informe completo estadounidense sobre los resultados del bombardeo atómico de Hiroshima, realizado hace 80 años esta semana, presentó una «estimación conservadora» de que alrededor de 100.000 personas murieron, según un informe del 8 de agosto de 1945 de las Fuerzas Aéreas del Ejército de EE. UU. en la isla de Tinian, publicado hoy por primera vez. El mensaje de seis páginas sobre los resultados de la «Misión Hiroshima» es uno de los puntos destacados de una colección actualizada de registros desclasificados publicada hoy por el Archivo de Seguridad Nacional para conmemorar el 80.º aniversario de los bombardeos atómicos de Hiroshima y Nagasaki.
Si bien los líderes estadounidenses elogiaron los bombardeos en su momento y durante muchos años después por poner fin a la guerra del Pacífico y salvar incontables miles de vidas estadounidenses, esa interpretación ha sido seriamente cuestionada desde entonces. Muchos otros han planteado cuestiones éticas sobre el uso de armas que causaron tantas muertes de civiles y que, en las décadas siguientes, desembocaron en una costosa y peligrosa carrera armamentística nuclear con la Unión Soviética (actual Rusia) y otros países.
Ochenta años después, Hiroshima y Nagasaki siguen siendo un símbolo de los peligros y el coste humano de la guerra, en concreto del uso de armas nucleares, pero persiste el desacuerdo sobre qué puso fin a la Segunda Guerra Mundial en el Pacífico. Dado que estos temas serán objeto de intenso debate durante muchos años, el Archivo ha actualizado y republicado uno de sus libros electrónicos más populares: una creciente recopilación de documentos desclasificados del gobierno estadounidense y registros japoneses traducidos sobre los bombardeos que aparecieron por primera vez en estas páginas hace 20 años, en 2005.
Entre el nuevo material publicado por primera vez en 2025 se encuentran:
Material de referencia sobre la creación del Proyecto Manhattan, incluyendo registros de las reuniones del Comité de Política Militar durante 1942 y 1943 e informes al presidente Roosevelt y altos funcionarios sobre los planes para establecer plantas de producción de plutonio y uranio altamente enriquecido necesarios para la fabricación de bombas.
Planes para lanzar la bomba (denominada el «dispositivo») a su objetivo y causar daños irreparables al máximo número de estructuras (viviendas y fábricas).
Discusión interna sobre las pruebas de «demostración», en la que el jefe de Los Álamos, J. Robert Oppenheimer, declaró, según un relato, que la única prueba de demostración «suficientemente espectacular» que podría tener impacto en Japón involucraría un «objetivo real de estructuras construidas».
Un registro de la reunión secreta de Oppenheimer con el director del Proyecto Manhattan, el general Leslie R. Groves, en Chicago el 24 de julio de 1945, donde discutieron el programa de producción de la bomba atómica y los efectos de la prueba Trinity.
Primera declaración pública de Robert Oppenheimer, el 9 de agosto de 1945, sobre el uso de la bomba y su esperanza de que el peligro de las armas atómicas obligara a los líderes mundiales a evitar conflictos.
La bomba atómica y el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial: Una colección de fuentes primarias Introducción
Por William Burr
Cualquier aniversario de los bombardeos atómicos de Hiroshima y Nagasaki en agosto de 1945 ofrece una ocasión para una seria reflexión. En Japón y en otras partes del mundo, cada aniversario se conmemora con gran solemnidad. Estos bombardeos marcaron la primera vez que se detonaron armas nucleares en operaciones de combate. Causaron terribles pérdidas humanas y destrucción en su momento, y más muertes y enfermedades en los años posteriores debido a los efectos de la radiación. Los bombardeos estadounidenses también aceleraron el proyecto de la bomba atómica de la Unión Soviética y han alimentado una carrera armamentista nuclear entre las grandes potencias hasta el día de hoy. Afortunadamente, las armas nucleares no se han detonado en una guerra desde 1945, quizás debido al tabú contra su uso, generado por el lanzamiento de las bombas sobre Japón. Sin embargo, 80 años después, el peligro de las armas nucleares es tan grande como siempre, con grandes potencias que las poseen y algunas, como Rusia y Corea del Norte, lanzando amenazas nucleares sin impunidad. Con la alta tensión en zonas de crisis que abarcan desde Ucrania hasta el sur de Asia y la península de Corea, el riesgo de un conflicto nuclear podría ser tan grande como lo fue durante la Guerra Fría. En agosto de 1945, el director del Laboratorio de Los Álamos, J. Robert Oppenhemer, esperaba que el peligro de las armas atómicas uniera a las naciones y generara mayor confianza entre ellas, pero esa esperanza ha sido esquiva.
Además de las cuestiones éticas que conlleva el uso de armas atómicas y otras armas con gran impacto, la cuestión de por qué se lanzaron las bombas en primer lugar ha sido objeto de un acalorado debate en ocasiones. Como ocurre con todos los acontecimientos de la historia de la humanidad, las interpretaciones varían y la lectura de fuentes primarias puede llevar a conclusiones diferentes. Por lo tanto, sigue siendo debatible hasta qué punto los bombardeos contribuyeron al fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial o al inicio de la Guerra Fría. Una cuestión controvertida importante es si, bajo el peso del bloqueo estadounidense y los bombardeos convencionales masivos, los japoneses estaban dispuestos a rendirse antes del lanzamiento de las bombas. También se sigue debatiendo el impacto de la declaración de guerra soviética y la invasión de Manchuria en la decisión japonesa de rendirse. Abundan las controversias sobre cuestiones contrafácticas, como si existían alternativas a los bombardeos atómicos o si Japón se habría rendido si se hubiera utilizado una demostración de la bomba para causar conmoción y terror. Además, el papel de una invasión de Japón en la planificación estadounidense sigue siendo objeto de debate, y algunos argumentan que los bombardeos salvaron miles de vidas estadounidenses que, de otro modo, se habrían perdido en una invasión.
Estas y otras preguntas serán objeto de debate en el futuro. Los lectores interesados seguirán absorbiendo la fascinante literatura histórica sobre el tema. Algunos querrán leer fuentes primarias desclasificadas para profundizar en su propia reflexión sobre los temas. Con ese fin, en 2005, coincidiendo con el 60.º aniversario de los bombardeos, el personal del Archivo de Seguridad Nacional recopiló y escaneó una cantidad significativa de documentos desclasificados del gobierno estadounidense para facilitar su acceso. Los documentos abarcan múltiples aspectos de los bombardeos y su contexto. Para ofrecer una perspectiva más amplia, la publicación también incluyó traducciones de documentos japoneses no disponibles anteriormente. Desde 2005, la colección se ha actualizado varias veces, la más reciente en 2020, cuando el Archivo publicó un nuevo documento sobre las primeras dudas de Dwight D. Eisenhower sobre el uso de armas nucleares. Esta última versión de la colección incluye nuevos documentos, texto revisado y notas al pie actualizadas para incorporar la literatura secundaria publicada recientemente.
Actualización 2020
Washington, D.C., 4 de agosto de 2020 – Para conmemorar el 75.º aniversario de los bombardeos atómicos de Hiroshima y Nagasaki en agosto de 1945, el Archivo de Seguridad Nacional actualiza y vuelve a publicar uno de sus libros electrónicos más populares de los últimos 25 años.
Si bien los líderes estadounidenses elogiaron los bombardeos en su momento y durante muchos años después por poner fin a la guerra del Pacífico y salvar incontables miles de vidas estadounidenses, esa interpretación ha sido seriamente cuestionada desde entonces. Además, cuestiones éticas han envuelto los bombardeos que causaron terribles pérdidas humanas y, en las décadas siguientes, alimentaron una carrera armamentística nuclear con la Unión Soviética y ahora con Rusia, entre otros.
Tres cuartos de siglo después, Hiroshima y Nagasaki siguen siendo un símbolo de los peligros y el coste humano de la guerra, en concreto del uso de armas nucleares. Dado que estos temas serán objeto de intenso debate durante muchos años más, el Archivo ha actualizado una vez más su recopilación de documentos desclasificados del gobierno estadounidense y registros japoneses traducidos que aparecieron por primera vez en estas páginas en 2005.
Introducción
Por William Burr
El 75.º aniversario de los bombardeos atómicos de Hiroshima y Nagasaki en agosto de 1945 es motivo de seria reflexión. En Japón y en otras partes del mundo, cada aniversario se conmemora con gran solemnidad. Los bombardeos marcaron la primera vez que se detonaron armas nucleares en operaciones de combate. Causaron terribles pérdidas humanas y destrucción en su momento, y más muertes y enfermedades en los años posteriores debido a los efectos de la radiación. Los bombardeos estadounidenses aceleraron el proyecto de la bomba atómica de la Unión Soviética y han alimentado una carrera armamentista nuclear entre las grandes potencias hasta el día de hoy. Afortunadamente, las armas nucleares no han explotado en guerras desde 1945, quizás debido al tabú contra su uso, generado por el lanzamiento de las bombas sobre Japón.
Además de las cuestiones éticas que implica el uso de armas atómicas y otras armas con consecuencias masivas, el motivo del lanzamiento inicial de las bombas ha sido objeto de acalorados debates. Como ocurre con todos los acontecimientos de la historia de la humanidad, las interpretaciones varían y la lectura de fuentes primarias puede llevar a conclusiones diferentes. Por lo tanto, el grado en que los bombardeos contribuyeron al fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial o al inicio de la Guerra Fría sigue siendo un tema de debate. Una cuestión controvertida importante es si, bajo el peso del bloqueo estadounidense y los bombardeos convencionales masivos, los japoneses estaban dispuestos a rendirse antes del lanzamiento de las bombas. También se debate el impacto de la declaración de guerra soviética y la invasión de Manchuria, en comparación con los bombardeos atómicos, en la decisión japonesa de rendirse. También se discuten cuestiones contrafácticas, por ejemplo, si existían alternativas a los bombardeos atómicos o si los japoneses se habrían rendido si se hubiera utilizado una demostración de la bomba para causar conmoción y terror. Además, el papel de una invasión de Japón en la planificación estadounidense sigue siendo tema de debate, y algunos argumentan que los bombardeos salvaron miles de vidas estadounidenses que, de otro modo, se habrían perdido en una invasión.
Estas y otras preguntas serán objeto de debate durante mucho tiempo. Los lectores interesados seguirán absorbiendo la fascinante literatura histórica sobre el tema. Algunos querrán leer fuentes primarias desclasificadas para profundizar en su propia reflexión sobre los temas. Con ese fin, en 2005, coincidiendo con el 60.º aniversario de los bombardeos, el personal del Archivo de Seguridad Nacional recopiló y escaneó una cantidad significativa de documentos desclasificados del gobierno estadounidense para ampliar su acceso. Los documentos abarcan múltiples aspectos de los bombardeos y su contexto. También se incluyeron, para ofrecer una perspectiva más amplia, traducciones de documentos japoneses que antes no estaban ampliamente disponibles. Desde 2005, la colección se ha actualizado. Esta última versión incluye correcciones, algunas revisiones menores y notas al pie actualizadas para tener en cuenta la literatura secundaria publicada recientemente.
Actualización de 2015
4 de agosto de 2015 – Unos meses después de los bombardeos atómicos de Hiroshima y Nagasaki, el general Dwight D. Eisenhower comentó durante un evento social que esperaba que la guerra hubiera terminado sin que hubiéramos tenido que usar la bomba atómica. Esta evidencia, prácticamente desconocida, del diario de Robert P. Meiklejohn, asistente del embajador W. Averell Harriman, publicada hoy por primera vez por el Archivo de Seguridad Nacional, confirma que el futuro presidente Eisenhower albergaba dudas iniciales sobre el primer uso de armas atómicas por parte de Estados Unidos. El general George C. Marshall es el único funcionario de alto rango cuyas dudas contemporáneas (previas a Hiroshima) sobre el uso de armas atómicas contra ciudades están documentadas.
En el 70.º aniversario del bombardeo de Hiroshima el 6 de agosto de 1945, el Archivo de Seguridad Nacional actualiza su publicación de 2005, la colección en línea más completa de documentos desclasificados del gobierno estadounidense sobre el primer uso de la bomba atómica y el fin de la guerra en el Pacífico. Esta actualización presenta material inédito y traducciones de registros difíciles de encontrar. Se incluyen documentos sobre las primeras etapas del proyecto estadounidense de la bomba atómica, el informe del general Curtis LeMay de las Fuerzas Aéreas del Ejército sobre el bombardeo incendiario de Tokio (marzo de 1945), las solicitudes del secretario de Guerra Henry Stimson para modificar las condiciones de la rendición incondicional, documentos soviéticos relacionados con los acontecimientos, extractos de los diarios de Robert P. Meiklejohn mencionados anteriormente y selecciones de los diarios de Walter J. Brown, asistente especial del secretario de Estado James Byrnes. La publicación original de 2005 incluía una amplia gama de material, incluyendo resúmenes «Magic» de comunicaciones japonesas interceptadas, anteriormente ultrasecretos, y las primeras traducciones completas del japonés de relatos de reuniones y debates de alto nivel en Tokio que condujeron a la decisión del Emperador de rendirse. También se documentan las decisiones de Estados Unidos de atacar ciudades japonesas, peticiones de científicos previas a Hiroshima que cuestionaban el uso militar de la bomba atómica, propuestas para demostrar los efectos de la bomba, debates sobre la modificación de las condiciones de rendición incondicional, informes de los bombardeos de Hiroshima y Nagasaki, y un conocimiento tardío de las altas esferas sobre los efectos de la radiación de las armas atómicas.
Los documentos pueden ayudar a los lectores a formarse su propia opinión sobre controversias de larga data, como si el primer uso de armas atómicas estuvo justificado, si el presidente Harry S. Truman tenía alternativas a los ataques atómicos para poner fin a la guerra y cuál fue el impacto de la declaración de guerra soviética en Japón. Desde la década de 1960, cuando comenzó la desclasificación de fuentes importantes, los historiadores han mantenido un intenso debate sobre la bomba atómica y el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Basándose en fuentes de los Archivos Nacionales y la Biblioteca del Congreso, así como en materiales japoneses, este libro informativo electrónico incluye documentos clave en los que los historiadores de los acontecimientos se han basado para presentar sus hallazgos y avanzar en sus interpretaciones.
La bomba atómica y el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial: Una colección de fuentes primarias Hace setenta años, Estados Unidos lanzó bombas atómicas sobre Hiroshima y Nagasaki, la Unión Soviética declaró la guerra a Japón y el gobierno japonés se rindió ante Estados Unidos y sus aliados. La era nuclear había comenzado realmente con el primer uso militar de armas atómicas. Con el material que sigue, el Archivo de Seguridad Nacional publica la colección en línea más completa hasta la fecha de documentos desclasificados del gobierno estadounidense sobre la bomba atómica y el fin de la guerra en el Pacífico. Además de material de los archivos del Proyecto Manhattan, esta colección incluye resúmenes y traducciones, anteriormente «Top Secret Ultra», de cables diplomáticos japoneses interceptados bajo el programa «Magic». Además, la colección incluye por primera vez traducciones de fuentes japonesas de reuniones y debates de alto nivel en Tokio, incluyendo las conferencias en las que el emperador Hirohito autorizó la decisión final de rendirse.[1]
Desde que las bombas atómicas explotaron sobre ciudades japonesas, historiadores, científicos sociales, periodistas, veteranos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y ciudadanos de a pie han generado una intensa controversia sobre los sucesos de agosto de 1945. El libro Hiroshima de John Hersey, publicado por primera vez en The New Yorker en 1946, animó a los lectores inquietos a cuestionar los bombardeos, mientras que grupos religiosos y algunos comentaristas, entre ellos Norman Cousins, los criticaron explícitamente. El exsecretario de Guerra Henry Stimson consideró preocupantes las críticas y publicó una influyente justificación de los ataques en Harper’s.[2] Durante la década de 1960, la disponibilidad de fuentes primarias posibilitó la investigación y la escritura histórica, y el debate se intensificó. Los historiadores Herbert Feis y Gar Alperovitz plantearon preguntas inquisitivas sobre el primer uso de armas nucleares y sus amplias implicaciones políticas y diplomáticas. La controversia, especialmente el argumento…
¿Fueron los ataques atómicos necesarios principalmente para evitar una invasión de Japón en noviembre de 1945? ¿Autorizó Truman el uso de bombas atómicas por razones político-diplomáticas (para intimidar a los soviéticos) o su principal objetivo era obligar a Japón a rendirse y poner fin a la guerra antes de lo previsto? Si la rápida finalización de la guerra fue la principal motivación de Truman y sus asesores, ¿hasta qué punto consideraron la capacidad de «diplomacia atómica» una ventaja?
¿En qué medida la justificación posterior de la bomba atómica exageró o malinterpretó las estimaciones de bajas estadounidenses en tiempos de guerra derivadas de una invasión de Japón?
¿Existían alternativas al uso de las armas? De haberlas, ¿cuáles eran y qué tan plausibles son en retrospectiva? ¿Por qué no se buscaron alternativas?
¿Cómo planeó el gobierno estadounidense utilizar las bombas? ¿Qué conceptos utilizaron los estrategas de guerra para seleccionar los objetivos? ¿Hasta qué punto estaban interesados los altos funcionarios en buscar alternativas a los objetivos urbanos? ¿Qué tan familiarizado estaba el presidente Truman con los conceptos que llevaron a los planificadores a elegir las principales ciudades como objetivos?
¿Por qué el secretario de Guerra Henry Stimson se opuso a los planes militares de atacar Kioto y cómo impidió que el director del Proyecto Manhattan, el general Groves, volviera a incluirla en la lista final de objetivos?
¿Qué sabían los altos funcionarios sobre los efectos de las bombas atómicas antes de su primer uso? En particular, ¿cuánto sabían los altos funcionarios sobre los efectos de la radiación de las armas?
¿Tomó el presidente Truman una decisión, en sentido estricto, de usar la bomba o heredó una decisión ya tomada?
¿Estaban los japoneses dispuestos a rendirse antes del lanzamiento de las bombas? ¿Hasta qué punto el emperador Hirohito prolongó la guerra innecesariamente al no aprovechar las oportunidades para rendirse?
Si Estados Unidos hubiera sido más flexible en cuanto a la exigencia de «rendición incondicional», garantizando explícita o implícitamente una monarquía constitucional, ¿se habría rendido Japón antes?
¿Cuán decisivos fueron los bombardeos atómicos para la decisión japonesa de rendirse?
¿Fue innecesario el bombardeo de Nagasaki? Dado que el bombardeo atómico fue crucial para la decisión japonesa de rendirse, ¿habría bastado con destruir una sola ciudad?
¿Habría bastado la declaración de guerra soviética para obligar a Tokio a admitir la derrota?
¿Era moralmente justificable el lanzamiento de las bombas atómicas?
¿Por qué el presidente Truman detuvo los bombardeos atómicos y cuál fue la trascendencia política de su decisión?
Esta recopilación no intentará responder a estas preguntas ni utilizar fuentes primarias para definir posturas sobre ninguna de ellas. Tampoco pretende sustituir la extraordinariamente rica literatura sobre los bombardeos atómicos y el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Tampoco incluye entrevistas, documentos elaborados tras los acontecimientos ni correspondencia posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial, etc., que los participantes en el debate han aportado para fundamentar sus argumentos. Originalmente, esta recopilación no incluía documentos sobre los orígenes y el desarrollo del Proyecto Manhattan, aunque esta actualización incluye algunos registros significativos para contextualizar. Al proporcionar acceso a una amplia gama de documentos estadounidenses y japoneses, principalmente de la primavera y el verano de 1945, los lectores interesados pueden comprobar por sí mismos el material fuente crucial que los académicos han utilizado para dar forma a las narrativas de los acontecimientos históricos y para fundamentar sus argumentos sobre las cuestiones que han suscitado controversia a lo largo de los años. Para ayudar a los lectores menos familiarizados con los debates, los comentarios sobre algunos documentos señalarán, aunque no de forma exhaustiva, algunas de las maneras en que se han interpretado. Con acceso directo a los documentos, los lectores pueden elaborar sus propias respuestas a las preguntas planteadas. Los documentos pueden incluso suscitar nuevas preguntas.
Quienes han contribuido a la controversia histórica han utilizado los documentos aquí seleccionados para respaldar sus argumentos sobre el primer uso de armas nucleares y el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El editor ha revisado minuciosamente las notas a pie de página y a final de diversos artículos y libros, así como documentos seleccionados citados por participantes de las distintas posturas de la controversia.[5] Si bien el editor tiene un punto de vista sobre los temas, en la medida de lo posible ha procurado evitar que este influya en la selección de documentos, por ejemplo, excluyendo o incluyendo selectivamente documentos que pudieran respaldar un punto de vista u otro. La tarea de recopilación implicó la consulta de fuentes primarias en los Archivos Nacionales, principalmente en los archivos del Proyecto Manhattan, conservados en los registros del Cuerpo de Ingenieros del Ejército, Grupo de Registros 77, pero también en los registros de la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional. Las colecciones privadas también fueron importantes, como los Documentos de Henry L. Stimson, conservados en la Universidad de Yale (aunque disponibles en microfilm, por ejemplo, en la Biblioteca del Congreso) y los documentos de W. Averell Harriman, conservados en la Biblioteca del Congreso. En gran medida, los documentos seleccionados para esta recopilación han sido desclasificados durante años, incluso décadas; las desclasificaciones más recientes datan de la década de 1990.
Los documentos estadounidenses citados aquí resultarán familiares para muchos lectores conocedores de la controversia de Hiroshima-Nagasaki y la historia del Proyecto Manhattan. Para ofrecer una visión más completa de la transición del antagonismo entre Estados Unidos y Japón a la reconciliación, el editor ha hecho todo lo posible, dentro de las limitaciones de tiempo y recursos, para presentar información sobre las actividades y los puntos de vista de los responsables políticos y diplomáticos japoneses. Esto incluye varios resúmenes, anteriormente ultrasecretos, de comunicaciones diplomáticas japonesas interceptadas, que permiten a los lectores interesados formarse sus propios juicios sobre la dirección de la diplomacia japonesa en las semanas previas a los bombardeos atómicos. Además, para arrojar luz sobre las consideraciones que llevaron a la rendición de Japón, este libro informativo incluye nuevas traducciones de fuentes primarias japonesas sobre eventos cruciales, incluyendo relatos de las conferencias del 9 y el 14 de agosto, donde el emperador Hirohito decidió aceptar las condiciones de rendición de los Aliados.
Nota del editor: Originalmente preparada en julio de 2005, esta publicación ha sido actualizada con nuevos documentos, cambios en la organización y otros cambios editoriales. Como se mencionó, se han incluido algunos documentos relacionados con los orígenes del Proyecto Manhattan, además de entradas de los diarios de Robert P. Meiklejohn y traducciones de algunos documentos soviéticos, entre otros. Asimismo, se han tenido en cuenta importantes contribuciones recientes a la literatura académica.
Nota del editor: Agradecemos al profesor Barton J. Bernstein, emérito del Departamento de Historia de la Universidad de Stanford, por su asesoramiento a lo largo de los años; a Richard W. Groves, por compartir información sobre la historia del Proyecto Manhattan; a Robert S. Norris, por proporcionar valiosas pistas sobre las fuentes documentales; y a Linda Katsiyiannis y Margaret Frank, ambas de la Universidad George Washington, por su asistencia en la investigación.
I. Antecedentes del Proyecto Atómico de EE. UU.
Documentos 1A-C: Informe del Comité del Uranio Documento 1A
Arthur H. Compton, Comité de Fisión Atómica de la Academia Nacional de Ciencias, a Frank Jewett, Presidente de la Academia Nacional de Ciencias, 17 de mayo de 1941, Secreto 17 de mayo de 1941 Fuente Archivos Nacionales, Registros de la Oficina de Investigación y Desarrollo Científico, Grupo de Registros 227 (en adelante RG 227), Colección de microfilmes de los documentos Bush-Conant, Rollo 1, Objetivo 2, Carpeta 1, «Archivo Histórico S-1, Sección A (1940-1941)».
Este conjunto de documentos se refiere al trabajo del Comité del Uranio de la Academia Nacional de Ciencias, un proyecto exploratorio que condujo a la producción propiamente dicha del Proyecto Manhattan. El informe inicial, de mayo de 1941, mostró cómo destacados científicos estadounidenses se enfrentaban al potencial de la energía nuclear con fines militares. Inicialmente, se contemplaron tres posibilidades: guerra radiológica, fuente de energía para submarinos y buques, y explosivos. Para producir material para cualquiera de estos fines se requería la capacidad de separar isótopos de uranio para producir U-235 fisionable. Para estas capacidades también era necesario producir una reacción nuclear en cadena. En la época del primer informe, se contemplaban varios métodos para producir una reacción en cadena y se presupuestaba su experimentación.
Más tarde ese año, el Comité del Uranio completó su informe y el presidente de la OSRD, Vannevar Bush, informó de las conclusiones al presidente Roosevelt: Como Bush enfatizó, las conclusiones estadounidenses eran más conservadoras que las del informe británico MAUD: la bomba sería algo «menos efectiva», tardaría más en producirse y tendría un costo mayor. Una de las conclusiones clave del informe fue que una bomba de fisión de poder superlativamente destructivo resultará de la rápida concentración de una masa suficiente del elemento U235. Eso era una certeza, «tan segura como cualquier predicción no probada basada en la teoría y la experimentación». La tarea crucial era desarrollar formas y medios para separar el uranio altamente enriquecido del uranio-238. Para iniciar la producción, Bush quería establecer un «grupo de ingeniería cuidadosamente seleccionado para estudiar los planes para una posible producción». Esta fue la base del Grupo de Políticas Principales, o Comité S-1, que Bush y James B. Conant establecieron rápidamente.[6]
En su análisis de los efectos de un arma atómica, el comité consideró tanto la explosión como los daños radiológicos. Respecto a estos últimos, «es posible que los efectos destructivos sobre la vida causados por la intensa radiactividad de los productos de la explosión sean tan importantes como los de la explosión misma». Esta perspectiva se pasó por alto cuando los altos funcionarios del Proyecto Manhattan consideraron el ataque a Japón en 1945.[7]
National Archives, Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, Record Group 227 (hereinafter RG 227), Bush-Conant papers microfilm collection, Roll 1, Target 2, Folder 1, «S-1 Historical File, Section A (1940-1941).»
National Archives, Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, Record Group 227 (hereinafter RG 227), Bush-Conant papers microfilm collection, Roll 1, Target 2, Folder 1, «S-1 Historical File, Section A (1940-1941).»
RG 227, Bush-Conant papers microfilm collection, Roll 1, Target 2, Folder 1, «S-1 Historical File, Section II (1941-1942)
The Manhattan Project never had an official charter establishing it and defining its mission, but these two documents are the functional equivalent of a charter, in terms of presidential approvals for the mission, not to mention for a huge budget. In a progress report, Bush told President Roosevelt that the bomb project was on a pilot plant basis, but not yet at the production stage. By the summer, once “production plants” would be at work, he proposed that the War Department take over the project. In reply, Roosevelt wrote a short memo endorsing Bush’s ideas as long as absolute secrecy could be maintained. According to Robert S. Norris, this was “the fateful decision” to turn over the atomic project to military control.[8]
Some months later, with the Manhattan Project already underway and under the direction of General LeslieGroves, Bush outlined to Roosevelt the effort necessary to produce six fission bombs. With the goal of having enough fissile material by the first half of 1945 to produce the bombs, Bush was worried that the Germans might get there first. Thus, he wanted Roosevelt’s instructions as to whether the project should be “vigorously pushed throughout.” Unlike the pilot plant proposal described above, Bush described a real production order for the bomb, at an estimated cost of a “serious figure”: $400 million, which was an optimistic projection given the eventual cost of $1.9 billion. To keep the secret, Bush wanted to avoid a “ruinous” appropriations request and asked Roosevelt to obtain from Congress the necessary discretionary funds. Initialed by President Roosevelt (“VB OK FDR”), this may have been the closest that he came to a formal approval of the Manhattan Project.
Record Group 319, Manhattan Project Background Files, Box 21, folder of Military Policy Committee Minutes
During this meeting of the recently created MPC, Groves and its members laid out production objectives: electromagnetic separation to produce 0.1 kilograms of HEU per day and a nuclear power plant to produce 1.0 kilograms per day of plutonium. The Kellogg company would develop a 600-unit gaseous diffusion plant for producing HEU, but the objective could not take away resources from the electromagnetic uranium enrichment plant or the nuclear power plant. The MPC would develop a report to President Roosevelt.
Record Group 319, Manhattan Project Background Files, Box 21, folder of Military Policy Committee Minutes
Continuing work on the report to President Roosevelt, the Committee set the goal of a 4600-unit gaseous diffusion plant and a 500-tank electromagnetic plant to make possible “the earliest production of material.” The “Chicago method,” a nuclear power plant, would go “forward full blast” with the plant sited in an “isolated area, but near power and water.”
Record Group 319, Manhattan Project Background Files, Box 20, Military Policy Committee
This is the full text of the report to President Roosevelt as transcribed by U.S. Army historians as background research for Vincent Jones’ official history, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, published in 1985 by the Army’s Center of Military History. In this report, the Military Policy Committee reviewed key issues, including parameters for various methods of producing fissile material, funding issues, the size of a bomb, time schedules, possibilities for producing nuclear power, heavy water, assessments of German progress, supply of ore, and cooperation and information sharing relations with the Canadians and the British.
According to the report, the chances of bomb production by June 1944 were “small,” while “somewhat better” by 1 January 1945, and “good” during the first half of 1945.
Record Group 319, Manhattan Project Background Files, Box 21, folder of Military Policy Committee Minutes
General Groves reported that the Kellogg Company would have responsibility for the engineering for the gaseous diffusion plant while Union Carbide would operate it. The Tennessee-Eastman Co. would operate the electromagnetic plant.
National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter RG 77), Manhattan Engineering District (MED), Minutes of the Military Policy Meeting (5 May 1943), Correspondence (“Top Secret”) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, microfilm publication M1109 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1980), Roll 3, Target 6, Folder 23, “Military Policy Committee, Minutes of Meetings”
While Manhattan Project leaders had their sights on developing fissile material production capacity, they were beginning to consider Japanese targets. Besides discussing programmatic matters (e.g., status of gaseous diffusion plants, heavy water production for reactors, and staffing at Las Alamos), the participants in this Military Policy Committee meeting agreed that the first use could be Japanese naval forces concentrated at Truk Harbor, an atoll in the Caroline Islands. If there was a misfire the weapon would be difficult for the Japanese to recover, which would not be the case if Tokyo was targeted. The MPC rejected targeting Germany because the Germans were considered more likely to “secure knowledge” from a defective weapon than the Japanese.[9]
Also of interest is the discussion of project funding: “The estimated total fund requirements of $850,000,000 were reported and explained to the members of the Committee. It was agreed that no report should be made at this time … to higher authority in view of the general indefiniteness.”
Record Group 319, Manhattan Project Background Files, Box 21, folder of Military Policy Committee Minutes
Reporting that the Norwegian heavy water factory had been repaired after the attempted sabotage, Groves observed that deliveries to Germany had or would be resumed and “that the Germans [had] progressed so far that there is a possibility of using the material in the present war and that heavy water was absolutely necessary to them, both for splitting the atom and in making up the explosive.” Not realizing that Hitler had not demanded a bomb project and that German scientists were not working on bomb physics or plutonium, Groves did not know that the Germans were making no progress at all.[9A]
The discussion of the diffusion process stipulated that it would aim for 36 percent “purity” although any “purity ranging between 20% and 40% would be satisfactory.” The electromagnetic plant would be “capable of taking the entire diffusion production” and enrich the uranium to desired levels. The Committee agreed that “all work should go ahead full blast despite the fact that there were still gaps in the scientific development.”
RG 77, Harrison-Bundy files, folder 6, Military Policy Committee
This update of the December 1942 report covered many of the same issues based on a greater fund of knowledge and practical experience. It included progress reports on the various methods for producing fissile material, funding issues, the size of a bomb, time schedules, “the secret laboratory,” heavy water, assessments of German progress, supply of ore, cooperation and information sharing relations with the British, as well as Russian activities.
On the Germans, the MPC noted the difficult of getting “satisfactory information,” but the members speculated that the Germany may be “in a position to use this material in the present war, particularly if events should lengthen the struggle unduly.” While the U.S. was “in a position to overtake them and eventually produce like material in greater quantities,” a situation could emerge where “it will be necessary for us to stand the first punishing blows before we are in a position to destroy the enemy.” As previously noted, none of that was within Germany’s capabilities because German scientists did not have an atomic bomb program.
On the size of the bomb, the MPC was assuming a gun-type device using highly enriched uranium or plutonium for fissile material. The fact that plutonium would not work with a gun-type weapon had yet to be discovered. The “size of [a] bomb for good efficiency of explosion may vary from 20 to 80 kilos.” A 20-kilogram bomb would be the equivalent of 10,000 tons of TNT. “What is needed is one decidedly powerful bomb. Plus the ability to follow it up with others. If the enemy is wavering, this might readily end the war.”
Like the December 1942, report, the MPC saw a “good” chance of a bomb being produced during the first half of 1945. Moreover, “this bomb can be followed up at reasonable intervals with other bombs” with the possibility that one bomb could be produced per month.
Captain William Sterling Parsons was a senior official at Los Alamos who began work in June 1943 as chief of the Ordnance Division but also as Associate Director, which meant that he was Oppenheimer’s deputy. One of his key responsibilities was to develop plans and programs for using atomic bombs on targeted areas. While Parsons had been interested in developing a weapon for underwater use against battleships, Los Alamos had abandoned it, and Parsons focused on the complex issues involved in aerial delivery of a weapon. As Parsons noted, Los Alamos was already at work on producing an implosion weapon, and he thought prospects were good for developing a device with an explosive yield of 1,000 tons (TNT) or more. A modified B-29 bomber could deliver the weapon.
As Parsons observed, the “assembled gadget” would be “heavy and awkward to handle” with its two tons of high explosives used to detonate the “active material.” That made it necessary “to develop a gadget which will be assembled near enough to the point of take-off so that transportation and unloading operations can be minimized.” That was a scenario for the role of the activities at Tinian Island which would serve as the launch pad for final work on the Fat Man and Little Boy weapons.
An important point that Parsons made was that the “primary and, so far, only contemplated method of delivery toward which the testing program is oriented, is high altitude (about 30,000 feet above sea level), horizontal bombing, with provision for detonating the bomb well above ground, relying primarily on blast effect to do material damage.” According to Parsons the goal was to set a height of detonation that would, “with the minimum probable efficiency,” damage beyond repair “the maximum number of structures (dwellings and factories).” As Sean Malloy has observed, that meant that the bombs were “optimized” for use against cities and civilians.
RG 77, Correspondence («Top Secret») of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, file 25M
This memorandum from General Groves to General Marshall captured how far the Manhattan Project had come in less than two years since Bush’s December 1942 report to President Roosevelt. Groves did not mention this but around the time he wrote this the Manhattan Project had working at its far-flung installations over 125,000 people ; taking into account high labor turnover some 485,000 people worked on the project (1 out of every 250 people in the country at that time). What these people were laboring to construct, directly or indirectly, were two types of weapons—a gun-type weapon using U-235 and an implosion weapon using plutonium (although the possibility of U-235 was also under consideration). As the scientists had learned, a gun-type weapon based on plutonium was “impossible” because that element had an “unexpected property”: spontaneous neutron emissions would cause the weapon to “fizzle.”[10] For both the gun-type and the implosion weapons, a production schedule had been established and both would be available during 1945. The discussion of weapons effects centered on blast damage models; radiation and other effects were overlooked.
Library of Congress, J.R. Oppenheimer Papers, Box 36, Groves, Leslie R. (1 of 2), 1943-1952)
The issue of targeting came up in a September 1944 memorandum to General Groves, where, among other matters, Parsons presented his objections to a non-combat demonstration of the bomb. According to Parsons, people “in high and responsible quarters” had made such a proposal, although he did not identify them. The argument for a demonstration test was that if “we are winning the war,” a “staged field test in an American desert,” would be an impressive way to demonstrate “our victory over the atom and our potential power to win victories over our future enemies.”
Parsons explained why he objected to a demonstration test:
“To have our project culminate in a spectacularly expensive field test in the closing months of the war, or to have it held for such a demonstration after the war, is, in my opinion, one way to invite a political and military fizzle, regardless of the scientific achievement. The principal difficulty with such a demonstration is that it would not be held one thousand feet over Times Square, where the human and material destruction would be obvious, but in an uninhabited desert, where there would be no humans and only sample structures.”
As he had earlier in the year, Parsons assumed that only by using the bomb against a city to demonstrate the “human and material destruction” would, as Malloy has put it, “provide a suitably dramatic display of the bomb’s destructive power:”
A few weeks later, Oppenheimer wrote to General Groves endorsing Parsons’ line of argument: “I agree completely with all the comments of Captain Parsons’ memorandum on the fallacy of regarding a controlled test as the culmination of the work of this laboratory. The laboratory is operating under a directive to produce weapons; this directive has been and will be rigorously adhered to.” [10A]
While Groves worried about the engineering and production problems, key War Department advisers were becoming troubled over the diplomatic and political implications of these enormously powerful weapons and the dangers of a global nuclear arms race. Concerned that President Roosevelt had an overly “cavalier” belief about the possibility of maintaining a post-war Anglo-American atomic monopoly, Bush and Conant recognized the limits of secrecy and wanted to disabuse senior officials of the notion that an atomic monopoly was possible. To suggest alternatives, they drafted this memorandum about the importance of the international exchange of information and international inspection to stem dangerous nuclear competition.[11]
Documents 6A-D: President Truman Learns the Secret
Soon after he was sworn in as president following President Roosevelt’s death, Harry Truman learned about the top secret Manhattan Project from briefings by Secretary of War Stimson and Manhattan Project chief General Groves (who went through the “back door” to escape the watchful press). Stimson, who later wrote up the meeting in his diary, also prepared a discussion paper, which raised broader policy issues associated with the imminent possession of “the most terrible weapon ever known in human history.”
In a background report prepared for the meeting, Groves provided a detailed overview of the bomb project from the raw materials to processing nuclear fuel to assembling the weapons to plans for using them, which were starting to crystallize. With respect to the point about assembling the weapons, Groves and Stimson informed Truman that the first gun-type weapon “should be ready about 1 August 1945” while an implosion weapon would also be available that month. “The target is and was always expected to be Japan.”
These documents have important implications for the perennial debate over whether Truman “inherited assumptions” from the Roosevelt administration that the bomb would be used when available or that he made the decision to do so. Alperovitz and Sherwin have argued that Truman made “a real decision” to use the bomb on Japan by choosing “between various forms of diplomacy and warfare.” In contrast, Bernstein found that Truman “never questioned [the] assumption” that the bomb would and should be used. Norris also noted that “Truman’s ”decision” amounted to a decision not to override previous plans to use the bomb.”[12]
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5g
The force of B-29 nuclear delivery vehicles that was being readied for first nuclear use—the Army Air Force’s 509th Composite Group—required an operational base in the Western Pacific. In late February 1945, months before atomic bombs were ready for use, the high command selected Tinian, an island in the Northern Marianas Islands, for that base.
Library of Congress, Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-36
As part of the war with Japan, the Army Air Force waged a campaign to destroy major industrial centers with incendiary bombs. This document is General Curtis LeMay’s report on the firebombing of Tokyo–“the most destructive air raid in history”–which burned down over 16 square miles of the city, killed up to 100,000 civilians (the official figure was 83,793), injured more than 40,000, and made over 1 million homeless. [13] According to the “Foreword,” the purpose of the raid, which dropped 1,665 tons of incendiary bombs, was to destroy industrial and strategic targets “not to bomb indiscriminately civilian populations.” Air Force planners, however, did not distinguish civilian workers from the industrial and strategic structures that they were trying to destroy.
The killing of workers in the urban-industrial sector was one of the explicit goals of the air campaign against Japanese cities. According to a Joint Chiefs of Staff report on Japanese target systems, expected results from the bombing campaign included: “The absorption of man-hours in repair and relief; the dislocation of labor by casualty; the interruption of public services necessary to production, and above all the destruction of factories engaged in war industry.” While Stimson would later raise questions about the bombing of Japanese cities, he was largely disengaged from the details (as he was with atomic targeting).[14]
Firebombing raids on other cities followed Tokyo, including Osaka, Kobe, Yokahama, and Nagoya, but with fewer casualties (many civilians had fled the cities). For some historians, the urban fire-bombing strategy facilitated atomic targeting by creating a “new moral context,” in which earlier proscriptions against intentional targeting of civilians had eroded.[15]
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5d (copy from microfilm)
On 27 April, military officers and nuclear scientists met to discuss bombing techniques, criteria for target selection, and overall mission requirements. The discussion of “available targets” included Hiroshima, the “largest untouched target not on the 21st Bomber Command priority list.” But other targets were under consideration, including Yawata (northern Kyushu), Yokohama, and Tokyo (even though it was practically “rubble.”) The problem was that the Air Force had a policy of “laying waste” to Japan’s cities which created tension with the objective of reserving some urban targets for nuclear destruction. [16]
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5g (copy from microfilm)
As director of Los Alamos Laboratory, Oppenheimer’s priority was producing a deliverable bomb, but not so much the effects of the weapon on the people at the target. In keeping with General Groves’ emphasis on compartmentalization, the Manhattan Project experts on the effects of radiation on human biology were at the MetLab and other offices and had no interaction with the production and targeting units. In this short memorandum to Groves’ deputy, General Farrell, Oppenheimer explained the need for precautions because of the radiological dangers of a nuclear detonation. The initial radiation from the detonation would be fatal within a radius of about 6/10ths of a mile and “injurious” within a radius of a mile. The point was to keep the bombing mission crew safe; concern about radiation effects had no impact on targeting decisions. [17]
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5d (copy from microfilm)
Scientists and officers held further discussion of bombing mission requirements, including height of detonation, weather, radiation effects (Oppenheimer’s memo), plans for possible mission abort, and the various aspects of target selection, including priority cities (“a large urban area of more than three miles diameter”) and psychological dimension. As for target cities, the committee agreed that the following should be exempt from Army Air Force bombing so they would be available for nuclear targeting: Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, and Kokura Arsenal. Japan’s cultural capital, Kyoto, would not stay on the list. Pressure from Secretary of War Stimson had already taken Kyoto off the list of targets for incendiary bombings and he would successfully object to the atomic bombing of that city. [18]
Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress)
On May 14 and 15, Stimson had several conversations involving S-1 (the atomic bomb); during a talk with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, he estimated that possession of the bomb gave Washington a tremendous advantage—“held all the cards,” a “royal straight flush”– in dealing with Moscow on post-war problems: “They can’t get along without our help and industries and we have coming into action a weapon which will be unique.” The next day a discussion of divergences with Moscow over the Far East made Stimson wonder whether the atomic bomb would be ready when Truman met with Stalin in July. If it was, he believed that the bomb would be the “master card” in U.S. diplomacy. This and other entries from the Stimson diary (as well as the entry from the Davies diary that follows) are important to arguments developed by Gar Alperovitz and Barton J. Bernstein, among others, although with significantly different emphases, that in light of controversies with the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe and other areas, top officials in the Truman administration believed that possessing the atomic bomb would provide them with significant leverage for inducing Moscow’s acquiescence in U.S. objectives.[19]
Joseph E. Davies Papers, Library of Congress, box 17, 21 May 1945
While officials at the Pentagon continued to look closely at the problem of atomic targets, President Truman, like Stimson, was thinking about the diplomatic implications of the bomb. During a conversation with Joseph E. Davies, a prominent Washington lawyer and former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Truman said that he wanted to delay talks with Stalin and Churchill until July when the first atomic device had been tested. Alperovitz treated this entry as evidence in support of the atomic diplomacy argument, but other historians, ranging from Robert Maddox to Gabriel Kolko, have denied that the timing of the Potsdam conference had anything to do with the goal of using the bomb to intimidate the Soviets.[20]
Harrison-Bundy Files relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1942-1946, microfilm publication M1108 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1980), File 77: «Interim Committee – International Control.»
In what Stimson called the “letter of an honest man,” Oswald C. Brewster sent President Truman a profound analysis of the danger and unfeasibility of a U.S. atomic monopoly. [21] An engineer for the Kellex Corporation, which was involved in the gas diffusion project to enrich uranium, Brewster recognized that the objective was fissile material for a weapon. That goal, he feared, raised terrifying prospects with implications for the “inevitable destruction of our present day civilization.” Once the U.S. had used the bomb in combat other great powers would not tolerate a monopoly by any nation and the sole possessor would be “be the most hated and feared nation on earth.” Even the U.S.’s closest allies would want the bomb because “how could they know where our friendship might be five, ten, or twenty years hence.” Nuclear proliferation and arms races would be certain unless the U.S. worked toward international supervision and inspection of nuclear plants.
Brewster suggested that Japan could be used as a “target” for a “demonstration” of the bomb, which he did not further define. His implicit preference, however, was for non-use; he wrote that it would be better to take U.S. casualties in “conquering Japan” than “to bring upon the world the tragedy of unrestrained competitive production of this material.”
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5d (copy from microfilm)
More updates on training missions, target selection, and conditions required for successful detonation over the target. The target would be a city–either Hiroshima, Kyoto (still on the list), or Niigata–but specific “aiming points” would not be specified at that time nor would industrial “pin point” targets because they were likely to be on the “fringes” a city. The bomb would be dropped in the city’s center. “Pumpkins” referred to bright orange, pumpkin-shaped high explosive bombs—shaped like the “Fat Man” implosion weapon–used for bombing run test missions.
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5g (copy from microfilm)
At the end of May General Groves forwarded to Army Chief of Staff Marshall a “Plan of Operations” for the atomic bombings. While that plan has not surfaced, apparently its major features were incorporated in this 29 May 1945 message on the “special functions” of the 509th Composite Group sent from Chief of Staff General Lauris Norstad to General Curtis LeMay, chief of the XXI Bomber Command, headquartered in the Marianas Islands.[21A] The Norstad message reviewed the complex requirements for preparing B-29s and their crew for delivering nuclear weapons. He detailed the mission of the specially modified B-29s that comprised the 509th Composite Group, the “tactical factors” that applied, training and rehearsal issues, and the functions of “special personnel” and the Operational Studies Group. The targets listed—Hiroshima, Kyoto, and Niigato—were those that had been discussed at the Target Committee meeting on 28 May, but Kyoto would be dropped when Secretary Stimson objected (although that would remain a contested matter) and Kokura would eventually be substituted. As part of the Composite Group’s training to drop “special bombs,” it would practice with facsimiles—the conventionally-armed “Pumpkins.” The 509th Composite Group’s cover story for its secret mission was the preparation for the use of “Pumpkins” in battle.
Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (“Safe File”), July 1940-September 1945, box 12, S-1
Tacitly dissenting from the Targeting Committee’s recommendations, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall argued for initial nuclear use against a clear-cut military target such as a “large naval installation.” If that did not work, manufacturing areas could be targeted, but only after warning their inhabitants. Marshall noted the “opprobrium which might follow from an ill considered employment of such force.” This document has played a role in arguments developed by Barton J. Bernstein that figures such as Marshall and Stimson were “caught between an older morality that opposed the intentional killing of non-combatants and a newer one that stressed virtually total war.”[22]
RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 100 (copy from microfilm)
With Secretary of War Stimson presiding, members of the committee heard reports on a variety of Manhattan Project issues, including the stages of development of the atomic project, problems of secrecy, the possibility of informing the Soviet Union, cooperation with “like-minded” powers, the military impact of the bomb on Japan, and the problem of “undesirable scientists.” In his comments on a detonation over Japanese targets, Oppenheimer mentioned that the “neutron effect would be dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile,” but did not mention that the radiation could cause prolonged sickness.
Interested in producing the “greatest psychological effect,” the Committee members agreed that the “most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers’ houses.” Bernstein argues that this target choice represented an uneasy endorsement of “terror bombing”-the target was not exclusively military or civilian; nevertheless, worker’s housing would include non-combatant men, women, and children.[23] It is possible that Truman was informed of such discussions and their conclusions, although he clung to a belief that the prospective targets were strictly military.
University of California Bancroft Library, Ernest O. Lawrence Papers, Carton 28, Folder 20 (Microfilm reel 42) (copy courtesy of the Bancroft Library)
Parsons’ argument against a demonstration shot resonated for months. Lawrence recalled the discussion of an atomic bomb demonstration, which he then supported, during the lunch break of the 31 May 1945 meeting. Secretary of State Byrnes had invited Lawrence to discuss the case for a demonstration and the conclusion was that it “did not appear to be desirable.” First, “the number of people that would be killed by the bomb would not be greater in order of magnitude than the number already killed in fire raids.” Second, Oppenheimer “could think of no demonstration that would be sufficiently spectacular to convince the [Japanese] that further resistance was useless.” Oppenheimer felt, as did Groves and others, “that the only way to put on a demonstration would be to attack a real target of built-up structures.”
Record Group 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, American-British-Canadian Top Secret Correspondence, Box 504, “ABC 387 Japan (15 Feb. 45)
George A. Lincoln, chief of the Strategy and Policy Group at U.S. Army’s Operations Department, commented on a memorandum by former President Herbert Hoover that Stimson had passed on for analysis. Hoover proposed a compromise solution with Japan that would allow Tokyo to retain part of its empire in East Asia (including Korea and Japan) as a way to head off Soviet influence in the region. While Lincoln believed that the proposed peace teams were militarily acceptable he doubted that they were workable or that they could check Soviet “expansion” which he saw as an inescapable result of World War II. As to how the war with Japan would end, he saw it as “unpredictable,” but speculated that “it will take Russian entry into the war, combined with a landing, or imminent threat of a landing, on Japan proper by us, to convince them of the hopelessness of their situation.” Lincoln derided Hoover’s casualty estimate of 500,000. J. Samuel Walker has cited this document to make the point that “contrary to revisionist assertions, American policymakers in the summer of 1945 were far from certain that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria would be enough in itself to force a Japanese surrender.” [24]
RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 100 (copy from microfilm)
In a memorandum to George Harrison, Stimson’s special assistant on Manhattan Project matters, Arneson noted actions taken at the recent Interim Committee meetings, including target criterion and an attack “without prior warning.”
Henry Stimson Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress)
Stimson and Truman began this meeting by discussing how they should handle a conflict with French President DeGaulle over the movement by French forces into Italian territory. (Truman finally cut off military aid to France to compel the French to pull back). [25] As evident from the discussion, Stimson strongly disliked de Gaulle whom he regarded as “psychopathic.” The conversation soon turned to the atomic bomb, with some discussion about plans to inform the Soviets but only after a successful test. Both agreed that the possibility of a nuclear “partnership” with Moscow would depend on “quid pro quos”: “the settlement of the Polish, Rumanian, Yugoslavian, and Manchurian problems.”
At the end, Stimson shared his doubts about targeting cities and killing civilians through area bombing because of its impact on the U.S.’s reputation as well as on the problem of finding targets for the atomic bomb. Barton Bernstein has also pointed to this as additional evidence of the influence on Stimson of an “an older morality.” While concerned about the U.S.’s reputation, Stimson did not want the Air Force to bomb Japanese cities so thoroughly that the “new weapon would not have a fair background to show its strength,” a comment that made Truman laugh. The discussion of “area bombing” may have reminded him that Japanese civilians remained at risk from U.S. bombing operations.
RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 76 (copy from microfilm)
Physicists Leo Szilard and James Franck, a Nobel Prize winner, were on the staff of the “Metallurgical Laboratory” at the University of Chicago, a cover for the Manhattan Project program to produce fuel for the bomb. The outspoken Szilard was not involved in operational work on the bomb and General Groves kept him under surveillance but Met Lab director Arthur Compton found Szilard useful to have around. Concerned with the long-run implications of the bomb, Franck chaired a committee, in which Szilard and Eugene Rabinowitch were major contributors, that produced a report rejecting a surprise attack on Japan and recommended instead a demonstration of the bomb on the “desert or a barren island.” Arguing that a nuclear arms race “will be on in earnest not later than the morning after our first demonstration of the existence of nuclear weapons,” the committee saw international control as the alternative. That possibility would be difficult if the United States made first military use of the weapon. Compton raised doubts about the recommendations but urged Stimson to study the report. Martin Sherwin has argued that the Franck committee shared an important assumption with Truman et al.–that an “atomic attack against Japan would `shock’ the Russians”–but drew entirely different conclusions about the import of such a shock. [26]
Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (“Safe File”), July 1940-September 1945, box 8, Japan (After December 7/41)
A former ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew’s extensive knowledge of Japanese politics and culture informed his stance toward the concept of unconditional surrender. He believed it essential that the United States declare its intention to preserve the institution of the emperor. As he argued in this memorandum to President Truman, “failure on our part to clarify our intentions” on the status of the emperor “will insure prolongation of the war and cost a large number of human lives.” Documents like this have played a role in arguments developed by Alperovitz that Truman and his advisers had alternatives to using the bomb such as modifying unconditional surrender and that anti-Soviet considerations weighed most heavily in their thinking. By contrast, Herbert P. Bix has suggested that the Japanese leadership would “probably not” have surrendered if the Truman administration had spelled out the status of the emperor.[27]
Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (“Safe File”), July 1940-September 1945, box 8, Japan (After December 7/41)
Commenting on another memorandum by Herbert Hoover, George A. Lincoln discussed war aims, face-saving proposals for Japan, and the nature of the proposed declaration to the Japanese government, including the problem of defining “unconditional surrender.” Lincoln argued against modifying the concept of unconditional surrender: if it is “phrased so as to invite negotiation” he saw risks of prolonging the war or a “compromise peace.” J. Samuel Walker has observed that those risks help explain why senior officials were unwilling to modify the demand for unconditional surrender.[28]
RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 76 (copy from microfilm)
In a report to Stimson, Oppenheimer and colleagues on the scientific advisory panel–Arthur Compton, Ernest O. Lawrence, and Enrico Fermi—tacitly disagreed with the report of the “Met Lab” scientists. The panel argued for early military use but not before informing key allies about the atomic project to open a dialogue on “how we can cooperate in making this development contribute to improved international relations.”
Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal Files, 1942-1945, box 198 334 JCS (2-2-45) Mtg 186th-194th
With the devastating battle for Okinawa winding up, Truman and the Joint Chiefs stepped back and considered what it would take to secure Japan’s surrender. The discussion depicted a Japan that, by 1 November, would be close to defeat, with great destruction and economic losses produced by aerial bombing and naval blockade, but not ready to capitulate. Marshall believed that the latter required Soviet entry and an invasion of Kyushu, even suggesting that Soviet entry might be the “decisive action levering them into capitulation.” Truman and the Chiefs reviewed plans to land troops on Kyushu on 1 November, which Marshall believed was essential because air power was not decisive. He believed that casualties would not be more than those produced by the battle for Luzon, some 31,000. This account hints at discussion of the atomic bomb (“certain other matters”), but no documents disclose that part of the meeting.
The record of this meeting has figured in the complex debate over the estimates of casualties stemming from a possible invasion of Japan. While post-war justifications for the bomb suggested that an invasion of Japan could have produced very high levels of casualties (dead, wounded, or missing), from hundreds of thousands to a million, historians have vigorously debated the extent to which the estimates were inflated. [29]
According to accounts based on post-war recollections and interviews, during the meeting McCloy raised the possibility of winding up the war by guaranteeing the preservation of the emperor albeit as a constitutional monarch. If that failed to persuade Tokyo, he proposed that the United States disclose the secret of the atomic bomb to secure Japan’s unconditional surrender. While McCloy later recalled that Truman expressed interest, he said that Secretary of State Byrnes squashed the proposal because of his opposition to any “deals” with Japan. Yet, according to Forrest Pogue’s account, when Truman asked McCloy if he had any comments, the latter opened up a discussion of nuclear weapons use by asking “Why not use the bomb?”[30]
RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 100 (copy from microfilm)
For Harrison’s convenience, Arneson summarized key decisions made at the 21 June meeting of the Interim Committee, including a recommendation that President Truman use the forthcoming conference of allied leaders to inform Stalin about the atomic project. The Committee also reaffirmed earlier recommendations about the use of the bomb at the “earliest opportunity” against “dual targets.” In addition, Arneson included the Committee’s recommendation for revoking part two of the 1944 Quebec agreement which stipulated that the neither the United States nor Great Britain would use the bomb “against third parties without each other’s consent.” Thus, an impulse for unilateral control of nuclear use decisions predated the first use of the bomb.
Reminding Stimson about the objections of some Manhattan project scientists to military use of the bomb, Harrison summarized the basic arguments of the Franck report. One recommendation shared by many of the scientists, whether they supported the report or not, was that the United States inform Stalin of the bomb before it was used. This proposal had been the subject of positive discussion by the Interim Committee on the grounds that Soviet confidence was necessary to make possible post-war cooperation on atomic energy.
Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard joined those scientists who sought to avoid military use of the bomb; he proposed a “preliminary warning” so that the United States would retain its position as a “great humanitarian nation.” Alperovitz cites evidence that Bard discussed his proposal with Truman who told him that he had already thoroughly examined the problem of advanced warning. This document has also figured in the argument framed by Barton Bernstein that Truman and his advisers took it for granted that the bomb was a legitimate weapon and that there was no reason to explore alternatives to military use. Bernstein, however, notes that Bard later denied that he had a meeting with Truman and that White House appointment logs support that claim.[31]
RG 107, Office of Assistant Secretary of War Formerly Classified Correspondence of John J. McCloy, 1941-1945, box 38, ASW 387 Japan
Despite the interest of some senior officials such as Joseph Grew, Henry Stimson, and John J. McCloy in modifying the concept of unconditional surrender so that the Japanese could be sure that the emperor would be preserved, it remained a highly contentious subject. For example, one of McCloy’s aides, Colonel Fahey, argued against modification of unconditional surrender (see “Appendix ‘C`”).
Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (“Safe File”), July 1940-September 1945, box 8, Japan (After December 7/41)
McCloy was part of a drafting committee at work on the text of a proclamation to Japan to be signed by heads of state at the forthcoming Potsdam conference. As McCloy observed the most contentious issue was whether the proclamation should include language about the preservation of the emperor: “This may cause repercussions at home but without it those who seem to know the most about Japan feel there would be very little likelihood of acceptance.”
Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (“Safe File”), July 1940-September 1945, box 8, Japan (After December 7/41)
Probably the work of General George A. Lincoln at Army Operations, this document was prepared a few weeks before the Potsdam conference when senior officials were starting to finalize the text of the declaration that Truman, Churchill, and Chiang would issue there. The author recommended issuing the declaration “just before the bombardment program [against Japan] reaches its peak.” Next to that suggestion, Stimson or someone in his immediate office, wrote “S1”, implying that the atomic bombing of Japanese cities was highly relevant to the timing issue. Also relevant to Japanese thinking about surrender, the author speculated, was the Soviet attack on their forces after a declaration of war.
Naval Aide to the President Files, box 4, Berlin Conference File, Volume XI – Miscellaneous papers: Japan, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library
On 2 July Stimson presented to President Truman a proposal that he had worked up with colleagues in the War Department, including McCloy, Marshall, and Grew. The proposal has been characterized as “the most comprehensive attempt by any American policymaker to leverage diplomacy” in order to shorten the Pacific War. Stimson had in mind a “carefully timed warning” delivered before the invasion of Japan. Some of the key elements of Stimson’s argument were his assumption that “Japan is susceptible to reason” and that Japanese might be even more inclined to surrender if “we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty.” The possibility of a Soviet attack would be part of the “threat.” As part of the threat message, Stimson alluded to the “inevitability and completeness of the destruction” which Japan could suffer, but he did not make it clear whether unconditional surrender terms should be clarified before using the atomic bomb. Truman read Stimson’s proposal, which he said was “powerful,” but made no commitments to the details, e.g., the position of the emperor. [32]
Record Group 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees, Secretary’s Staff Meetings Minutes, 1944-1947 (copy from microfilm)
The possibility of modifying the concept of unconditional surrender so that it guaranteed the continuation of the emperor remained hotly contested within the U.S. government. Here senior State Department officials, Under Secretary Joseph Grew on one side, and Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish on the other, engaged in hot debate.
RG 218, Central Decimal Files, 1943-1945, CCS 381 (6-4-45), Sec. 2 Pt. 5
This review of Japanese capabilities and intentions portrays an economy and society under “tremendous strain”; nevertheless, “the ground component of the Japanese armed forces remains Japan’s greatest military asset.” Alperovitz sees statements in this estimate about the impact of Soviet entry into the war and the possibility of a conditional surrender involving survival of the emperor as an institution as more evidence that the policymakers saw alternatives to nuclear weapons use. By contrast, Richard Frank takes note of the estimate’s depiction of the Japanese army’s terms for peace: “for surrender to be acceptable to the Japanese army it would be necessary for the military leaders to believe that it would not entail discrediting the warrior tradition and that it would permit the ultimate resurgence of a military in Japan.” That, Frank argues, would have been “unacceptable to any Allied policy maker.”[33]
Record Group 59, Decimal Files 1945-1949, 740.0011 PW (PE)/7-1645
On the eve of the Potsdam Conference, a State Department draft of the proclamation to Japan contained language which modified unconditional surrender by promising to retain the emperor. When former Secretary of State Cordell Hull learned about it he outlined his objections to Byrnes, arguing that it might be better to wait “the climax of allied bombing and Russia’s entry into the war.” Byrnes was already inclined to reject that part of the draft, but Hull’s argument may have reinforced his decision.
Henry L. Stimson Papers (MS 465), Sterling Library, Yale University (reel 113) (microfilm at Library of Congress)
Still interested in trying to find ways to “warn Japan into surrender,” this represents an attempt by Stimson before the Potsdam conference, to persuade Truman and Byrnes to agree to issue warnings to Japan prior to the use of the bomb. The warning would draw on the draft State-War proclamation to Japan; presumably, the one criticized by Hull (above) which included language about the emperor. Presumably the clarified warning would be issued prior to the use of the bomb; if the Japanese persisted in fighting then “the full force of our new weapons should be brought to bear” and a “heavier” warning would be issued backed by the “actual entrance of the Russians in the war.” Possibly, as Malloy has argued, Stimson was motivated by concerns about using the bomb against civilians and cities, but his latest proposal would meet resistance at Potsdam from Byrnes and other.[34]
RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 76 (copy from microfilm)
On the eve of the Potsdam conference, Leo Szilard circulated a petition as part of a final effort to discourage military use of the bomb. Signed by about 68 Manhattan Project scientists, mainly physicists and biologists (copies with the remaining signatures are in the archival file), the petition did not explicitly reject military use, but raised questions about an arms race that military use could instigate and requested Truman to publicize detailed terms for Japanese surrender. Truman, already on his way to Europe, never saw the petition.[35]
National Security Agency Mandatory declassification review release.
Beginning in September 1940, U.S. military intelligence began to decrypt routinely, under the “Purple” code-name, the intercepted cable traffic of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Collectively the decoded messages were known as “Magic.” How this came about is explained in an internal history of pre-war and World War II Army and Navy code-breaking activities prepared by William F. Friedman, a central figure in the development of U.S. government cryptology during the 20th century. The National Security Agency kept the ‘Magic” diplomatic and military summaries classified for many years and did not release the entire series for 1942 through August 1945 until the early 1990s.[36]
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Magic” Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
The 12 July 1945 “Magic” summary includes a report on a cable from Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow concerning the Emperor’s decision to seek Soviet help in ending the war. Not knowing that the Soviets had already made a commitment to their Allies to declare war on Japan, Tokyo fruitlessly pursued this option for several weeks. The “Magic” intercepts from mid-July have figured in Gar Alperovitz’s argument that Truman and his advisers recognized that the Emperor was ready to capitulate if the Allies showed more flexibility on the demand for unconditional surrender. This point is central to Alperovitz’s thesis that top U.S. officials recognized a “two-step logic”: relaxing unconditional surrender and a Soviet declaration of war would have been enough to induce Japan’s surrender without the use of the bomb.[37]
RG 165, Army Operations OPD Executive File #17, Item 13 (copy courtesy of J. Samuel Walker)
The day after the Togo message was reported, Army intelligence chief Weckerling proposed several possible explanations of the Japanese diplomatic initiative. Robert J. Maddox has cited this document to support his argument that top U.S. officials recognized that Japan was not close to surrender because Japan was trying to “stave off defeat.” In a close analysis of this document, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, who is also skeptical of claims that the Japanese had decided to surrender, argues that each of the three possibilities proposed by Weckerling “contained an element of truth, but none was entirely correct”. For example, the “governing clique” that supported the peace moves was not trying to “stave off defeat” but was seeking Soviet help to end the war.[38]
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Magic” Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18
The day after he told Sato about the current thinking on Soviet mediation, Togo requested the Ambassador to see Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and tell him of the Emperor’s “private intention to send Prince Konoye as a Special Envoy” to Moscow. Before he received Togo’s message, Sato had already met with Molotov on another matter.
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Magic” Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
Another intercept of a cable from Togo to Sato shows that the Foreign Minister rejected unconditional surrender and that the Emperor was not “asking the Russian’s mediation in anything like unconditional surrender.” Incidentally, this “`Magic’ Diplomatic Summary” indicates the broad scope and capabilities of the program; for example, it includes translations of intercepted French messages (see pages 8-9).
Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 916-917 [Translation by Hikaru Tajima]
In 1944 Navy minister Mitsumasa Yonai ordered rear admiral Sokichi Takagi to go on sick leave so that he could undertake a secret mission to find a way to end the war. Takagi was soon at the center of a cabal of Japanese defense officials, civil servants, and academics, which concluded that, in the end, the emperor would have to “impose his decision on the military and the government.” Takagi kept a detailed account of his activities, part of which was in diary form, the other part of which he kept on index cards. The material reproduced here gives a sense of the state of play of Foreign Minister Togo’s attempt to secure Soviet mediation. Hasegawa cited it and other documents to make a larger point about the inability of the Japanese government to agree on “concrete” proposals to negotiate an end to the war.[39]
The last item discusses Japanese contacts with representatives of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Switzerland. The reference to “our contact” may refer to Bank of International Settlements economist Pers Jacobbson who was in touch with Japanese representatives to the Bank as well as Gero von Gävernitz, then on the staff, but with non-official cover, of OSS station chief Allen Dulles. The contacts never went far and Dulles never received encouragement to pursue them.[40]
L.D. Riabev, ed., Atomnyi Proekt SSSR (Moscow: izd MFTI, 2002), Volume 1, Part 2, 335-336
This 10 July 1945 letter from NKVD director V. N. Merkulov to Beria is an example of Soviet efforts to collect inside information on the Manhattan Project, although not all the detail was accurate. Merkulov reported that the United States had scheduled the test of a nuclear device for that same day, although the actual test took place 6 days later. According to Merkulov, two fissile materials were being produced: element-49 (plutonium), and U-235; the test device was fueled by plutonium. The Soviet source reported that the weight of the device was 3 tons (which was in the ball park) and forecast an explosive yield of 5 kilotons. That figure was based on underestimates by Manhattan Project scientists: the actual yield of the test device was 20 kilotons.
As indicated by the L.D. Riabev’s notes, it is possible that Beria’s copy of this letter ended up in Stalin’s papers. That the original copy is missing from Beria’s papers suggests that he may have passed it on to Stalin before the latter left for the Potsdam conference.[41]
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File 5e (copy from microfilm)
An elated message from Harrison to Stimson reported the success of the Trinity Test of a plutonium implosion weapon. The light from the explosion could been seen “from here [Washington, D.C.] to “high hold” [Stimson’s estate on Long Island—250 miles away]” and it was so loud that Harrison could have heard the “screams” from Washington, D.C. to “my farm” [in Upperville, VA, 50 miles away][42]
A little-known story in Manhattan Project history is the secret discussions held in Chicago on 24 July 1945 concerning the schedule for the production of atomic weapons, including ones with even higher capacity.[43A] On 19 July 1945, Oppenheimer sent Groves a teletype, NR364T, which remains classified (but the subject of a FOIA request), that included a proposal for using a “large amount” of HEU from Little Boy “to make composite cores with plutonium and enriched uranium.”[43B] By proposing a design change, Oppenheimer may have had in mind advantages in explosive yield or efficiency, but that needs to be clarified. But what he proposed raised questions about the schedule for weapons use and production that Groves refused to consider. Groves declared that, “Factors beyond our control prevent us from considering any decision, other than to proceed according to the existing schedules for the time being”: Little Boy first, then the first Fat Man, “probably a second one,” and possibly a third “to conform to planned strategical operations.” Groves told Oppenheimer he was “planning on coming out to see you and discuss this problem.”
NARA, Leslie R. Groves Personal Papers Lieutenant General Leslie Richard Groves, Jr. Visitations and Telephone Calls Diaries, November 19, 1940–February 28, 1948
On July 19 at 4:32 p.m., Groves spoke with James B. Conant about an earlier discussion with Oppenheimer, although he may have meant the teletyped message. Using Aesopian language, Groves recounted that Oppenheimer had told him that that “the boys out there [at Los Alamos] are discussing the advantages of murdering L.B. and devoting all of his clothes to the F.B” [i.e., Fat Man] In other words, some Los Alamos scientists wanted to stop production of Little Boy HEU-weapons and use the enriched uranium (“clothes”) for producing implosion weapons, the “Fat Man” type.(That may not have been exactly what Oppenheimer had in mind; future declassifications may clarify the point.)
Groves told Conant that such a course “would be a terrible mistake,” and Conant stated most emphatically “SO DO I. I AGREE WITH YOU 100%.” [Emphasis in original] Groves was thinking of going to Los Alamos where apparently Tolman was already.
At 5:25 p.m. the same day, during a call with Groves, Tolman discussed elliptically the proposals for changing the schedule for weapon use. He told Groves that “he didn’t know all the facts but there are a considerable body of people out there who think it should be changed but Tolman believed” otherwise: “we have something to learn by not changing” [the schedule].
Groves then spoke with Oppenheimer about several matters and suggested meeting the following week, possibly in Chicago.
In a somewhat cryptic statement, Oppenheimer “asked whether he would be more useful with Kirk [Possibly a reference to his Berkeley colleague Paul L. Kirk] or where he is and Groves advised he wished Oppenheimer were twins.” Whatever was being said, Groves was plainly flattering Oppenheimer.
During a conversation on 20 July at 4:40 p.m., Oppenheimer told Groves that Los Alamos implosion expert Hartley Rowe “advises that the original plan should go through as originally scheduled.” Apparently [Robert] Bacher wanted to use the fissile material as proposed [to produce uranium implosion weapons?] because 1. “it increases the number [of weapons?] we get out of it,” 2. it “reduces the unreliable feature we have discussed, although does not eliminate” it, and 3. “can’t see that it does any harm”; «to make this change will cost between a week or 10 days and the feeling we have rather strongly is that we ought to do this next time.” The last several points need elucidation.
Groves “asked if the decision had to be made before they met in Chicago and JRO stated if they don’t make the decision now to postpone it 5 days will simply be 3 days later.”
Groves “decided that JRO would fly to Chicago where he and there General would meet for a few hours—to meet in Chicago on Tuesday.”
Stimson aide George L. Harrison reported to his boss that the first implosion weapon (“the tested type”) would be ready for delivery on 6 August and that the next one would be “ready” by 24 August. “Additional ones ready at accelerating rate from possibly three in September to we hope seven or more in December. The increased rate above three per month entails changes in design which Groves believes thoroughly sound.” Whether Harrison knew about the proposals for composite uranium-plutonium “composite” weapons—the change in design that Groves had in mind—is not clear, but he knew that Groves would meet with Oppenheimer in Chicago to discuss “future plans.”
RG 77, Top Secret MED documents, Box 3, folder 5I, Notes Taken in Chicago
During the 24 July 1945 meeting, Richard Tolman took detailed notes of the discussions of weapons effects and schedules for weapons production. The National Archives declassified the Tolman notes in 1996 in an excised version, but they have remained unknown since then because they reside in the paper copies of top secret Manhattan Project records, which are off limits to researchers (who only have access to the microfilm version). A request to NARA’s reference division was necessary to determine whether the documents mentioned by Robert S. Norris in his book on General Groves had become available, which they had.[43C]
A subtext of Tolman’s detailed notes of the meeting is that, as General Groves insisted on 19 July, the first few bombs (Little Boy and Fat Man) would be used according to the schedule. Whether more weapons would become available for use and when that could happen was a central topic for discussion.
The Tolman notes have significant excisions making them difficult to interpret but the second page consists of three columns, possibly on the production schedule for the three weapons types that had been under discussion—Litle Boy, Fat Man, and the composite uranium-PU weapons. As a guess, the first column lists availabilities for Little Boy weapons, which would have been fewer in number; the second column lists implosion weapons; and the third may list the HEU-PU composite that Oppenheimer had proposed. Justifying that interpretation is the message that Groves sent to Marshall later that day, indicating a sharp increase in numbers of composite weapons later in the year.
The third page of typed notes include a section on “Decision as of today: (July 24, 1945).” The decisions were:
Continue with 49 as at present [Produce plutonium implosion weapons]
Develop 25 to achieve effective use immediately [Produce Little Boy weapons using HEU or “25”]
Prepare to develop 25-49 if called upon by 30 July or later [A reference to the composite HEU-plutonium implosion weapons]
Prepare to develop 25 to achieve 49 power by l November [Possibly a reference to using HEU cores for implosion weapons]
LRG to attempt to get additional information which will permit more definite decision.
LRG to report to S of W and C of S the possibilities” [Groves sent a report to Chief of Staff Marshall later that day.]
None of the three participants had any idea how long the atomic bombings against Japan would last and whether only a few weapons would be used. Evidently, Groves wanted to be prepared for a longer campaign and expected Los Alamos to prepare the numbers of weapons needed for such a purpose. (Within weeks, however, as the war against Japan ended, Army-Air Force leaders were looking closely at Soviet targets, and Groves was critiquing the projected numbers of weapons and targeting arrangements.)
Tolman’s notes for the meeting do not specify who said what to whom but are somewhat in thematic order. The top of the first page concerns weapons effects from the Trinity test, including blast (“B”) damage and radiation (neutrons and gamma rays). The participants optimistically projected “No real effects anticipated on the ground from radioactive materials,” and that “we think we can move troops right through.”
For unexplained reasons, the notes refer to a bet placed by Enrico Fermi in a moment of dark humor during the hours before the Trinity test, on whether there was a “1/30 chance or blowing up New Mexico” or a “1/1000 chance of blowing up World.”[43D]
One sentence refers to staffing at Los Alamos and other sites: “What to do with people – – Keep temporarily, then reduce surplus with kindness.”
A reference to the hydrogen bomb (“super”) consists of: “What to do with super — nothing essential.” That was a touchy issue because of Edward Teller’s central role in managing what was a backburner project. Groves and Oppenheimer made a non-decision by leaving the project alone, without advancing it.
Below the production schedule columns is more discussion of weapons effects as well as plans for using the weapons, including height of burst—with 15 kilotons anticipated at 1850 feet.
A brief discussion of the “overpressure” caused by the blast followed—the powerful blast wave would place objects within its path under severe, sharp increases in atmospheric pressure. If the editor is reading this correctly, the overpressure for the area within 2 and a half square miles would go up to 7 pounds, but within 900 feet the “shock area,” under 150 pounds of overpressure, would be deadly. At 1200 feet the overpressure would be 60 pounds.
One suggestion was that destruction of industrial areas would require a lower blast elevation at 1400 feet.
“Decisions as of today” are followed by more points about weapons effects,
then some unexplained details about a “new plug assembly” for the composite weapon and a plug for an HEU weapon that would cause up to a ten-day delay.
Soon after the meeting in Chicago, Groves sent a report to General Marshall, who was then attending the Potsdam conference. Groves explained the plans to deliver atomic bombs from Tinian Island, the three potential targets, methods of delivery, plans for later delivery of a third and subsequent weapon, and the operation’s military organization, with directives attached. Concerning later plans, Groves informed Marshall that a “sharp increase to seven [weapons] in December is dependent upon the modification of the present implosion bomb which uses plutonium only to one using a combination of plutonium and uranium 235.” Apparently that was consistent with the production schedule that Groves and Oppenheimer had approved earlier that day.
The targets that Groves listed were Hiroshima, Kokura, and Niigata, in that order. That same day, however, Amy Air Force leaders modified the target list so that it included Nagasaki.
Los Alamos developed “composite” weapons in the months ahead and they received their first test in the 1948 “Sandstone” series. Their use along with other innovations would contribute to significant increases in the “efficiency’’ and explosive yields of nuclear weapons.[43E]
Barton J. Bernstein, “Truman at Potsdam: His Secret Diary,” Foreign Service Journal, July/August 1980, excerpts, used with author’s permission.[44]
Some years after Truman’s death, a hand-written diary that he kept during the Potsdam conference surfaced in his personal papers. For convenience, Barton Bernstein’s rendition is provided here but linked here are the scanned versions of Truman’s handwriting on the National Archives’ website (for 15-30 July).
The diary entries cover July 16, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, and 30 and include Truman’s thinking about a number of issues and developments, including his reactions to Churchill and Stalin, the atomic bomb and how it should be targeted, the possible impact of the bomb and a Soviet declaration of war on Japan, and his decision to tell Stalin about the bomb. Receptive to pressure from Stimson, Truman recorded his decision to take Japan’s “old capital” (Kyoto) off the atomic bomb target list. Barton Bernstein and Richard Frank, among others, have argued that Truman’s assertion that the atomic targets were “military objectives” suggested that either he did not understand the power of the new weapons or had simply deceived himself about the nature of the targets.
Moreover, notwithstanding Truman’s concern about sparing “women and children” from the bomb, he did not seek information about the targeting plans developed by Army Air Force officers on Tinian Island, who selected “aiming points” designed to maximize destruction on the targeted cities.
Another statement—“Fini Japs when that [Soviet entry] comes about”—has also been the subject of controversy over whether it meant that Truman thought that a Soviet declaration of war could end the conflict without an invasion of Japan.[45]
Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress)
Stimson did not always have Truman’s ear, but historians have frequently cited his diary when he was at the Potsdam conference. There Stimson kept track of S-1 developments, including news of the successful first test (see entry for July 16) and the ongoing deployments for nuclear use against Japan. When Truman received a detailed account of the test, Stimson reported that the “President was tremendously pepped up by it” and that “it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence” (see entry for July 21). Whether this meant that Truman was getting ready for a confrontation with Stalin over Eastern Europe and other matters has also been the subject of debate.
An important question that Stimson discussed with Marshall, at Truman’s request, was whether Soviet entry into the war remained necessary to secure Tokyo’s surrender. Marshall was not sure whether that was so although Stimson privately believed that the atomic bomb would provide enough to force surrender (see entry for July 23). This entry has been cited by all sides of the controversy over whether Truman was trying to keep the Soviets out of the war.[46] During the meeting on August 24, discussed above, Stimson gave his reasons for taking Kyoto off the atomic target list: destroying that city would have caused such “bitterness” that it could have become impossible “to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians.” Stimson vainly tried to preserve language in the Potsdam Declaration designed to assure the Japanese about “the continuance of their dynasty” but received Truman’s assurance that such a consideration could be conveyed later through diplomatic channels (see entry for July 24). Hasegawa argues that Truman realized that the Japanese would refuse a demand for unconditional surrender without a proviso on a constitutional monarchy and that “he needed Japan’s refusal to justify the use of the atomic bomb.”[47]
Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. Brown Papers, box 10, folder 12, Byrnes, James F.: Potsdam, Minutes, July-August 1945
Walter Brown, who served as special assistant to Secretary of State Byrnes, kept a diary which provided considerable detail on the Potsdam conference and the growing concerns about Soviet policy among top U.S. officials. This document is a typed-up version of the hand-written original (which Brown’s family has provided to Clemson University). That there may be a difference between the two sources becomes evident from some of the entries; for example, in the entry for July 18, 1945 Brown wrote: «Although I knew about the atomic bomb when I wrote these notes, I dared not place it in writing in my book.”
The degree to which the typed-up version reflects the original is worth investigating. In any event, historians have used information from the diary to support various interpretations. For example, Bernstein cites the entries for 20 and 24 July to argue that “American leaders did not view Soviet entry as a substitute for the bomb” but that the latter “would be so powerful, and the Soviet presence in Manchuria so militarily significant, that there was no need for actual Soviet intervention in the war.” For Brown’s diary entry of 3 August 9 1945 historians have developed conflicting interpretations (See discussion of document 57).[48]
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Magic” Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
This “Magic” summary includes messages from both Togo and Sato. In a long and impassioned message, the latter argued why Japan must accept defeat: “it is meaningless to prove one’s devotion [to the Emperor] by wrecking the State.” Togo rejected Sato’s advice that Japan could accept unconditional surrender with one qualification: the “preservation of the Imperial House.” Probably unable or unwilling to take a soft position in an official cable, Togo declared that “the whole country … will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will as long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender.”
Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, James Forrestal Diaries
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was a regular recipient of “Magic” intercept reports; this substantial entry reviews the dramatic Sato-Togo exchanges covered in the 22 July “Magic” summary (although Forrestal misdated Sato’s cable as “first of July” instead of the 21st). In contrast to Alperovitz’s argument that Forrestal tried to modify the terms of unconditional surrender to give the Japanese an out, Frank sees Forrestal’s account of the Sato-Togo exchange as additional evidence that senior U.S. officials understood that Tokyo was not on the “cusp of surrender.” [49]
Joseph E. Davies Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, box 19, 29 July 1945
Having been asked by Truman to join the delegation to the Potsdam conference, former-Ambassador Davies sat at the table with the Big Three throughout the discussions. This diary entry has figured in the argument that Byrnes believed that the atomic bomb gave the United States a significant advantage in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Plainly Davies thought otherwise.[50]
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Magic” Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
In the Potsdam Declaration the governments of China, Great Britain, and the United States) demanded the “unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces. “The alternative is prompt and utter destruction.” The next day, in response to questions from journalists about the government’s reaction to the ultimatum, Prime Minister Suzuki apparently said that “We can only ignore [mokusatsu] it. We will do our utmost to complete the war to the bitter end.” That, Bix argues, represents a “missed opportunity” to end the war and spare the Japanese from continued U.S. aerial attacks.[51] Togo’s private position was more nuanced than Suzuki’s; he told Sato that “we are adopting a policy of careful study.” That Stalin had not signed the declaration (Truman and Churchill did not ask him to) led to questions about the Soviet attitude. Togo asked Sato to try to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov as soon as possible to “sound out the Russian attitude” on the declaration as well as Japan’s end-the-war initiative. Sato cabled Togo earlier that he saw no point in approaching the Soviets on ending the war until Tokyo had “concrete proposals.” “Any aid from the Soviets has now become extremely doubtful.”
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Magic” Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
This report included an intercept of a message from Sato reporting that it was impossible to see Molotov and that unless the Togo had a “concrete and definite plan for terminating the war” he saw no point in attempting to meet with him.
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Magic” Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
An intercepted message from Togo to Sato showed that Tokyo remained interested in securing Moscow’s good office but that it “is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once.” “[W]e are exerting ourselves to collect the views of all quarters on the matter of concrete terms.” Barton Bernstein, Richard Frank, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, among others, have argued that the “Magic” intercepts from the end of July and early August show that the Japanese were far from ready to surrender. According to Herbert Bix, for months Hirohito had believed that the “outlook for a negotiated peace could be improved if Japan fought and won one last decisive battle,” thus, he delayed surrender, continuing to “procrastinate until the bomb was dropped and the Soviets attacked.”[52]
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Magic” Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
This summary included intercepts of Japanese diplomatic reporting on the Soviet buildup in the Far East as well as a naval intelligence report on Anglo-American discussions of U.S. plans for the invasion of Japan. Part II of the summary includes the rest of Togo’s 2 August cable which instructed Sato to do what he could to arrange an interview with Molotov.
Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. Brown Papers, box 10, folder 12, Byrnes, James F.: Potsdam, Minutes, July-August 1945
Historians have used this item in the papers of Byrne’s aide, Walter Brown, to make a variety of points. Richard Frank sees this brief discussion of Japan’s interest in Soviet diplomatic assistance as crucial evidence that Admiral Leahy had been sharing “MAGIC” information with President Truman. He also points out that Truman and his colleagues had no idea what was behind Japanese peace moves, only that Suzuki had declared that he would “ignore” the Potsdam Declaration. Alperovitz, however, treats it as additional evidence that “strongly suggests” that Truman saw alternatives to using the bomb.[53]
RG 457, Summaries of Intercepted Japanese Messages (“Magic” Far East Summary, March 20, 1942 – October 2, 1945), box 7, SRS 491-547
This “Far East Summary” included reports on the Japanese Army’s plans to disperse fuel stocks to reduce vulnerability to bombing attacks, the text of a directive by the commander of naval forces on “Operation Homeland,” the preparations and planning to repel a U.S. invasion of Honshu, and the specific identification of army divisions located in, or moving into, Kyushu. Both Richard Frank and Barton Bernstein have used intelligence reporting and analysis of the major buildup of Japanese forces on southern Kyushu to argue that U.S. military planners were so concerned about this development that by early August 1945 they were reconsidering their invasion plans.[54]
This summary included several intercepted messages from Sato, who conveyed his despair and exasperation over what he saw as Tokyo’s inability to develop terms for ending the war: “[I]f the Government and the Military dilly-dally in bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes.” Sato remained skeptical that the Soviets would have any interest in discussions with Tokyo: “it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Three Power Proclamation and then engage in conversations with our special envoy.”
IX. The Execution OrderDocuments 60A-D: These messages convey the process of creating and transmitting the execution order to bomb Hiroshima. Possibly not wanting to take responsibility for the first use of nuclear weapons, Army Air Force commanders sought formal authorization from Chief of Staff Marshall who was then in Potsdam
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, Files no. 5b and 5e (copies from microfilm)
These messages convey the process of creating and transmitting the execution order to bomb Hiroshima. Possibly not wanting to take responsibility for the first use of nuclear weapons, Army Air Force commanders sought formal authorization from Chief of Staff Marshall who was then in Potsdam.[55] On 22 July Marshall asked Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas Handy to prepare a draft; General Groves wrote one which went to Potsdam for Marshall’s approval. Colonel John Stone, an assistant to commanding General of the Army Air Forces Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, had just returned from Potsdam and updated his boss on the plans as they had developed. On 25 July Marshall informed Handy that Secretary of War Stimson had approved the text; that same day, Handy signed off on a directive which ordered the use of atomic weapons on Japan, with the first weapon assigned to one of four possible targets—Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki. “Additional bombs will be delivery on the [targets] as soon as made ready by the project staff.”
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5
With more information on the Alamogordo test available, Groves provided Marshall with detail on the destructive power of atomic weapons. Barton J. Bernstein has observed that Groves’ recommendation that troops could move into the “immediate explosion area” within a half hour demonstrates the prevalent lack of top-level knowledge of the dangers of nuclear weapons effects.[56] Groves also provided the schedule for the delivery of the weapons: the components of the gun-type bomb to be used on Hiroshima had arrived on Tinian, while the parts of the second weapon to be dropped were leaving San Francisco. By the end of November over ten weapons would be available, presumably in the event the war had continued.
The Hiroshima “operation” was originally slated to begin in early August depending on local conditions. As these cables indicate, reports of unfavorable weather delayed the plan. The second cable on 4 August shows that the schedule advanced to late in the evening of 5 August. The handwritten transcriptions are on the original archival copies.
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5b (copy from microfilm)
Two days after the bombing of Hiroshima, Groves provided Chief of Staff Marshall with a report which included messages from Captain William S. Parsons and others about the impact of the detonation which, through prompt radiation effects, fire storms, and blast effects, immediately killed at least 70,000, with many dying later from radiation sickness and other causes.[57]
How influential the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and later Nagasaki compared to the impact of the Soviet declaration of war were to the Japanese decision to surrender has been the subject of controversy among historians. Sadao Asada emphasizes the shock of the atomic bombs, while Herbert Bix has suggested that Hiroshima and the Soviet declaration of war made Hirohito and his court believe that failure to end the war could lead to the destruction of the imperial house. Frank and Hasegawa divide over the impact of the Soviet declaration of war, with Frank declaring that the Soviet intervention was “significant but not decisive” and Hasegawa arguing that the two atomic bombs “were not sufficient to change the direction of Japanese diplomacy. The Soviet invasion was.”[58]
Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. Brown Papers, box 68, folder 13, “Transcript/Draft B
Returning from the Potsdam Conference, sailing on the U.S.S. Augusta, Truman learned about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and announced it twice, first to those in the wardroom (socializing/dining area for commissioned officers), and then to the sailors’ mess. Still unaware of radiation effects, Truman emphasized the explosive yield. Later, he met with Secretary of State Byrnes and they discussed the Manhattan Project’s secrecy and the huge expenditures. Truman, who had been chair of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, said that “only on the appeal of Secretary of War Stimson did he refrain and let the War Department continue with the experiment unmolested.”
A. Zolotarev, ed., Sovetsko-Iaponskaia Voina 1945 Goda: Istoriia Voenno-Politicheskogo Protivoborstva Dvukh Derzhav v 30–40e Gody (Moscow: Terra, 1997 and 2000), Vol. 7 (1), 340-341.
To keep his pledge at Yalta to enter the war against Japan and to secure the territorial concessions promised at the conference (e.g., Soviet annexation of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin and a Soviet naval base at Port Arthur, etc.) Stalin considered various dates to schedule an attack. By early August he decided that 9-10 August 1945 would be the best dates for striking Japanese forces in Manchuria. In light of Japan’s efforts to seek Soviet mediation, Stalin wanted to enter the war quickly lest Tokyo reach a compromise peace with the Americans and the British at Moscow’s expense. But on 7 August, Stalin changed the instructions: the attack was to begin the next day. According to David Holloway, “it seems likely that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima the day before that impelled [Stalin] to speed up Soviet entry into the war” and “secure the gains promised at Yalta.”[59]
Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Papers of W. Averell Harriman, box 181, Chron File Aug 5-9, 1945.
The Soviets already knew about the U.S. atomic project from espionage sources in the United States and Britain so Molotov’s comment to Ambassador Harriman about the secrecy surrounding the U.S. atomic project can be taken with a grain of salt, although the Soviets were probably unaware of specific plans for nuclear use.
Documents 67A-B: Early High-level Reactions to the Hiroshima Bombing
Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ed. Shusen Shiroku (The Historical Records of the End of the War), annotated by Jun Eto, volume 4, 57-60 [Excerpts] [Translation by Toshihiro Higuchi]
Excerpts from the Foreign Ministry’s compilation about the end of the war show how news of the bombing reached Tokyo as well as how Foreign Minister’s Togo initially reacted to reports about Hiroshima. When he learned of the atomic bombing from the Domei News Agency, Togo believed that it was time to give up and advised the cabinet that the atomic attack provided the occasion for Japan to surrender on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. Togo could not persuade the cabinet, however, and the Army wanted to delay any decisions until it had learned what had happened to Hiroshima. When the Foreign Minister met with the Emperor, Hirohito agreed with him; he declared that the top priority was an early end to the war, although it would be acceptable to seek better surrender terms–probably U.S. acceptance of a figure-head emperor–if it did not interfere with that goal. In light of those instructions, Togo and Prime Minister Suzuki agreed that the Supreme War Council should meet the next day. [59A]
Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 923-924 [Translation by Hikaru Tajima]
An entry from Admiral Takagi’s diary for August 8 conveys more information on the mood in elite Japanese circles after Hiroshima, but before the Soviet declaration of war and the bombing of Nagasaki. Seeing the bombing of Hiroshima as a sign of a worsening situation at home, Takagi worried about further deterioration. Nevertheless, his diary suggests that military hard-liners were very much in charge and that Prime Minister Suzuki was talking tough against surrender, by evoking last ditch moments in Japanese history and warning of the danger that subordinate commanders might not obey surrender orders. The last remark aggravated Navy Minister Yonai who saw it as irresponsible. That the Soviets had made no responses to Sato’s request for a meeting was understood as a bad sign; Yonai realized that the government had to prepare for the possibility that Moscow might not help. One of the visitors mentioned at the beginning of the entry was Iwao Yamazaki who became Minister of the Interior in the next cabinet.
Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, James Forrestal Diaries
General Douglas MacArthur had been slated as commander for military operations against Japan’s mainland, this letter to Truman from Forrestal shows that the latter believed that the matter was not settled. Richard Frank sees this as evidence of the uncertainty felt by senior officials about the situation in early August; Forrestal would not have been so “audacious” to take an action that could ignite a “political firestorm” if he “seriously thought the end of the war was near.”
Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Papers of W. Averell Harriman, box 181, Chron File Aug 5-9, 1945
Shortly after the Soviets declared war on Japan, in line with commitments made at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Ambassador Harriman met with Stalin, with George Kennan keeping the U.S. record of the meeting. After Stalin reviewed in considerable detail, Soviet military gains in the Far East, they discussed the possible impact of the atomic bombing on Japan’s position (Nagasaki had not yet been attacked) and the dangers and difficulty of an atomic weapons program. According to Hasegawa, this was an important, even “startling,” conversation: it showed that Stalin “took the atomic bomb seriously”; moreover, he disclosed that the Soviets were working on their own atomic program.[60]
W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, box 211, Robert Pickens Meiklejohn World War II Diary At London and Moscow March 10, 1941-February 14, 1946, Volume II (Privately printed, 1980 [Printed from hand-written originals]) (Reproduced with permission)
Robert P. Meiklejohn, who worked as Ambassador W. A. Harriman’s administrative assistant at the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and London during and after World War II, kept a detailed diary of his experiences and observations. The entries for 8 and 9 August, prepared in light of the bombing of Hiroshima, include discussion of the British contribution to the Manhattan Project, Harriman (“his nibs’”) report on his meeting with Molotov about the Soviet declaration of war, and speculation about the impact of the bombing of Hiroshima on the Soviet decision. According to Meiklejohn, “None of us doubt that the atomic bomb speeded up the Soviets’ declaration of war.”
Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress)
At their first meeting after the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima, Stimson briefed Truman on the scale of the destruction, with Truman recognizing the “terrible responsibility” that was on his shoulders. Consistent with his earlier attempts, Stimson encouraged Truman to find ways to expedite Japan’s surrender by using “kindness and tact” and not treating them in the same way as the Germans. They also discussed postwar legislation on the atom and the pending Henry D. Smyth report on the scientific work underlying the Manhattan project and postwar domestic controls of the atom.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Henry Arnold Papers, box 5, Chron Correspondence (Reel 5)[60A]
Someone with the 20th Air Force on Tinian Island (in the Northern Mariana Islands) prepared a triumphant report of the destruction of Hiroshima based on blast damage and fire effect, but not radiation injuries. According to the message, “Hiroshima is no more” because “the entire area within a radius of 18,000 feet from the heart of the city has been wiped clean as though it had never existed.” The “pulverization produced by the atomic explosion [was so complete] that not even debris of buildings was left.”
Given Hiroshima’s population of 334,000, if sixty percent of its residents lived in the “totally destroyed area,” that suggested that “more than 200,000 lost their lives during that negligible fraction of time represented by the one-tenth of a microsecond of the atomic explosion.” Nevertheless, “the most conservative estimate here is that at least 100,000 of Hiroshima’s inhabitants had been needlessly sacrificed by their military leaders.” This “conservative” estimate may have reached the White House because, a few days later, President Truman declared that the “thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible.”[60B] [See Document 78]
The message includes accounts of the bombing by Enola Gay pilots Col. Paul W. Tibbets and Capt. Robert A. Lewis and by Capt. William S. Parsons, who was on board. It concluded with the “tentative text” of a leaflet to be dropped the following day, warning the Japanese of what was “in store for them” unless they “petition the Emperor to end the war.” [See Document 94C for more details.]
RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 20, Envelope G Tinian Files, Top Secret
The prime target for the second atomic attack was Kokura, which had a large army arsenal and ordnance works, but various problems ruled that city out; instead, the crew of the B-29 that carried “Fat Man” flew to an alternate target at Nagasaki. These cables are the earliest reports of the mission; the bombing of Nagasaki killed immediately at least 39,000 people, with more dying later. According to Frank, the “actual total of deaths due to the atomic bombs will never be known,” but the “huge number” ranges somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 people. Barton J. Bernstein and Martin Sherwin have argued that if top Washington policymakers had kept tight control of the delivery of the bomb instead of delegating it to Groves the attack on Nagasaki could have been avoided. The combination of the first bomb and the Soviet declaration of war would have been enough to induce Tokyo’s surrender. By contrast, Maddox argues that Nagasaki was necessary so that Japanese “hardliners” could not “minimize the first explosion” or otherwise explain it away.[61]
Library of Congress, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, box 60, Ramsey, Norman
Ramsey, a physicist, served as deputy director of the bomb delivery group, Project Alberta. This personal account, written on Tinian, reports his fears about the danger of a nuclear accident, the confusion surrounding the Nagasaki attack, and early Air Force thinking about a nuclear strike force.
RG 457, Summaries of Intercepted Japanese Messages (“Magic” Far East Summary, March 20, 1942 – October 2, 1945), box 7, SRS 491-547
Within days after the bombing of Hiroshima, U.S. military intelligence intercepted Japanese reports on the destruction of the city. According to an “Eyewitness Account (and Estimates Heard) … In Regard to the Bombing of Hiroshima”: “Casualties have been estimated at 100,000 persons.”
Zenshiro Hoshina, Daitoa Senso Hishi: Hoshina Zenshiro Kaiso-roku [Secret History of the Greater East Asia War: Memoir of Zenshiro Hoshina] (Tokyo, Japan: Hara-Shobo, 1975), excerpts from Section 5, “The Emperor made go-seidan [= the sacred decision] – the decision to terminate the war,” 139-149 [translation by Hikaru Tajima]
Despite the bombing of Hiroshima, the Soviet declaration of war, and growing worry about domestic instability, the Japanese cabinet (whose decisions required unanimity) could not form a consensus to accept the Potsdam Declaration. Members of the Supreme War Council—“the Big Six”[62]—wanted the reply to Potsdam to include at least four conditions (e.g., no occupation, voluntary disarmament); they were willing to fight to the finish. The peace party, however, deftly maneuvered to break the stalemate by persuading a reluctant emperor to intervene. According to Hasegawa, Hirohito had become convinced that the preservation of the monarchy was at stake. Late in the evening of 9 August, the emperor and his advisers met in the bomb shelter of the Imperial Palace.
Zenshiro Hoshina, a senior naval official, attended the conference and prepared a detailed account. With Prime Minister Suzuki presiding, each of the ministers had a chance to state their views directly to Hirohito. While Army Minister Anami tacitly threatened a coup (“civil war”), the emperor accepted the majority view that the reply to the Potsdam declaration should include only one condition not the four urged by “Big Six.” Nevertheless, the condition that Hirohito accepted was not the one that foreign minister Togo had brought to the conference. What was at stake was the definition of the kokutai (national policy). Togo’s proposal would have been generally consistent with a constitutional monarchy because it defined the kokutai narrowly as the emperor and the imperial household. What Hirohito accepted, however, was a proposal by the extreme nationalist Kiichiro Hiranuma which drew upon prevailing understandings of the kokutai: the “mythical notion” that the emperor was a living god. “This was the affirmation of the emperor’s theocratic powers, unencumbered by any law, based on Shinto gods in antiquity, and totally incompatible with a constitutional monarchy.” Thus, the Japanese response to the Potsdam declaration opposed “any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of his Majesty as a sovereign ruler.” This proved to be unacceptable to the Truman administration.[63]
California Institute of Technology, Archives and Special Collections, Robert F. Bacher Papers, Box 17, folder 3, Manhattan Project, Miscellaneous Documents 1943-1945 (Thanks to Barton J. Bernstein for calling attention to this document)
The day of the bombing of Nagasaki J. Robert Oppenheimer issued a statement to the North American News Alliance, a wire service of that period, responding to its request for his thoughts on the “tremendously sobering responsibilities of knowledge [of the] atomic bomb and on [the] possible beneficial rather than destructive uses.” Oppenheimer responded with a substantive and thoughtful statement, which he wrote after consulting a few colleagues, that provides insight into how he and others thought about the use of the bomb at the time: as a way to “shorten the war,” but also to stimulate recognition that the terrible danger of atomic weaponry made it imperative to avoid future wars. Oppenheimer distributed the statement to all of the Division Leaders at Los Alamos Laboratory.
The statement called attention to the belief that the use of the bomb “might help shorten the war” against Japan but “above all” to the “thought that this rather spectacular technical development, and the assured prospect of far more terrifying future developments, would force upon the people of this country, and all the war-weary peoples of the world, a recognition of how imperative it has become to avert wars in the future.” That imperative made “cooperation and understanding between nations” a “desperate necessity.” Oppenheimer hoped that “in the hands of statesmen atomic power itself could help to provide a mechanism for bringing peoples together and for establishing confidence between ·nations.” Supporting that hope was the “fact that science itself, out of which this development has been born, is one of the most universal of human efforts, and that its tendency has been to bridge the gap between cultures rather than to deepen it.”
Oppenheimer did not spell out what he meant by “the assured prospect of far more terrifying future developments” but he probably had in mind the possibility of thermonuclear weapons. In the early stages of his research on nuclear weapons, Oppenheimer had worked on the “Super”, the H-bomb project, but that went on the back-burner as the prospect of fission bombs became more tangible.
The next day the Washington Evening Star published Oppenheimer’s statement but as far as can be told it received no further media distribution, at least to newspapers with searchable databases. So far only one study of Oppenheimer has cited his statement. [63A]
Documents 77A-B: The First Japanese Offer Intercepted
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Magic” Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18
The first Japanese surrender offer was intercepted shortly before Tokyo broadcast it. This issue of the diplomatic summary also includes Togo’s account of his notification of the Soviet declaration of war, reports of Soviet military operations in the Far East, and intercepts of French diplomatic traffic.
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Magic” Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18
A full translation of the surrender offer was circulated separately. The translations differ but they convey the sticking point that prevented U.S. acceptance: Tokyo’s condition that the allies not make any “demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.”
Papers of Henry A. Wallace, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa (copy courtesy of Special Collections Department)
Secretary of Commerce (and former Vice President) Henry Wallace provided a detailed report on the cabinet meeting where Truman and his advisers discussed the Japanese surrender offer, Russian moves into Manchuria, and public opinion on “hard” surrender terms. With Japan close to capitulation, Truman asserted presidential control over nuclear weapons and later ordered that atomic bombs were not to be used on Japan without his “express authority from the President.” [See Document 82] Barton J. Bernstein has suggested that Truman’s comment about “all those kids” showed his belated recognition that the bomb caused mass casualties and that the target was not purely a military one.[64]
W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, box 211, Robert Pickens Meiklejohn World War II Diary At London and Moscow March 10, 1941-February 14, 1946, Volume II (Privately printed, 1980 [Printed from hand-written originals]) (Reproduced with permission)
In these entries, Meiklejohn discussed how he and others in the Moscow Embassy learned about the bombing of Nagasaki from the “OWI Bulletin.” Entries for 10 and 11 August cover discussion at the Embassy about the radio broadcast announcing that Japan would surrender as long the Emperor’s status was not affected. Harriman opined that “surrender is in the bag” because of the Potsdam Declaration’s provision that the Japanese could “choose their own form of government, which would probably include the Emperor.” Further, “the only alternative to the Emperor is Communism,” implying that an official role for the Emperor was necessary to preserve social stability and prevent social revolution.
Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress)
Stimson’s account of the events of 10 August focused on the debate over the reply to the Japanese note, especially the question of the Emperor’s status. The U.S. reply, drafted during the course of the day, did not explicitly reject the note but suggested that any notion about the “prerogatives” of the Emperor would be superceded by the concept that all Japanese would be “Subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.” The language was ambiguous enough to enable Japanese readers, upon Hirohito’s urging, to believe that they could decide for themselves the Emperor’s future role. Stimson accepted the language believing that a speedy reply to the Japanese would allow the United States to “get the homeland into our hands before the Russians could put in any substantial claim to occupy and help rule it.” If the note had included specific provision for a constitutional monarchy, Hasegawa argues, it would have “taken the wind out of the sails” of the military faction and Japan might have surrendered several days earlier, on August 11 or 12 instead of August 14.[65]
Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter Brown Papers, box 68, folder 13, “Transcript/Draft B
Brown recounted Byrnes’ debriefing of the 10 August White House meeting on the Japanese peace offer, an account which differed somewhat from that in the Stimson diary. According to what Byrnes told Brown, Truman, Stimson, and Leahy favored accepting the Japanese note, but Byrnes objected that the United States should “go [no] further than we were willing to go at Potsdam.” Stimson’s account of the meeting noted Byrnes’ concerns (“troubled and anxious”) about the Japanese note and implied that he (Stimson) favored accepting it, but did not picture the debate as starkly as Browns’s did.
George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA (copy courtesy of Barton J. Bernstein)
Groves informed General Marshall that he was making plans for the use of a third atomic weapon sometime after 17 August, depending on the weather. With Truman having ordered a halt to the atomic bombings [See document 78], Marshall wrote on Grove’s memo that the bomb was “not to be released over Japan without express authority from the President.”
Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Papers of W. Averell Harriman, box 181, Chron File Aug 10-12, 1945
Japan’s prospective surrender was the subject of detailed discussion between Harriman, British Ambassador Kerr, and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov during the evening of August 10 (with a follow-up meeting occurring at 2 a.m.). In the course of the conversation, Harriman received a message from Washington that included the proposed U.S. reply and a request for Soviet support of the reply. After considerable pressure from Harriman, the Soviets signed off on the reply but not before tensions surfaced over the control of Japan–whether Moscow would have a Supreme Commander there as well. This marked the beginning of a U.S.-Soviet “tug of war” over occupation arrangements for Japan.[66]
Up to the point where Japan’s surrender began to appear more likely, General Carl Spaatz, the Commanding General of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, had been unsure whether an invasion could be avoided. Initially, he had opposed using the atomic bomb: “When the atomic bomb was first discussed with me in Washington I was not in favor of it just as I have never favored the destruction of cities as such with all inhabitants being killed.” But his thinking shifted when “it was pointed out to me … that the use of the atomic bomb would certainly mean that an invasion would be unnecessary and that thousands of American lives would be saved.” With his doubts about nuclear use, Spaatz may have insisted on a written order to use the weapons which he received on 24 July 1945 [See Document 60E].[66A]
Although Spaatz believed that the use of “Air Power” would have an important impact on a Japanese decision to surrender, as an organizational loyalist, he worried that an “airman is not to be represented at the peace conference – the sea and the ground will be represented.” As it turned out, Spaatz was present on the battleship Missouri at the official act of Japanese surrender on 2 September 1945.
Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 926-927 [Translation by Hikaru Tajima]
As various factions in the government maneuvered on how to respond to the Byrnes note, Navy Minister Yonai and Admiral Takagi discussed the latest developments. Yonai was upset that Chief of Staff Yoshijiro Umezu and naval chief Suemu Toyada had sent the emperor a memorandum arguing that acceptance of the Brynes note would “desecrate the emperor’s dignity” and turn Japan into virtually a “slave nation.” The emperor chided Umezu and Toyoda for drawing hasty conclusions; in this he had the support of Yonai, who also dressed them down. As Yonai explained to Takagi, he had also confronted Naval Vice Chief Takijiro Onishi to make sure that he obeyed any decision by the Emperor. Yonai made sure that Takagi understood his reasons for bringing the war to an end and why he believed that the atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war had made it easier for Japan to surrender.[67]
National Archives, RG 165, Army Operations OPD, Executive Files 1940-1945, box 12, Exec #2
Not altogether certain that surrender was imminent, Army intelligence did not rule out the possibility that Tokyo would try to “drag out the negotiations” or reject the Byrnes proposal and continue fighting. If the Japanese decided to keep fighting, G-2 opined that “Atomic bombs will not have a decisive effect in the next 30 days.” Richard Frank has pointed out that this and other documents indicate that high level military figures remained unsure as to how close Japan really was to surrender.
Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Shusen Shiroku [Historical Record of the End of the War] (Tokyo: Hokuyosha, 1977-1978), vol. 5, 27-35 [Translated by Toshihiro Higuchi]
The Byrnes Note did not break the stalemate at the cabinet level. An account of the cabinet debates on August 13 prepared by Information Minister Toshiro Shimamura showed the same divisions as before; Anami and a few other ministers continued to argue that the Allies threatened the kokutai and that setting the four conditions (no occupation, etc.) did not mean that the war would continue. Nevertheless, Anami argued, “We are still left with some power to fight.” Suzuki, who was working quietly with the peace party, declared that the Allied terms were acceptable because they gave a “dim hope in the dark” of preserving the emperor. At the end of the meeting, he announced that he would report to Hirohito and ask him to make another “Sacred Judgment”. Meanwhile, junior Army officers plotted a coup to thwart the plans for surrender.[68]
George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA, George C. Marshall Papers (copy courtesy of Barton J. Bernstein)
While Truman had rescinded the order to drop nuclear bombs, the war was not yet over and uncertainty about Japan’s next step motivated war planner General John E. Hull (assistant chief of staff for the War Department’s Operations Division), and one of Groves’ associates, Colonel L. E. Seeman, to continue thinking about further nuclear use and its relationship to a possible invasion of Japan. As Hull explained, “should we not concentrate on targets that will be of greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, etc.” “Nearer the tactical use”, Seaman agreed and they discussed the tactics that could be used for beach landings. In 1991 articles, Barton Bernstein and Marc Gallicchio used this and other evidence to develop the argument that concepts of tactical nuclear weapons use first came to light at the close of World War II.[69]
Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Magic” Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18
The dropping of two atomic bombs, the tremendous destruction caused by U.S. bombing, and the Soviet declaration of war notwithstanding, important elements of the Japanese Army were unwilling to yield, as was evident from intercepted messages dated 12 and 13 August. Willingness to accept even the “destruction of the Army and Navy” rather than surrender inspired the military coup that unfolded and failed during the night of 14 August.
Hiroshi [Kaian) Shimomura, Shusenki [Account of the End of the War] (Tokyo, Kamakura Bunko, [1948], 148-152 [Translated by Toshihiro Higuchi]
Frightened by the rapid movement of Soviet forces into Manchuria and worried that the army might launch a coup, the peace party set in motion a plan to persuade Hirohito to meet with the cabinet and the “Big Six” to resolve the stalemate over the response to the Allies. Japan was already a day late in responding to the Byrnes Note and Hirohito agreed to move quickly. At 10:50 a.m., he met with the leadership at the bomb shelter in his palace. This account, prepared by Director of Information Shimomura, conveys the drama of the occasion (as well as his interest in shifting the blame for the debacle to the Army). After Suzuki gave the war party–Umeda, Toyoda, and Anami–an opportunity to present their arguments against accepting the Byrnes Note, he asked the emperor to speak.
Hirohito asked the leadership to accept the Note, which he believed was “well intentioned” on the matter of the “national polity” (by leaving open a possible role for the Emperor). Arguing that continuing the war would reduce the nation “to ashes,” his words about “bearing the unbearable” and sadness over wartime losses and suffering prefigured the language that Hirohito would use in his public announcement the next day. According to Bix, “Hirohito’s language helped to transform him from a war to a peace leader, from a cold, aloof monarch to a human being who cared for his people” but “what chiefly motivated him … was his desire to save a politically empowered throne with himself on it.”[70]
Hirohito said that he would make a recording of the surrender announcement so that the nation could hear it. That evening army officers tried to seize the palace and find Hirohito’s recording, but the coup failed. Early the next day, General Anami committed suicide. On the morning of August 15, Hirohito broadcast the message to the nation (although he never used the word “surrender”). A few weeks later, on September 2, 1945 Japanese representatives signed surrender documents on the USS Missouri, in Tokyo harbor.[71]
The British National Archives, Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FO 800/461
With the Japanese surrender announcement not yet in, President Truman believed that another atomic bombing might become necessary. After a White House meeting on 14 August, British Minister John Balfour reported that Truman had “remarked sadly that he now had no alternative but to order an atomic bomb to be dropped on Tokyo.” [72] This was likely emotional thinking spurred by anxiety and uncertainty. Truman was apparently not considering the fact that Tokyo was already devastated by fire bombing and that an atomic bombing would have killed the Emperor, which would have greatly complicated the process of surrender. Moreover, he may not have known that the third bomb was still in the United States and would not be available for use for nearly another week.[73] As it turned out, a few hours later, at 4:05 p.m., the White House received the Japanese surrender announcement.
Two scientists at Oak Ridge’s Health Division, Henshaw and Coveyou, saw a United Press report in the Knoxville News Sentinel about radiation sickness caused by the bombings. Victims who looked healthy weakened, “for unknown reasons” and many died. Lacking direct knowledge of conditions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Henshaw and Coveyou had their own data on the biological effects of radiation and could make educated guesses. After reviewing the impact of various atomic bomb effects–blast, heat, flash radiation (prompt effects from gamma and neutron radiation), and radiation from radioactive substances–they concluded that “it seems highly plausible that a great many persons were subjected to lethal and sub-lethal dosages of radiation in areas where direct blast effects were possibly non-lethal.” It was “probable,” therefore, that radiation “would produce increments to the death rate and “even more probable” that a “great number of cases of sub-lethal exposures to radiation have been suffered.”[74]
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5b
Despite the reports pouring in from Japan about radiation sickness among the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, General Groves and Dr. Charles Rea, a surgeon who was head of the base hospital at Oak Ridge (and had no specialized knowledge about the biological effects of radiation) dismissed the reports as “propaganda”. Unaware of the findings of Health Division scientists, Groves and Rhea saw the injuries as nothing more than “good thermal burns.”[75]
Documents 94A-B: General Farrell Surveys the Destruction
RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 17, Envelope B
A month after the attacks Groves’ deputy, General Farrell, traveled to Japan to see for himself the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. His vivid account shows that senior military officials in the Manhattan Project were no longer dismissive of reports of radiation poisoning. As Farrell observed in his discussion of Hiroshima, “Summaries of Japanese reports previously sent are essentially correct, as to clinical effects from single gamma radiation dose.” Such findings dismayed Groves, who worried that the bomb would fall into a taboo category like chemical weapons, with all the fear and horror surrounding them. Thus, Groves and others would try to suppress findings about radioactive effects, although that was a losing proposition.[76]
RG 77, Reports Pertaining to the Effects of the Atomic Bomb,1945-1946
Drawing on his messages on the effects of the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki [Documents 94A and B], Groves’ deputy, Brig. Gen. Farrell, prepared a longer report on the atomic bombing operations. Beginning with an account of the conference on Guam with General Curtis LeMay on operational issues, including targets and numbers of aircraft, Farrell reviewed the final preparations for the bombings. He then recounted the bombing of Hiroshima and assessed the photographic evidence.
Farrell reported that, after the Hiroshima bombing, he and others recommended further review of targets with a revision of the target list to “include several large cities,” including the Tokyo region “because of its great psychological value.” With the ending of the war in a few days, the recommendation became unnecessary.
Farrell provided details on the propaganda campaign launched after the bombing of Hiroshima, including short-wave broadcasts and Japanese language leaflets and newspapers. The Air Force’s plan included the dropping of over 16 million leaflets on 47 cities, with six million dropped before the Japanese negotiated for surrender.
The account of the atomic strike against Nagasaki included its “difficulties,” notably the cloud cover over the prime target, Kokura, and the decision to strike Nagasaki on the return flight to Iwo Jima. According to Farrell, the bombardier had a view of the target for a “few brief seconds,” with the bomb “released and detonated in the center of the highly industrialized region of Nagasaki.” Nevertheless, the Nagasaki bomb was some three quarters of a mile off target.”
The second half of Farrell’s report recounts his visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, including comparisons of their destruction. In that connection, he changed, or removed, language in his earlier report on Nagasaki, which included suggestive information on possible radiation effects [See Document 94B]. The sentence that appears in the telegram as: “The Japanese official reported that anyone who entered the blast area after the explosion has become sick,” was worded in the report as “no one.” The following sentence appeared in the telegram but not in the report: “The Japanese report a considerable number have died in September who did not seem to be wounded originally.” Removing such findings was consistent with the approach that Farrell had taken in his interactions with U.S. medical experts in Japan, to whom he wanted to prove that the bombs caused no radioactivity.[76A]
W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, box 211, Robert Pickens Meiklejohn World War II Diary At London and Moscow March 10, 1941-February 14, 1946, Volume II (Privately printed, 1980 [Printed from hand-written originals]) (Reproduced with permission)
In this entry written several months later, Meiklejohn shed light on what much later became an element of the controversy over the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombings: whether any high level civilian or military officials objected to nuclear use. Meiklejohn recounted Harriman’s visit in early October 1945 to the Frankfurt-area residence of General Dwight Eisenhower, who was finishing up his service as Commanding General, U.S. Army, European Theater. It was Meiklejohn’s birthday and during the dinner party, Eisenhower and McCloy had an interesting discussion of atomic weapons, which included comments alluding to scientists’ statements about what appears to be the H-bomb project (a 20 megaton weapon), recollection of the early fear that an atomic detonation could burn up the atmosphere, and the Navy’s reluctance to use its battleships to test atomic weapons. At the beginning of the discussion, Eisenhower made a significant statement: he “mentioned how he had hoped that the war might have ended without our having to use the atomic bomb.” The general implication was that prior to Hiroshima-Nagasaki, he had wanted to avoid using the bomb.
Some may associate this statement with one that Eisenhower later recalled making to Stimson. In his 1948 memoirs (further amplified in his 1963 memoirs), Eisenhower claimed that he had “expressed the hope [to Stimson] that we would never have to use such a thing against an enemy because I disliked seeing the United States take the lead in introducing into war something as horrible and destructive as this new weapon was described to be.” That language may reflect the underlying thinking behind Eisenhower’s statement during the dinner party, but whether Eisenhower used such language when speaking with Stimson has been a matter of controversy. In later years, those who knew both thought it unlikely that the general would have expressed misgivings about using the bomb to a civilian superior. Eisenhower’s son John cast doubts about the memoir statements, although he attested that when the general first learned about the bomb he was downcast.
Stimson’s diary mentions meetings with Eisenhower twice in the weeks before Hiroshima, but without any mention of a dissenting Eisenhower statement (and Stimson’s diaries are quite detailed on atomic matters). The entry from Meiklejohn’s diary does not prove or disprove Eisenhower’s recollection, but it does confirm that he had doubts which he expressed only a few months after the bombings. Whether Eisenhower expressed such reservations prior to Hiroshima will remain a matter of controversy.[77]
On 15 December, President Truman spoke about the atomic bombings in his speech at the annual dinner of the Gridiron Club, organized by bureau chiefs and other leading figures of print media organizations. [78] Besides Truman, guests included New York Governor Thomas Dewey (Republican presidential candidate in 1944 and 1948), foreign ambassadors, members of the cabinet and the Supreme Court, the military high command, and various senators and representatives. The U.S. Marine Band provided music for the dinner and for the variety show that was performed by members of the press.[79]
In accordance with the dinner’s rules that “reporters are never present,” Truman’s remarks were off-the record. The president, however, wrote in long-hand a text that that might approximate what he said that evening. Pages 12 through 15 of those notes refer to the atomic bombing of Japan:
“You know the most terrible decision a man ever had to make was made by me at Potsdam. It had nothing to do with Russia or Britain or Germany. It was a decision to loose the most terrible of all destructive forces for the wholesale slaughter of human beings. The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and I weighed that decision most prayerfully. But the President had to decide. It occurred to me that a quarter of a million of the flower of our young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities, and I still think that they were and are. But I couldn’t help but think of the necessity of blotting out women and children and non-combatants. We gave them fair warning and asked them to quit. We picked a couple of cities where war work was the principle industry, and dropped bombs. Russia hurried in and the war ended.”
Truman characterized the Potsdam Declaration as a “fair warning,” but it was an ultimatum. Plainly he was troubled by the devastation and suffering caused by the bombings, but he found it justifiable because it saved the lives of U.S. troops. His estimate of 250,000 U.S. soldiers spared far exceeded that made by General Marshall in June 1945, which was in the range of 31,000 (comparable to the Battle of Luzon) [See Document 26]. By citing an inflated casualty figure, the president was giving a trial run for the rationale that would become central to official and semi-official discourse about the bombings during the decades ahead.[80]
Despite Truman’s claim that he made “the most terrible” decision at Potsdam, he assigned himself more responsibility than the historical record supports. On the basic decision, he had simply concurred with the judgments of Stimson, Groves, and others that the bomb would be used as soon as it was available for military use. As for targeting, however, he had a more significant role. At Potsdam, Stimson raised his objections to targeting Japan’s cultural capital, Kyoto, and Truman supported the secretary’s efforts to drop that city from the target list [See Documents 47 and 48].[81]
Where he had taken significant responsibility was by making a decision to stop the atomic bombings just before the Japanese surrender, thereby asserting presidential control over nuclear weapons
Notes
[1]. The World Wide Web includes significant documentary resources on these events. The Truman Library has published a helpful collection of archival documents, some of which are included in the present collection. A collection of transcribed documents is Gene Dannen’s “Atomic Bomb: Decision.” For a print collection of documents, see Dennis Merrill ed., Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Volume I: The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb on Japan (University Publications of America, 1995). A more recent collection of documents, along with a bibliography, narrative, and chronology, is Michael Kort’s The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). An important on-line collection focuses on the air-raids of Japanese cities and bases, providing valuable context for the atomic attacks.
[2]. For the early criticisms and their impact on Stimson and other former officials, see Barton J. Bernstein, “Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History: Stimson, Conant, and Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” Diplomatic History 17 (1993): 35-72, and James Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995), 291-301. For Stimson’s article, see “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” Harper’s 194 (February 1947): 97-107. Social critic Dwight MacDonald published trenchant criticisms immediately after Hiroshima-Nagasaki; see Politics Past: Essays in Political Criticism (New York: Viking, 1972), 169-180.
[3]. The proposed script for the Smithsonian exhibition can be seen at Philipe Nobile,Judgment at the Smithsonian (New York: Matthews and Company, 1995), pp. 1-127. For reviews of the controversy, see Barton J. Bernstein, “The Struggle Over History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative,” ibid., 128-256, and Charles T. O’Reilly and William A. Rooney, The Enola Gay and The Smithsonian (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2005).
[4]. For the extensive literature, see the references in J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Third Edition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016) at 131-136, as well as Walker’s, “Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground,” Diplomatic History 29 (April 2005): 311-334. For more recent contributions, see Sean Malloy, Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), Andrew Rotter, Hiroshima: The World’s Bomb (New York: Oxford, 2008), Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008), Wilson D. Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Also important to take into account is John Dower’s extensive discussion of Hiroshima/Nagasaki in context of the U.S. fire-bombings of Japanese cities in Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9-11/Iraq (New York, W. Norton, 2010), 163-285.
[5]. The editor particularly benefited from the source material cited in the following works: Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie S. Groves, The Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 2002); Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1995); Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999), Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins of the Arm Race (New York, Vintage Books, 1987), and as already mentioned, Hasegawa’s Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2005). Barton J. Bernstein’s numerous articles in scholarly publications (many of them are listed in Walker’s assessment of the literature) constitute an invaluable guide to primary sources. An article that Bernstein published in 1995, “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,” Foreign Affairs 74 (1995), 135-152, nicely summarizes his thinking on the key issues. Noteworthy publications since 2015 include Michael D. Gordin and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Age of Hiroshima (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), especially Alex Wellerstein’s essay, «The Kyoto Misconception: What Truman Knew, Didn’t Know, About Hiroshima,» at 34-54; Sheldon Garon, “On the Transnational Destruction of Cities: What Japan and the United States Learned from the Bombing of Britain and Germany in the Second World War,” Past and Present 247 (2020): 235-271; Katherine E. McKinney, Scott Sagan, and Allen S. Weiner, “Why the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima Would Be Illegal Today,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76 (2020); Gregg Mitchell, The Beginning or the End: How Hollywood and America Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (New York: The New Press, 2020); Steve Olson, The Apocalypse Factory: Plutonium and the Making of the Atomic Age (New York: W.W. Norton, 2020); Neil J. Sullivan, The Prometheus Bomb: The Manhattan Project and Government in the Dark (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press/Potomac Books, 2016); Alex Wellerstein; Restricted Data: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the United States, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming, 2020), a memoir by a Hiroshima survivor, Taniguchi Sumitero, The Atomic Bomb on My Back: A Life Story of Survival and Activism (Montpelier, VT: Rootstock Publishing, 2020), and a collection of interviews, Cynthia C. Kelly, ed., The Manhattan Project: The Birth of the Atomic Bomb in the Words of Its Creators, Eyewitnesses, and Historians (Black Dog & Leventhal, 2020). A significant recent study is Richard Overy’s Rain of Ruin: Tokyo, Hiroshima, and the Surrender of Japan (New York: W.W. Norton, 2025). Raising useful questions about Japan’s surrender is Sheldon Garon’s «Operation STARVATION 1945: A Transnational History of Blockades and the Defeat of Japan,» The International History Review 46 (2024): 535-550.
[6]. Malloy (2008), 49-50. For more on the Uranium Committee, the decision to establish the S-1 Committee, and the overall context, see James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995), 140-154.
[7]. Sean Malloy, “`A Very Pleasant Way to Die’: Radiation Effects and the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb against Japan,” Diplomatic History 36 (2012), especially 523. For an important study of how contemporary officials and scientists looked at the atomic bomb prior to first use in Japan, see Michael D. Gordin, Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
[9A] . Manfred Popp, “Why Hitler Did Not Have Atomic Bombs,” Journal of Nuclear Engineering 2 (2021), 9–27, and Manfred Popp and Piet de Klerk, “The Peculiarities of the German Uranium Project (1939–1945),” Journal of Nuclear Engineering 4 (2023): 634-653
[10A] . Both Al Christman in Target Hiroshima: Deak Parsons and the Creation of the Atomic Bomb (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 158-159 and Sean Malloy in “‘The Rules of Civilized Warfare’: Scientists, Soldiers, Civilians, and American Nuclear Targeting, 1940-1945,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30 (2007), 489-490, cite and quote the Parsons memorandum, but they attribute it to a William Sterling Parsons collection at the Library of Congress, where it cannot be found, although a copy shows up in the Oppenheimer papers as noted.
[11]. For discussion of the importance of this memorandum, see Sherwin, 126-127, and Hershberg, James B. Conant, 203-207.
[13]. Quotation and statistics from Thomas R. Searle, “`It Made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers’: The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945, The Journal of Military History 55 (2002):103. More statistics and a detailed account of the raid is in Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 130-137.
[14]. Searle, “`It Made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers,’” 118. For detailed background on the Army Air Forces’ incendiary bombing planning, see Schaffer (1985) 107-127. On Stimson, see Schaffer (1985), 179-180 and Malloy (2008), 54. For a useful discussion of the firebombing of Tokyo and the atomic bombings, see Alex Wellerstein, “Tokyo vs. Hiroshima,” Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog, 22 September 2014
[19]. Alperovitz argues that the possibility of atomic diplomacy was central to the thinking of Truman and his advisers, while Bernstein, who argues that Truman’s primary objective was to end the war quickly, suggests that the ability to “cow other nations, notably the Soviet Union” was a “bonus” effect. See Bernstein (1995), 142.
[20]. Alperovitz, 147; Robert James Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995), 52; Gabiel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 421-422. As Alperovitz notes, the Davies papers include variant diary entries and it is difficult to know which are the most accurate.
[21A]. Vincent Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 529.
[22]. Bernstein (1995), 146. See also Barton J. Bernstein, “Looking Back: Gen. Marshall and the Atomic Bombing of Japanese Cities,” Arms Control Today, November 2015.
[23]. Bernstein (1995), 144. See also Malloy (2008), at 116-117, including the argument that 1) Stimson was deceiving himself by accepting the notion that a “vital war plant …surrounded by workers’ houses” was a legitimate military target, and 2) that Groves was misleading Stimson by withholding the Target Committee’s conclusions that the target would be a city center.
[25]. Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II (New York, Twayne, 1992), 38-39.
[26]. Barton J. Bernstein, Introduction to Helen S. Hawkins et al. editors, Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), xxx-xxv; Sherwin, 210-215.
[27]. Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000), 523.
[29]. For a review of the debate on casualty estimates, see Walker (2005), 315, 317-318, 321, 323, and 324-325.
[30]. Hasegawa, 105; Alperovitz, 67-72; Forrest Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987), 18. Pogue only cites the JCS transcript of the meeting; presumably, an interview with a participant was the source of the McCloy quote.
[31]. Alperovitz, 226; Bernstein, “Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender,” Diplomatic History 19 (1995), 237, note 22.
[35]. Bernstein, introduction, Toward a Livable World, xxxvii-xxxviii.
[36]. “Magic” summaries for post-August 1945 remain classified at the National Security Agency. Information from the late John Taylor, National Archives. For background on Magic and the “Purple” code, see John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II ( New York: Random House, 1995), 161-172 and David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New York: Scribner, 1996), 1-67.
[40]. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 170-174, 248-249.
[41]. David Holloway, “Barbarossa and the Bomb: Two Cases of Soviet Intelligence in World War II,” in Jonathan Haslam and Karina Urbach, eds., Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918-1989 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 63-64. For the inception of the Soviet nuclear program and the role of espionage in facilitating it, see Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994).
[43A] . So far solely mentioned in Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, The Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (Steerforth Press, South Royalton, VT, 2002), 413-416.
[43B] . Lillian Hoddeson et al.,Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943- 1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 377.
[43C] . Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves), pp. 413–416 and endnotes.
[43D] . James B. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York: Knopf, 1993), 232. In preceding years, others had raised the possibility of an atomic explosion setting the atmosphere on fire; see Alex Wellerstein, “Cleansing Thermonuclear Fire,” Restricted Data, 29 June 2018.
[43E] . David A. Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” International Security 7 (1983): 24; B. Cameron Reed, “Composite Cores and Tamper Yield: Lesser-known Aspects of Manhattan Project Fission Bombs,” American Journal of Physics 88 (2020): 108-114.
[44]. Bernstein’s detailed commentary on Truman’s diary has not been reproduced here except for the opening pages where he provides context and background.
[45]. Frank, 258; Bernstein (1995), 147; Walker (2005), 322. See also Alex Wellerstein’s “The Kyoto Misconception”
[50]. Alperovitz, 281-282. For Davies at Potsdam, see Elizabeth Kimball MacLean, Joseph E. Davies: Envoy to the Soviets (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 151-166
[54]. Frank, 273-274; Bernstein, “The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. Fears and Counterfactual Analysis: Would the Planned November 1945 Invasion of Southern Kyushu Have Occurred?” Pacific Historical Review 68 (1999): 561-609.
[56]. Barton J. Bernstein, «‘Reconsidering the ‘Atomic General’: Leslie R. Groves,» The Journal of Military History 67 (July 2003): 883-920. See also Malloy, “A Very Pleasant Way to Die,” 539-540.
[57]. For casualty figures and the experience of people on the ground, see Frank, 264-268 and 285-286, among many other sources. Drawing on contemporary documents and journals, Masuji Ibuse’s novel Black Rain (Tokyo, Kodansha, 1982) provides an unforgettable account of the bombing of Hiroshima and its aftermath. For early U.S. planning to detonate the weapon at a height designed to maximize destruction from mass fires and other effects, see Alex Wellerstein, “The Height of the Bomb.”
[58]. Sadao Asada, “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration,” Pacific Historical Review 67 (1998): 101-148; Bix, 523; Frank, 348; Hasegawa, 298. Bix appears to have moved toward a position close to Hasegawa’s; see Bix, “Japan’s Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in an Unwinnable War,” Japan Focus . For emphasis on the “shock” of the atomic bomb, see also Lawrence Freedman and Saki Dockrill, “Hiroshima: A Strategy of Shock,” in Saki Dockrill, ed., From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima : the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941-1945 (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 191-214. For more on the debate over Japan’s surrender, see Hasegawa’s important edited book, The End of the Pacific War: A Reappraisal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), with major contributions by Hasegawa, Holloway, Bernstein, and Hatano.
[59]. Melvyn P. Leffler, “Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War,” International Security 11 (1986): 107; Holloway, “Barbarossa and the Bomb,” 65.
[59A]. For more on these developments, see Asada, «The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration,» 486-488.
[62]. The Supreme War Council comprised the prime minister, foreign minister, army and navy ministers, and army and navy chiefs of staff; see Hasegawa, 72.
[63]. For the maneuverings on August 9 and the role of the kokutai, see Hasegawa, 3-4, 205-214
[63A]. Barton J. Bernstein in “The Flawed and Unexamined History of Christopher Nolan’s ‘Oppenheimer’: Science, Scientists, Nuclear Weapons, and Politics,” Journal of Cold War Studies 26 (2024): 223-224. For Oppenheimer and the “Super” in 1942, see pages 224-225. See also Bernstein, “Christopher Nolan’s Forthcoming ‘Oppenheimer’ Movie: A Historian’s Questions, Worries, and Challenges,” Washington Decoded, 11 July 2023. A file on the North American News Alliance in box 286 of the Oppenheimer papers at the Library of Congress includes correspondence with Alliance editors but no information on the statement’s distribution.
[64]. For Truman’s recognition of mass civilian casualties, see also his letter to Senator Richard Russell, 9 August 1945.
[69]. Barton J. Bernstein, “Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking about Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 15 (Spring 1991): 149-173; Marc Gallicchio, “After Nagasaki: General Marshall’s Plans for Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Japan,” Prologue 23 (Winter 1991): 396-404. Letters from Robert Messer and Gar Alperovitz, with Bernstein’s response, provide insight into some of the interpretative issues. “Correspondence,” International Security 16 (Winter 1991/1992): 214-221.
[70]. Bix, “Japan’s Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in an Unwinnable War,” Japan Focus.
[71]. For Hirohito’ surrender speech–the actual broadcast and a translation–see Japan Times, August 2015.
[72]. Cited by Barton J. Bernstein, “Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking About Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 15 (1991) at page 167. Thanks to Alex Wellerstein for the suggestion and the archival link.
[74]. See Malloy, “A Very Pleasant Way to Die,” 541-542.
[75]. For Groves and the problem of radiation sickness, see Norris, 339-441, Bernstein, “Reconsidering the ‘Atomic General’: Leslie R. Groves,” Journal of Military History 67 (2003), 907-908, and Malloy, “A Very Pleasant Way to Die,” 513-518 and 539-542
[76]. See Janet Farrell Brodie, “Radiation Secrecy and Censorship after Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” The Journal of Social History 48 (2015): 842-864.
[76A] . On Farrell’s public relations concerns, see Nolan, Atomic Doctors, at page 86.
[77]. For Eisenhower’s statements, see Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), 443, and Mandate for Change (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963), 312-313. Barton J. Bernstein’s 1987 article, “Ike and Hiroshima: Did He Oppose It?” The Journal of Strategic Studies 10 (1987): 377-389, makes a case against relying on Eisenhower’s memoirs and points to relevant circumstantial evidence. For a slightly different perspective, see Malloy (2007), 138
[78]. Cited in Barton J. Bernstein, “Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending the «Decision,” The Journal of Military History 62 (1998), at page 559. Thanks to Alex Wellerstein for the suggestion and the archival link.
[79]. “Truman Plays Part of Himself in Skit at Gridiron Dinner,” and “List of Members and Guests at the Gridiron Show,” The Washington Post, 16 December 1945.
[80]. For varied casualty figures cited by Truman and others after the war, see Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan, 101-102.
Quando os Estados Unidos tinham escravos algemados, eram considerados um exemplo de democracia. Ainda hoje, insiste-se que o país nunca teve uma ditadura.
A África do Sul do apartheid foi defendida por Ronald Reagan como um bastião da liberdade naquele continente repleto de negros com tendência socialista, enquanto Nelson Mandela estava na lista de “terroristas perigosos” de Londres e Washington.
Como Israel, outro regime de apartheid de acordo com todas as organizações internacionais de direitos humanos e de acordo com muitos israelenses, pode ser definido como uma democracia? Um regime brutal, com licença para matar e massacrar à vontade, com todos os bilhões de dólares estrangeiros em armas e alta tecnologia, que depois chora como se fosse a vítima universal.
Em que mente decente é possível que, enquanto dezenas de milhares de crianças estão sendo massacradas, insiste-se que essas e todas as crianças sobreviventes famintas, traumatizadas e amputadas devem morrer e, como se isso não bastasse, são bajulados pelos líderes trêmulos (trêmulos) da direita e da esquerda do mundo?
Tenho uma coleção de ameaças covardes (proibições, listas proibidas) e nenhuma delas me assusta, mas também tenho a solidariedade de inúmeros judeus decentes que não se deixam corromper por essa ideologia fanática, racista e supremacista.
Vou repetir isso mil vezes. Eles podem matar quantos milhares de seres humanos quiserem, podem ameaçar os bilhões de habitantes deste planeta que protestam contra essa barbárie, mas jamais poderão matar a dignidade alheia, que os covardes genocidas, bem armados e bajulados, nunca tiveram.
A história tem uma fossa séptica esperando por eles na esquina.
En 1972, Truman Capote publicó un original texto que venía a ser la autobiografía que nunca escribió. Lo tituló «Autorretrato» (en Los perros ladran, Anagrama, 1999), y en él se entrevistaba a sí mismo con astucia y brillantez. Aquellas preguntas que sirvieron para proclamar sus frustraciones, deseos y costumbres, ahora, extraídas en su mayor parte, forman la siguiente «entrevista capotiana», con la que conoceremos la otra cara, la de la vida, de Jorge Majfud.
Si tuviera que vivir en un solo lugar, sin poder salir jamás de él, ¿cuál elegiría?
En realidad, ese lugar existe: es la infancia. Ahora, si tuviese que ser un lugar físico, particular, creo que sería aquel enorme árbol en la granja de mis abuelos donde podía ver a mis seres queridos que ya no están y, de alguna forma, a los que no estaban aún.
¿Prefiere los animales a la gente?
A veces. No depende de qué animales sino de qué gente.
¿Es usted cruel?
Más o menos, como todos. Con frecuencia, la verdad es una forma de crueldad y uno debe decidir si vale la pena. Otras veces, uno es cruel solo por ignorancia o por pasiones mezquinas, como pueden serlo el fastidio o la frustración.
¿Tiene muchos amigos?
Tengo unos pocos amigos seguros y muchos amigos tal vez.
¿Qué cualidades busca en sus amigos?
No busco nada en particular. Cada uno es diferente y la amistad, como el amor, es algo que se da sin ninguna lógica.
¿Suelen decepcionarle sus amigos?
Sí, como cualquier otro tipo de seres humanos. Pero me preocupa mucho más decepcionarlos a ellos.
¿Es usted una persona sincera?
No creo que nadie pueda contestar a esa pregunta sinceramente. Más que sincero intento ser honesto.
¿Cómo prefiere ocupar su tiempo libre?
Leyendo un libro que no me mate el tiempo. Conversando con alguien que no me mate con el tiempo.
¿Qué le da más miedo?
El sufrimiento de mis seres queridos.
¿Qué le escandaliza, si es que hay algo que le escandalice?
A mi edad ya casi nada me escandaliza. Me repugna la hipocresía, el escándalo ante un beso y la tolerancia a la violencia, a la muerte de un solo niño bajo bombas inteligentes, a la opresión de pueblos enteros, a las Mentiras de Destrucción Masiva.
Si no hubiera decidido ser escritor, llevar una vida creativa, ¿qué habría hecho?
Si no fuera escritor caminar o lavar los platos sería mucho menos interesante. No sé, he hecho muchas cosas diferentes en mi vida. Tal vez hubiese sido físico. Siempre me atrajo la Teoría de la Relatividad.
¿Practica algún tipo de ejercicio físico?
Si caminar por la playa es un ejercicio…
¿Sabe cocinar?
No, pero lo intento casi todos los días.
Si el Reader’s Digest le encargara escribir uno de esos artículos sobre «un personaje inolvidable», ¿a quién elegiría?
No sabría sobre quién escribir. Todos somos olvidables.
¿Cuál es, en cualquier idioma, la palabra más llena de esperanza?
“Perdón”.
¿Y la más peligrosa?
“Patriotismo.”
¿Alguna vez ha querido matar a alguien?
Nunca, ni de niño, a pesar de haber visto tanta gente morir y matarse.
¿Cuáles son sus tendencias políticas?
Siempre resistí todas las tentaciones, que no fueron pocas, de asociarme a un partido político. Los partidos parten, dividen de formas muy arbitrarias. Son un mal necesario, como la simplificación monolineal de izquierda y derecha. Ahora, entre todas las simplificaciones yo prefiero la menos usada de arriba y abajo y tomar partido por los de abajo.
Si pudiera ser otra cosa, ¿qué le gustaría ser?
Alguien que pudiese abolir el dolor y la muerte.
¿Cuáles son sus vicios principales?
Leer, beber dos cervezas, viajar al pasado, imaginar lo que vendrá, la sonrisa sin tiempo de la gente… No sé, tantas cosas. En fin, la vida.
¿Y sus virtudes?
Ojalá tenga alguna, aunque quién sabe si esto tiene alguna importancia.
Imagine que se está ahogando. ¿Qué imágenes, dentro del esquema clásico, le pasarían por la cabeza?
El agua, supongo.
Jorge Majfud es escritor uruguayo. Toni Montesinos es poeta, escritor y crítico literario de Barcelona.
En 2008, el filósofo argentino Hugo Biagini publicó su Diccionario del Pensamiento Alternativo. Biagini me invitó muchas veces a colaborar con sus proyectos (como América latina hacia la segunda independencia, con Arturo Roig, 2007; en su Diccionario de Autobiografías intelectuales, 2019) y en esa oportunidad mi aporte fue solo una entrada sobre “La sociedad desobediente”. Allí aproveché para repetir una respuesta al cofundador de Wikipedia, Larry Sanger, cuando en 2007 abandonó el proyecto por considerarlo un fracaso, debido a su falta de autoridad. En 2020, Larry Sanger acusó a Wikipedia de estar dominada por “izquierdistas”. Algo discutible. No tan discutible es el hecho de que si alguien ama el dinero no va a dedicar su vida a la enseñanza o a Wikipedia.
Para mí, con todos sus defectos, Wikipedia era un ejemplo reciente y exitoso de organización del conocimiento independiente de una autoridad política y económica, una “forma de desobediencia cultural”. En el Diccionario de Biagini, anoté: “Contrariamente a lo que se podía predecir, la escritura de la información por parte de millones de individuos anónimos alrededor del mundo no ha derivado en un caos sino en una confiabilidad (según estudios tradicionales) tan alta como la Enciclopedia Británica (…) En la sociedad desobediente la educación posindustrial toma progresivamente el lugar de la educación industrialista (uniformizante), de la misma forma que ésta tomó el lugar de la educación escolástica durante la Revolución Industrial. En la esfera política, uno de sus requisitos es la democracia directa (…) Según este diagnóstico, resulta posible pronosticar que los tradicionales sistemas representativos (como el parlamentario) perderán su importancia en las decisiones de las sociedades, de la misma forma en que, en su momento, la perdieron los reyes absolutistas en beneficio de los parlamentos. Es probable que esta misma idea de agravamiento de las condiciones impuestas por un poder imperial (en este caso la globalización de la cultura norteamericana…) sea producto de una reacción de los poderes tradicionales contra el surgimiento de la sociedad desobediente… No obstante, podemos pensar que no es esta inevitable radicalización de la desobediencia el origen del conflicto sino la reacción de los poderes tradicionales…” (506-508)
Claro, todo a pesar de la continua presión e injerencia de mafias institucionalizadas, como la CIA (para la cual Elon Musk trabaja y es agente con acceso a documentos clasificados). Desde los primeros años de Wikipedia, se han detectado guerras de ediciones generadas con IPs procedentes de la misma CIA, antes que la NRL desarrollase Tor, un navegador anónimo que también se les escapó de las manos (era inevitable hacerlo “open source” para que fuese realmente “intrazable”). Pero la CIA no disminuyó sino que aumentó su uso. El mismo caso de Linux, como lo reconoció su fundador negándolo con la boca y afirmándolo con la cabeza.
El otro fundador de Wikipedia, Jimmy Wales, comenzó desde una filosofía libertaria y capitalista, pero su proyecto confunde un anarquismo de derecha (antigubernamental, como el marxismo original) con un anarquismo de izquierda (igualitario). En 2005 ya había calificado al Partido Libertario como una “horda de lunáticos”.
Elon Musk se ha burlado de la mendicidad de Wikipedia para sobrevivir, similar a las cadenas públicas de radio y televisión sobrevivientes en Estados Unidos. NPR y PBS son odiadas por Musk y quiere verlas desaparecer. Debido al progresivo desfinanciamiento estatal, estas cadenas públicas han debido recurrir a donaciones.
Wales ha insistido que el principio de Wikipedia de no financiarse a través de publicidad es para preservar su independencia. Claro, cuando no están limitadas, las donaciones son un arma de doble filo. Es aquí donde la dosis de la medicación hace una diferencia absoluta entre la vida y la muerte. Un ejemplo obvio fue la abolición del tope de donaciones a los partidos políticos en 2010, lo cual recientemente hizo posible que Musk comprase su acceso a la Casa Blanca con una donación de 250 millones de dólares a la campaña de Donald Trump.
La políticos, los medios y la opinión pública se pueden comprar. Pero hay cosas que no, como el amor y la dignidad. En el caso de Wikipedia, es una espina en el talón que llevan ultra millonarios como Musk: ¿cómo es posible que exista una fuente global de información que no cotiza en la Bolsa de Londres o Nueva York? Si Musk pudo comprar Twitter por 44 mil millones (y sin poner un dólar de su bolsillo), le cambió el nombre y, en nombre de la libertad de expresión comenzó a manipular el algoritmo para censurar y privilegiar la visibilidad global de Trump y la suya misma, ¿cómo es posible que Superman, con todo sus superpoderes, no pueda escribir su propia biografía ni la historia de las ideas políticas, sociales, sexuales y raciales? ¡Pero qué horror!
Para peor, Wikipedia en inglés mantiene un dato que le hiere el ego, naturalmente inflamado: “En el primer aniversario de la adquisición [de Twitter], Musk declaró el valor de la compañía en 19 mil millones de dólares, una depreciación del 55 por ciento respecto al precio de compra de 44 mil millones”.
Si desde la Edad Media los nobles donaban para las iglesias y las catedrales que construían los artesanos, quienes luego iban a escuchar los sermones de los sacerdotes que vivían de las donaciones de los nobles y burgueses, ¿cómo es posible que aun en el actual regreso a la Edad Media todavía los señores feudales puedan comprar a Dios y no una maldita enciclopedia?
Musk ofreció por Wikipedia mil millones de dólares y propuso llamarla Wokepedia o Dickipedia (Vergapedia), lo que confirma que los dueños del mundo ni son felices ni tienen capacidad alguna de vivir en paz consigo mismos―menos con el resto de la humanidad.
El comandante en jefe de la Casa Blanca que vino del Apartheid sudafricano sabe que Wikipedia es uno de los escasos ejemplos de independencia del gran capital, por lo cual no puede vivir pensando que hay algo que puede existir sin la posibilidad de ser comprado, es decir, controlado por los psicópatas del apartheid global y de clase.
Al igual que la fortuna de su padre, quien también sufría de un profundo racismo, clasismo y sexismo que hoy se ha romantizado con la ideología del Macho alfa de la Nueva Derecha fascista, como líder natural de una manada de lobos vagando sobre la nieve en busca de una presa a la que descuartizar. Ese es el modelo, la utopía de humanidad que restringe y estriñe las capacidades intelectuales de individuos que se creen semidioses por el solo hecho de poseer (su verbo favorito) la habilidad de acumular dinero para comprar seres humanos (sean trabajadores o adulones), para comprarse el derecho de usar un látigo contra toda forma de pensamiento, contra toda forma de ser que no se ajuste a su mediocre existencia.
Elon Musk compra todo lo que odia y odia aún más todo lo que no puede comprar. De ahí su odio a Wikipedia y su oferta para comprarla en un billón. Probablemente odie la vida misma, porque sabe que no puede comprarla.
Elon Musk compra tudo o que odeia e odeia ainda mais o que não pode comprar. Daí seu ódio à Wikipédia e sua oferta de 1 bilhão por ela. Provavelmente, odeia a própria vida, porque sabe que não pode comprá-la.
O artigo é de Jorge Majfud, escritor uruguaio e professor da Jacksonville University, em artigo publicado por Página|12, 04-01-2025.
Eis o artigo.
Em 2012, o filósofo argentino Hugo Biagini publicou seu Dicionário do Pensamento Alternativo. Biagini frequentemente me convidou para colaborar em seus projetos (como América Latina Rumo à Segunda Independência, com Arturo Roig, 2007; e no Dicionário de Autobiografias Intelectuais, 2019). Nessa ocasião, minha contribuição foi apenas uma entrada sobre “A sociedade desobediente”. Nela, aproveitei para reiterar uma resposta ao cofundador da Wikipédia, Larry Sanger, quando, em 2007, ele abandonou o projeto, considerando-o um fracasso devido à falta de autoridade. Em 2020, Larry Sanger acusou a Wikipédia de ser dominada por “esquerdistas”. Algo discutível. Menos discutível é o fato de que, se alguém ama o dinheiro, dificilmente dedicará sua vida ao ensino ou à Wikipédia.
Para mim, com todos os seus defeitos, a Wikipédia era um exemplo recente e bem-sucedido de organização do conhecimento independente de uma autoridade política e econômica, uma “forma de desobediência cultural”. No Dicionário de Biagini, escrevi:
“Contrariamente ao que se poderia prever, a redação de informações por milhões de indivíduos anônimos ao redor do mundo não resultou em caos, mas sim em uma confiabilidade (segundo estudos tradicionais) tão alta quanto a da Enciclopédia Britânica. (…) Na sociedade desobediente, a educação pós-industrial progressivamente substitui a educação industrialista (uniformizadora), da mesma forma que esta substituiu a educação escolástica durante a Revolução Industrial. Na esfera política, um de seus requisitos é a democracia direta. (…) Segundo esse diagnóstico, é possível prever que os tradicionais sistemas representativos (como o parlamentarismo) perderão importância nas decisões das sociedades, assim como, em seu tempo, os reis absolutistas perderam importância em benefício dos parlamentos. É provável que essa ideia de agravamento das condições impostas por um poder imperial (neste caso, a globalização da cultura norte-americana…) seja uma reação dos poderes tradicionais contra o surgimento da sociedade desobediente. (…) No entanto, podemos considerar que o conflito não decorre da inevitável radicalização da desobediência, mas sim da reação dos poderes tradicionais” (p. 506-508).
Claro, isso ocorre apesar da contínua pressão e ingerência de máfias institucionalizadas, como a CIA (para a qual Elon Musk trabalha, sendo um agente com acesso a documentos classificados). Desde os primeiros anos da Wikipédia, foram detectadas guerras de edições oriundas de IPs da própria CIA, antes mesmo de a NRL desenvolver o Tor, um navegador anônimo que também saiu de seu controle (era inevitável torná-lo open source). Contudo, a CIA não diminuiu, mas aumentou seu uso. O mesmo ocorre com o Linux, como admitiu seu fundador, negando com palavras, mas afirmando com gestos.
O outro fundador da Wikipédia, Jimmy Wales, começou com uma filosofia libertária e capitalista, mas seu projeto confunde um anarquismo de direita (antigovernamental, como o marxismo original) com um anarquismo de esquerda (igualitário). Em 2005, ele já havia classificado o Partido Libertário como uma “horda de lunáticos”.
Elon Musk zombou da mendicância da Wikipédia para sobreviver, algo semelhante às redes públicas de rádio e televisão que ainda resistem nos Estados Unidos. A NPR e a PBS são odiadas por Musk, que deseja vê-las desaparecer. Devido ao progressivo desfinanciamento estatal, essas redes públicas foram obrigadas a recorrer a doações.
Jimmy Wales insistiu que o princípio da Wikipédia de não se financiar por meio de publicidade é preservar sua independência. Claro que, quando não são limitadas, as doações tornam-se uma arma de dois gumes. É aqui que a dosagem do remédio faz uma diferença absoluta entre a vida e a morte. Um exemplo óbvio foi a abolição do teto para doações a partidos políticos em 2010, o que recentemente permitiu que Musk comprasse seu acesso à Casa Branca com uma doação de 250 milhões de dólares à campanha de Donald Trump.
Os políticos, os meios de comunicação e a opinião pública podem ser comprados. Mas há coisas que não podem, como o amor e a dignidade. No caso da Wikipédia, ela é um espinho no calcanhar dos ultramilionários como Musk: como é possível que exista uma fonte global de informação que não esteja listada na Bolsa de Londres ou de Nova York? Se Musk pôde comprar o Twitter por 44 bilhões de dólares (sem desembolsar um centavo do próprio bolso), mudou o nome da plataforma e, em nome da liberdade de expressão, começou a manipular o algoritmo para censurar e privilegiar a visibilidade global de Trump e a sua própria, como é possível que o “Superman”, com todos os seus superpoderes, não consiga escrever sua própria biografia ou a história das ideias políticas, sociais, sexuais e raciais? Que horror!
Para piorar, a Wikipédia em inglês mantém um dado que fere seu ego, naturalmente inflamado: “No primeiro aniversário da aquisição [do Twitter], Musk declarou o valor da empresa em 19 bilhões de dólares, uma depreciação de 55% em relação ao preço de compra de 44 bilhões”.
Se desde a Idade Média os nobres doavam para igrejas e catedrais construídas por artesãos, que depois ouviam os sermões de sacerdotes sustentados por essas doações, como é possível que, no atual retorno à Idade Média, os senhores feudais ainda possam comprar a Deus, mas não uma maldita enciclopédia?
Musk ofereceu 1 bilhão de dólares pela Wikipédia e sugeriu renomeá-la como Wokepedia ou Dickipedia (Vergapedia), o que confirma que os donos do mundo nem são felizes nem têm capacidade de viver em paz consigo mesmos — muito menos com o restante da humanidade.
O comandante-em-chefe da Casa Branca, que veio do apartheid sul-africano, sabe que a Wikipédia é um dos raros exemplos de independência do grande capital, razão pela qual não suporta a ideia de que algo possa existir sem ser comprado, ou seja, controlado pelos psicopatas do apartheid global e de classe.
Assim como a fortuna de seu pai, que também sofria de profundo racismo, classismo e sexismo — hoje romantizados pela ideologia do “Macho Alfa” da Nova Direita fascista, como o líder natural de uma alcateia vagando pela neve em busca de uma presa para dilacerar. Esse é o modelo, a utopia de humanidade que limita e estreita as capacidades intelectuais de indivíduos que se creem semideuses apenas por possuírem (seu verbo favorito) a habilidade de acumular dinheiro para comprar seres humanos (sejam trabalhadores ou bajuladores), adquirindo o direito de usar o chicote contra qualquer forma de pensamento ou de existência que não se ajuste à sua medíocre realidade.
Elon Musk compra tudo o que odeia e odeia ainda mais o que não pode comprar. Daí seu ódio à Wikipédia e sua oferta de 1 bilhão por ela. Provavelmente, odeia a própria vida, porque sabe que não pode comprá-la.
Los capítulos de La frontera salvaje: 200 años de fanatismo anglosajón en América latina (2021) sobre los expermientos psicologicos de la CIA, confirmados y ampliados con nuevas desclasificaciones aquí:
El Archivo de Seguridad Nacional publica registros clave sobre el infame programa MKULTRA
La agencia buscaba drogas y técnicas de control de conducta para usar en “interrogatorios especiales” y operaciones ofensivas
Washington, D.C., 23 de diciembre de 2024 – Hoy, el Archivo de Seguridad Nacional y ProQuest (parte de Clarivate) celebran la publicación de una nueva colección de documentos académicos que se ha estado elaborando durante muchos años sobre la impactante historia secreta de los programas de investigación de control mental de la CIA. La nueva colección, CIA and the Behavioral Sciences: Mind Control, Drug Experiments and MKULTRA, reúne más de 1200 registros esenciales sobre uno de los programas más infames y abusivos de la historia de la CIA.
Bajo nombres clave que incluían MKULTRA, BLUEBIRD y ARTICHOKE, la CIA llevó a cabo experimentos aterradores utilizando drogas, hipnosis, aislamiento, privación sensorial y otras técnicas extremas en sujetos humanos, a menudo ciudadanos estadounidenses, que con frecuencia no tenían idea de lo que se les estaba haciendo o de que eran parte de una prueba de la CIA.
El anuncio de hoy se produce 50 años después de que una investigación del New York Times realizada por Seymour Hersh desencadenó investigaciones que sacarían a la luz los abusos de MKULTRA. La nueva colección también llega 70 años después de que el gigante farmacéutico estadounidense Eli Lilly & Company desarrollara por primera vez un proceso para agilizar la fabricación de LSD a fines de 1954, convirtiéndose en el principal proveedor de la CIA de la recién descubierta sustancia química psicoactiva, fundamental para muchos de los esfuerzos de control de la conducta de la Agencia.
Los aspectos más destacados de la nueva colección MKULTRA incluyen:
Un plan aprobado por el DCI en 1950 para el establecimiento de «equipos de interrogatorio» que «utilizarían el polígrafo, las drogas y el hipnotismo para lograr los mejores resultados en las técnicas de interrogatorio». (Documento 2) Un memorando de 1951 que captura una reunión entre la CIA y funcionarios de inteligencia extranjeros sobre la investigación del control mental y su interés compartido en el concepto de control mental individual. (Documento 3) Una entrada de 1952 del calendario diario de George White, un agente federal de narcóticos que dirigía una casa de seguridad donde la CIA probaba drogas como el LSD y realizaba otros experimentos con estadounidenses inconscientes. (Documento 5) Un informe de 1952 sobre el uso “exitoso” de los métodos de interrogatorio ARTICHOKE que combinaban el uso de “narcosis” e “hipnosis” para inducir regresión y posterior amnesia en “agentes rusos sospechosos de estar duplicados”. (Documento 6) Un memorando de 1956 en el que el jefe de MKULTRA, Sidney Gottlieb, firma un proyecto que “evaluaría los efectos de grandes dosis de LSD-25 en voluntarios humanos normales” en prisioneros federales en Atlanta. (Documento 13) El informe de 1963 del inspector general de la CIA, que llevó a la dirección de la CIA a reexaminar el uso de estadounidenses inconscientes en su programa encubierto de pruebas de drogas. (Documento 16) La declaración en 1983 del jefe de MKULTRA, Sidney Gottlieb, en un caso civil interpuesto por Velma “Val” Orlikow, víctima de proyectos patrocinados por la CIA y dirigidos por el Dr. Ewen Cameron en el Instituto Allan Memorial de Montreal. (Documento 20) Los desafíos a los que se enfrentó este proyecto de documentación fueron considerables, ya que el director de la CIA, Richard Helms, y el antiguo jefe de MKULTRA, Sidney Gottlieb, destruyeron la mayoría de los registros originales del proyecto en 1973. Es una historia sobre el secreto, tal vez el encubrimiento más infame en la historia de la Agencia. También es una historia marcada por la impunidad casi total a nivel institucional e individual por innumerables abusos cometidos a lo largo de décadas, no durante interrogatorios de agentes enemigos o en situaciones de guerra, sino durante tratamientos médicos ordinarios, dentro de hospitales penitenciarios, clínicas de adicciones y centros de detención de menores, y en muchos casos dirigidos por figuras importantes en el campo de las ciencias del comportamiento. A pesar de los esfuerzos de la Agencia por borrar esta historia oculta, los documentos que sobrevivieron a esta purga y que se han reunido aquí presentan una narrativa convincente e inquietante de los esfuerzos de décadas de la CIA por descubrir y probar formas de borrar y reprogramar la mente humana.
La mayor parte de estos registros se extrajeron de los registros recopilados por John Marks, el ex funcionario del Departamento de Estado que presentó las primeras solicitudes de la Ley de Libertad de Información sobre el tema y cuyo libro de 1979, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate”: The CIA and Mind Control: The Secret History of the Behavioral Sciences (Nueva York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1979) sigue siendo la fuente más importante sobre este episodio. Marks donó más tarde sus documentos de la FOIA y otros trabajos de investigación al Archivo de Seguridad Nacional. Muchas de las redacciones en los documentos se han eliminado de manera efectiva con el paso del tiempo, ya que las investigaciones oficiales, las declaraciones civiles y las historias detalladas han arrojado luz significativa sobre algunos de estos episodios. En muchos casos, las copias de registros desclasificados donados por Marks al Archivo de Seguridad Nacional llevan sus anotaciones escritas a mano.
El legado de MKULTRA va mucho más allá de los diversos “subproyectos” descritos en estos documentos y que fueron en gran parte clausurados a mediados de los años 1970. Como señala el autor Stephen Kinzer, los programas de investigación de control de conducta de la CIA “contribuyeron decisivamente al desarrollo de técnicas que los estadounidenses y sus aliados utilizaron en los centros de detención de Vietnam, América Latina, Afganistán, Irak, la Bahía de Guantánamo y prisiones secretas de todo el mundo”. Las técnicas de MKULTRA fueron citadas en el manual de interrogatorio KUBARK de la CIA de 1963, que fue la base para los interrogatorios de prisioneros en Vietnam y más tarde en las dictaduras anticomunistas de América Latina.[1]
Si bien muchos de los proyectos MKULTRA se llevaron a cabo en hospitales, laboratorios u otros entornos institucionales, otros se llevaron a cabo en casas de seguridad clandestinas de la CIA atendidas no por médicos o clínicos sino por duros agentes federales antinarcóticos como George Hunter White. Bajo la dirección de Gottlieb, White adoptó la personalidad de un artista bohemio llamado “Morgan Hall” para atraer a víctimas desprevenidas a su “piso”, donde él y sus colaboradores de la CIA experimentaban en secreto con ellas y grababan su comportamiento. White, un veterano de la OSS que había trabajado en el desarrollo de la “droga de la verdad” para el Ejército durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, dosificó subrepticiamente a muchas de sus víctimas con LSD, una droga que la CIA tenía en abundancia gracias a Eli Lilly, que había desarrollado la capacidad de producir la droga en “cantidades enormes” y había aceptado convertirse en el proveedor de la Agencia. Gottlieb, su adjunto Robert Lashbrook y el psicólogo de la CIA John Gittinger se encuentran entre los funcionarios de la CIA que visitaban con frecuencia los refugios de White.
De particular interés es la misteriosa muerte en 1953 de Frank Olson, un químico del Ejército y especialista en aerosoles de la División de Operaciones Especiales (SOD) del Cuerpo Químico del Ejército, el socio militar de la CIA en la investigación del control de la conducta. Oficialmente se consideró que se trató de un suicidio, y la muerte de Olson, que se produjo tras caer desde un piso de diez pisos en la ciudad de Nueva York, se produjo diez días después de que Gottlieb y el personal del TSS le echaran LSD a su cóctel durante un retiro de trabajo de la CIA-SOD en Deep Creek Lake, Maryland. Más tarde se determinó que la droga había contribuido a su muerte, pero muchos, incluidos miembros de su familia, han puesto en duda la conclusión de que Olson (que compartía habitación con Lashbrook esa noche) se arrojó por la ventana del Hotel Statler.
En el centro de todo estaba Sidney Gottlieb, jefe del Personal de Servicios Técnicos (TSS) de la División Química de la CIA y más tarde director de la División de Servicios Técnicos (TSD). Gottlieb era «el principal fabricante de venenos de la CIA», según Kinzer, cuyo libro, Poisoner in Chief: Sidney Gottlieb and the CIA Search for Mind Control (Nueva York: Henry Holt, 2019), es la obra definitiva sobre el químico voluble. Desde su posición en lo profundo de los pasillos secretos de la CIA, Gottlieb dirigió el esfuerzo de décadas de la Agencia para encontrar formas de usar drogas, hipnosis y otros métodos extremos para controlar el comportamiento humano y, se esperaba, convertirlos en herramientas utilizables para las agencias de inteligencia y los responsables políticos.
Las historias sobre la participación de la CIA en los intentos fallidos de asesinar al Primer Ministro del Congo Patrice Lumumba y al líder cubano Fidel Castro, entre otros, se encuentran entre los ejemplos más legendarios, si no los más exitosos, de los esfuerzos de la Agencia para poner en práctica los trucos y herramientas reunidos por la unidad de Gottlieb. Menos conocido es su papel en los experimentos con drogas y los programas de «interrogatorio especial» que dejaron a cientos de personas psicológicamente dañadas y a otras «permanentemente destrozadas», según Kinzer. [2]
Aunque MKULTRA fue aprobado en los niveles más altos, funcionó prácticamente sin supervisión. Como señala Marks, la autorización inicial del presupuesto de MKULTRA “eximió al programa de los controles financieros normales de la CIA” y “permitió a TSS iniciar proyectos de investigación ‘sin la firma de los contratos habituales u otros acuerdos escritos’”. [3] Con poca rendición de cuentas, recursos ilimitados y el respaldo del jefe de operaciones encubiertas de la CIA, Richard Helms, Gottlieb y su personal en TSS desarrollaron una serie de experimentos extraños que creían que mejorarían las operaciones de inteligencia encubierta y, al mismo tiempo, mejorarían las defensas de la Agencia contra el uso de técnicas similares por parte de las fuerzas enemigas.
Cuando Gottlieb llegó a la CIA en 1952, el Proyecto BLUEBIRD, que exploraba “la posibilidad de controlar a un individuo mediante la aplicación de técnicas especiales de interrogatorio”, ya estaba en marcha. [4] Dirigidos por el jefe de la Oficina de Seguridad, Morse Allen, los primeros experimentos BLUEBIRD fueron realizados por equipos que incluían expertos en polígrafo y psicólogos y se llevaron a cabo en detenidos y sospechosos de ser informantes en instalaciones secretas de interrogatorio de Estados Unidos en Japón y Alemania.
El ascenso de Allen Dulles a subdirector de la CIA en 1951 dio lugar a una ampliación de los programas BLUEBIRD bajo un nuevo nombre, ARTICHOKE, y bajo la dirección de Gottlieb en el TSS. El nuevo programa debía incluir, entre otros proyectos, el desarrollo de “pistolas de gas” y “venenos”, y experimentos para comprobar si los “sonidos monótonos”, la “conmoción cerebral”, el “electroshock” y el “sueño inducido” podían utilizarse como medios para obtener “control hipnótico de un individuo”.
Fue bajo ARTICHOKE cuando la Agencia empezó a reclutar de forma más sistemática a los mejores investigadores y a cortejar a las instituciones más prestigiosas para que colaboraran en sus investigaciones sobre el control mental. Uno de los primeros en participar fue el subdirector del Hospital Psicopático de Boston, el Dr. Robert Hyde, que en 1949 fue el primer estadounidense en “viajar” con LSD después de que el hospital adquiriera muestras de la droga del laboratorio Sandoz en Suiza. En 1952, la CIA empezó a financiar la investigación del hospital sobre el LSD, en la que Hyde se utilizó a sí mismo, a sus colegas, a estudiantes voluntarios y a pacientes del hospital como sujetos de estudio. Hyde trabajaría en cuatro subproyectos de MKULTRA durante la década siguiente.
Poco después de que Dulles se convirtiera en DCI en 1953, autorizó MKULTRA, ampliando la investigación de control de la conducta de la Agencia y reorientándola hacia el desarrollo de “una capacidad para el uso encubierto de materiales biológicos y químicos” en “operaciones clandestinas presentes y futuras”. [6] Muchos de los 149 subproyectos de MKULTRA se llevaron a cabo a través de universidades de prestigio como Cornell, Georgetown, Rutgers, Illinois y Oklahoma. El Dr. Carl Pfeiffer, presidente del Departamento de Farmacología de la Universidad Emory, dirigió cuatro subproyectos de MKULTRA, todos los cuales implicaban el uso de drogas, incluido el LSD, para inducir estados psicóticos. La horrible serie de experimentos dejó a muchos de sus sujetos, incluidos prisioneros de la Penitenciaría Federal de Atlanta y jóvenes alojados en un centro de detención en Bordentown, Nueva Jersey, marcados de por vida.
Muchos otros subproyectos de MKULTRA se establecieron mediante subvenciones de fundaciones falsas financiadas por la CIA. Una de ellas, el Fondo Geschickter para la Investigación Médica, dirigido por el Dr. Charles Geschickter, profesor de patología en la Universidad de Georgetown, destinó millones de dólares de la CIA a programas de investigación en Georgetown y otras instituciones. Como parte del acuerdo, la CIA obtuvo acceso a un refugio médico seguro en el recién construido Anexo Gorman del Hospital Universitario de Georgetown, junto con un suministro de pacientes y estudiantes para utilizar como sujetos para los experimentos de MKULTRA.
Otra importante fundación “recortada” de MKULTRA, la Human Ecology Society, estaba dirigida por el neurólogo del Centro Médico Cornell, el Dr. Harold Wolff, quien escribió un estudio temprano sobre las técnicas comunistas de lavado de cerebro para Allen Dulles y más tarde se asoció con la CIA para desarrollar una combinación de drogas y privación sensorial que pudiera usarse para borrar la mente humana. Entre los proyectos MKULTRA más extremos financiados a través del grupo de Wolff estaban los infames experimentos de “desesquematización” realizados por el Dr. D. Ewen Cameron en el Allan Memorial Institute, un hospital psiquiátrico de la Universidad McGill en Montreal, Canadá. Los métodos de Cameron combinaban sueño inducido, electroshocks y “conducción psíquica”, bajo los cuales sujetos drogados eran torturados psicológicamente durante semanas o meses en un esfuerzo por reprogramar sus mentes.
Estos registros también arrojan luz sobre un período especialmente oscuro en la historia de las ciencias del comportamiento en el que algunos de los mejores médicos en el campo llevaron a cabo investigaciones y experimentos generalmente asociados con los médicos nazis que fueron juzgados en Nuremberg. Mientras que algunos profesionales médicos contratados por la CIA aparentemente luchaban con los problemas éticos que planteaba la realización de pruebas dañinas en sujetos humanos inconscientes, otros estaban ansiosos por participar en un programa en el que, según un memorando de 1953, “ninguna área de la mente humana debe quedar sin explorar”. Así como los psicólogos de la CIA supervisaron más tarde la tortura de prisioneros en la Bahía de Guantánamo y en los “sitios negros” de la CIA, durante las primeras décadas del siglo XXI, muchos de los médicos y clínicos reclutados para el trabajo de MKULTRA eran líderes en el campo, cuya participación impulsó el prestigio del programa y atrajo a otros hacia él. Los académicos e investigadores que analizan la participación de psicólogos y otros profesionales médicos en los horribles programas de detención e interrogatorio de Estados Unidos que han sido expuestos en los últimos años encontrarán paralelos y antecedentes históricos a lo largo de esta colección.
La colección también es de gran valor para aquellos interesados en aprender más sobre los primeros años de la CIA y algunas de sus principales personalidades, como Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, Richard Bissell, Franks Wisner y otros, quienes imaginaron y crearon una agencia de inteligencia que favorecía la acción audaz, a menudo encubierta, y donde proyectos controvertidos como MKULTRA podían arraigarse y florecer en secreto.
After returning from an overseas trip, the CIA’s Morse Allen summarizes his recommendations for the establishment of “security validation teams” in the U.S. and abroad that would combine the use drugs, hypnosis and the polygraph to perform a variety of intelligence functions, including the screening of Agency personnel and informants, the interrogation of suspected enemy agents, the processing of any “loyalty cases” that might arise, and the possible use of “operational hypnosis.” The teams would also gather information about the “interrogation techniques and special operational procedures being utilized by Russia and Russian dominated countries.”
Sheffield Edwards requests that DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter approve plans for Project BLUEBIRD, sending it directly to the DCI rather than through the normal approval process due to “the extreme sensitivity of this project and its covert nature.” The memo indicates broad agreement among CIA offices “for the immediate establishment of interrogation teams for the operational support of OSO [Office of Special Operations] and OPC [Office of Policy Coordination] activities,” referring to the groups responsible for managing covert operations. The teams would “utilize the polygraph, drugs, and hypnotism to attain the greatest results in interrogation techniques.” Noting that there is “considerable interest in the field of hypnotism” across CIA offices, the idea of Bluebird would be “to bring all such interests within the purview and control of a single project.”
The project envisions “interrogation teams … utilizing the cover of polygraph interrogation to determine the bona fides of high potential defectors and agents, and also for the collection of incidental intelligence from such projects.” Each team would consist of a psychiatrist, a polygraph technician and a hypnotist. An office would be established in Washington “to serve as a cover for training, experimentation, and indoctrination” of psychiatrists “in the use of drugs and hypnotism.” When not deployed abroad, the doctors would be used “for defensive training of covert personnel, study, and experimentation in the application of these techniques.”
A handwritten annotation indicates that Hillenkoetter authorized $65,515 for the project on April 20, 1950.
In The Search for the Manchurian Candidate, Marks cites this fascinating account of an “informal get-together” between representatives of the U.S., British and Canadian intelligence services in which “all matters related to the influence or control of the minds of individuals were discussed.” The conversation among the allied intelligence services “ranged from the specific subject of means for extracting information to the broadest aspects of psychological warfare and propaganda.”
One foreign intelligence official (identified by Marks as the British representative) at first seemed skeptical about the idea of individual mind control and was more interested in programs that would research “the psychological factors causing the human mind to accept certain political beliefs” and “aimed at determining means for combatting communism, “‘selling’ democracy,” and preventing the “penetration of communism into trade unions.” However, “after lengthy discussions he became quite enthusiastic” about research into individual mind control, according to the meeting notes.
“All present agreed that there has been no conclusive evidence, either from reports on Soviet activities or in Western research, to indicate that new or revolutionary progress has been made in this field,” but “full investigation of the Soviet cases was essential and basic research in the field is most important because of the importance of this matter in connection with cold war operations… Even though no radical discoveries are made, even small gains in knowledge will justify the effort expended.”
Since the group had only discussed “pure research” and not the offensive use of mind control techniques, the author of the memo recommends that the U.S. strike “a clear separation between the intelligence and the research aspects” of the project when dealing with allied intelligence organizations.
Bureaucratic authority within the CIA for the ARTICHOKE program bounced around during the early 1950s from the Office of Security to the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) before going back to Security and, finally, to the Technical Services Staff (TSS) under Sidney Gottlieb. Less than a month after ARTICHOKE was first transferred from Security to OSI, the new project director, Robert J. Williams, sent this memo to his boss, H. Marshall Chadwell, outlining the program’s major accomplishments and deficiencies and pointing to the need to involve, or even turn the program over to, the CIA Medical Staff since he sees it as “primarily a medical problem.”
Williams reports that “field tests utilizing special techniques for interrogation” had not occurred as previously planned since the Artichoke project leaders lack confidence “in the techniques presently available” for ARTICHOKE interrogations and have been unable “to come up with any new techniques offering significant advantages” known methods. A “major factor” contributing to these conditions, Williams writes, is “the difficulty in obtaining competent medical support, both for the operational teams and for the research effort.”
A seven-page attachment describes ARTICHOKE as “a special agency program established for the development and application of special techniques in CIA interrogations and in other CIA covert activities where control of an individual is desired.” In the weeks since taking over the program, “OSI has endeavored to evaluate known techniques and to uncover new ones using consultants, Armed Service contracts and whatever information may be available within CIA or through other CIA channels.” The new team was also working to “evaluate claims that the USSR and/or its satellites may have developed new and significant techniques for this purpose.”
While no new techniques had been discovered, presently known mind control techniques described in the attachment include the use of LSD and other drugs, hypnosis, the use of the polygraph, neurosurgery, and electric shock treatments. However, field testing of these techniques has been handicapped by the “inability to provide the medical competence for a final evaluation and for such field testing as the evaluation indicates. Repeated efforts to recruit medical personnel have failed and until recently the CIA Medical Staff has not been in a position to assist.”
George White Papers, M1111, Dept. of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, Calif.
In his daily planner entry for June 6, 1952, federal narcotics agent George White notes a morning meeting with the Sidney Gottlieb of the CIA, jotting at the bottom of the page: “Gottlieb proposes I be CIA consultant – I agree.” Using the alias “Morgan Hall,” White would go on to run CIA safehouses in New York and San Francisco where unwitting individuals would be surreptitiously dosed with LSD and other drugs and subjected to other mind control techniques.
In a memo to the DCI, the CIA Security Office reports on the “successful” use of ARTICHOKE interrogation methods on “Russian agents suspected of being doubled.” Using the cover of a “psychiatric-medical” evaluation, officials from the Security Office and the CIA Medical Office combined the use of “narcosis” and “hypnosis” to induce regression and, in one case, “a subsequent total amnesia produced by post-hypnotic suggestion.” In the second case, CIA handlers used “heavy dosages of sodium pentothal,” a barbiturate, “coupled with the stimulant Desoxyn,” a methamphetamine, “with outstanding success.” The officers involved believed “that the ARTICHOKE operations were entirely successful” and “that the tests demonstrated conclusively the effectiveness of the combined chemical-hypnotic technique in such cases.”
This memo to Deputy Director for Plans Allen Dulles records a meeting of CIA office heads at which it was decided to transfer control of the ARTICHOKE project from OSI back to the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO) with the Office of Technical Services (OTS), home of Sidney Gottlieb and the Technical Services Staff (TSS), taking over responsibility for ARTICHOKE-related research and for maintaining contact with the Defense Department.
Those present at the meeting agreed that “the scope of Project ARTICHOKE is research and testing to arrive at means of control, rather than the more limited concept embodied in ‘special interrogations.’”
Shortly after the death of U.S. Army scientist Frank Olson was linked to a CIA LSD experiment, this memo recounts steps taken by CIA Technical Services Staff (TSS) chief Willis Gibbons to account for LSD handled and distributed by TSS. Gibbons has “impounded all LSD material in CIA Headquarters in a safe adjacent to his desk” and was “stopping any LSD tests which may have been instituted or contemplated under CIA auspices.” CIA field stations in Manila and Atsugi, Japan, also have LSD on site. The CIA has also provided LSD to federal narcotics agent George White, who Gibbons said was “fully cleared.” Asked for any “reports on the use and effects of LSD,” Gibbons said he likely had “a drawer full of papers.”
Gibbons was not fully clear on how the CIA obtained LSD, but most of it came from the Eli Lilly & Company, according to this memo, which “apparently makes a gift of it to CIA.”
Vincent Ruwet, the head of the Special Operations Division of the Army Chemical Corps and Frank Olson’s boss, gives a firsthand account of the last days and hours of Olson’s life, including comments on his state of mind during and in the days following the Deep Creek Lake experiment, in which he and other CIA and Army officials were unwittingly dosed with LSD.
An internal memo describes the interrogation of “an important covert operational asset” by an operational unit of the CIA’s ARTICHOKE program. Conducted at an undisclosed safe house, the ARTICHOKE interrogation was meant to “evaluate his part reports; to accept or not accept his past accounts or future budgets; to determine his future potentialities and clearly re-establish his bonafides.” CIA interrogators applied ARTICHOKE techniques including hypnosis and “massive use of chemicals” under cover of medical treatment for a case of influenza. The report says that the subject “was held under ARTICHOKE techniques for approximately twelve hours” and that they were under “direct interrogation” for 90 minutes. Consultants who reviewed the interrogation report agreed that ARTICHOKE officials “took certain (probably calculated) chances in using the massive dosages of chemicals” but that “ultimate results apparently justified the measures taken.”
George C. Marshall Research Library, James Srodes Collection, Box 8, Folder: “AWD [Allen Welsh Dulles]: Mind Control 1953-1961”
The CIA’s Technical Services Section (TSS) requests authorization for a project at Georgetown University Hospital that would provide cover for research under the Agency’s “biological and chemical warfare program.” Using a philanthropic organization as a “cut-out,” the CIA would partially fund “a new research wing” of the hospital (the Gorman Annex) and would use one sixth of the new annex to conduct “Agency-sponsored research in these sensitive fields.” MKULTRA, the memo observes, provides research and development funding “for highly sensitive projects in certain fields, including covert biological, chemical and radiological warfare” but does not specifically authorize funds to establish cover for these programs.
An attachment describes the rationale for the use of a university hospital as cover for conducting such experiments, noting that “competent individuals in the field of physiological, psychiatric and other biological sciences are very reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which would connect them with this activity since such connection might seriously jeopardize their professional reputations.”
The Agency’s clandestine funding and use of the hospital would be channeled through the Geschickter Fund for Medical Research, named for Dr. Charles Geschickter, a professor of pathology at Georgetown University Hospital who had been secretly working with the CIA since 1951. The Fund was used “both as a cut-out for dealing with contractors in the fields of covert chemical and biological warfare, and as a prime contractor for certain areas of biological research.” In addition to Geschickter, at least two other board members of the Fund were aware that it was being used to conceal the CIA’s “sensitive research projects.”
Agency sponsorship was “completely deniable since no connection would exist between the University and the Agency.” Three “bio-chemical employees of the Chemical Division of TSS” would be given “excellent professional cover” while “human patients and volunteers for experimental use will be available under excellent clinical conditions” and with hospital supervision.
The document was found among the papers of James Srodes, author of Allen Dulles: Master of Spies (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1999), which are housed at the George C. Marshall Research Library of the Virginia Military Institute.
John Marks Collection; George C. Marshall Research Library, James Srodes Collection, Box 8, Folder: “AWD [Allen Welsh Dulles]: Mind Control 1953-1961”
This document was apparently drafted by the TSS Chemical Division after a discussion in which DCI Dulles and others had questioned whether the use of Georgetown University Hospital as a “cut-out” for sensitive experiments was worth the considerable cost and had asked TSS “to draw up a handwritten list of advantages which such a place would afford our people.”
The response from TSS lists 17 “materials and methods” that the Chemical Division was working to develop, including:
substances that “promote illogical thinking,”
materials that would “render the induction of hypnosis easier” or “enhance its usefulness,”
substances that would help individuals to endure “privation, torture and coercion during interrogation” and attempts at ‘brain-washing,’”
“materials and physical methods” to “produce amnesia” and “shock and confusion over extended periods of time,”
substances that would “produce physical disablement, including paralysis,
substances that “alter personality structure” or that “produce ‘pure’ euphoria with no subsequent let-down,”
and a “knockout pill” for use in surreptitious druggings and to produce amnesia, among other things.
TSS notes that private physicians are often quite willing to test new substances for pharmaceutical companies “in order to advance the science of medicine,” but that, “It is difficult and sometimes impossible for TSS/CD to offer such an inducement with respect to its products.” Outside contractors can be used during the “preliminary phases” of many CIA experiments, but “that part which involves human testing at effective dose levels presents security problems which cannot be handled by the ordinary contractor.”
In a memorandum for the record, Gottlib authorizes an MKULTRA subproject to be led by Carl Pfeiffer of Emory University, a frequent collaborator who conducted experiments on prisoners at the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia. Here Gottlieb approves a request to continue Pfeiffer’s experiments, which include the development of “an anti-interrogation drug” and “tests in human volunteers.”
The attached proposal identifies the name of the study: “The Pharmacological Screening and Evaluation of Chemical Compounds Having Central Nervous System Activities,” summarizing it as the testing of “materials capable of producing alterations in the human central nervous system which are reflected as alterations in human behavior.” Facilities described in the redacted document include “auxilliary [sic] animal testing laboratories,” those used for “preliminary human pharmacological testing,” and additional facilities “for testing in normal human volunteers at [deleted] Penitentiary directed by [deleted].”
Among the “particular projects” on the agenda for the year to come are: (1) “To evaluate the effects of large doses of LSD-25 in normal human volunteers,” and (2) “To evaluate the threshold dose levels in humans of a particular natural product to be supplied by [deleted],” and (3) “To evaluate in human beings a substance which we now believe has the ability to counteract the inebriating effects of ethyl alcohol.”
Sidney Gottlieb was shown this one-page document during a 1983 deposition in a lawsuit brought by Velma “Val” Orlikow, a former patient at the Allan Memorial Institute in Montreal, site of some of the most horrific MKULTRA experiments. The memo describes accounting procedures for a CIA safehouse run by federal narcotics agent George White “for conducting experiments involving the covert administration of physiologically active materials to unwitting subjects.” Gottlieb writes that “the highly unorthodox nature of these activities and the considerable risk incurred” by White and his associates make it “impossible to require that they provide a receipt for these payments of that they indicate the precise manner in which the funds were spent.”
A CIA “Fitness Report” evaluates the first six months of Sidney Gottlieb’s stint as a CIA case officer in Europe. Characterized as “very mature” and “highly intelligent,” the evaluation notes that Gottlieb’s “entire agency career had been technical in nature” before this new assignment, his “first indoctrination to operational activities.” Gottlieb displayed a “keen desire to learn” and a “willingness to undertake all types of operational assignments” despite being “considerably senior in age and grade to other officers at the branch.” Gottlieb’s “only apparent weakness,” according to the evaluation, “is a tendency to let his enthusiasm carry him into more precipitous action than the operational situation will bear.”
In a memo forwarding his report on TSD’s management of MKULTRA to the DCI, CIA Inspector General John Earman says that the program’s “structure and operational controls need strengthening”; that the Agency should improve “the administration of research projects”; and that “some of the testing of substances under simulated operational conditions was judged to involve excessive risk to the Agency.”
The attached report briefly reviews the history of the program and finds that many of the projects initiated during that time “do not appear to have been sufficiently sensitive to warrant waiver of normal Agency procedures for authorization and control,” and that TSD was managing the program without proper documentation and oversight.
“Over the ten-year life of the program many additional avenues to the control of human behavior have been designated by the TSD management as appropriate to investigation under the MKULTRA charter, including radiation, electro-shock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and anthropology, graphology, harrassment [sic] substances, and paramilitary devices and materials.”
“TSD has pursued a philosophy of minimum documentation,” according to the report, and the “lack of consistent records precluded use of routine inspection procedures and raised a variety of questions concerning management and fiscal controls.” There were only two people at TSD with “full substantive knowledge of the program,” but these were “highly skilled, highly motivated, professionally competent individuals” who relied on the “‘need to know’ doctrine” to protect “the sensitive nature of the American intelligence capability to manipulate human behavior.”
Earman’s report looks closely at how each phase in the development of and operationalization of “materials capable of producing behavioral or physiological change in humans” is managed by TSD, including arrangements with physicians and scientists where the Agency “in effect ‘buys a piece’ of the specialist in order to enlist his aid in pursuing the intelligence implications of his research.”
With respect to human testing, the IG identifies two stages: the first “involves physicians, toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general hospitals and in prisons, who are provided the products and findings of the basic research projects and proceed with intensive testing on human subjects.” During this phase, “Where health permits, test subjects are voluntary participants in the program.”
In the “final phase” of MKULTRA drug testing, the substances are given to “unwitting subjects in normal life settings.” Earman says it is “firm doctrine” at TSD “that testing of materials under accepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reactions and attributions that may occur in operational situations.” Because of this, “TSD initiated a program for covert testing of materials on unwitting U.S. citizens in 1955.”
The reports focuses on drug experiments conducted at CIA safehouses in the U.S. and directed by Bureau of Narcotics agent George White. Some of the test subjects “have been informers or members of suspect criminal elements,” but unwitting subjects were drawn from all walks of life: “[T]he effectiveness of the substances on individuals at all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign, is of great significance and testing has been performed on a variety of individuals within these categories.”
Earman nevertheless recommends that the Agency terminate the testing of substances on unwitting U.S. citizens after weighing “possible benefits of such testing against the risk of compromise and of resulting damage to CIA” but is equally clear that such tests can continue to be performed foreign nationals. The Agency’s “deep cover agents overseas” were “more favorably situated than the U.S. narcotics agents” that ran the safehouses in the U.S., and “operational use of the substances clearly serves the testing function.”
Overall, MKULTRA materials had not been very useful in intelligence operations: “As of 1960 no effective knockout pill, truth serum, aphrodisiac, or recruitment pill was known to exist,” although “real progress has been made in the use of drugs in support of interrogation.” Among other obstacles, Some case officers “have basic moral objections to the concept of MKDELTA,” the program meant to operationalize materials and techniques developed through MKULTRA.
This memo records a meeting held in the office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Gen. Marshall Carter to settle the one major point of disagreement among CIA officials over the inspector general’s MKULTRA recommendations: whether to continue with the testing of MKULTRA substances on unwitting U.S. citizens. Others present were Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms, CIA executive director (and former inspector general) Lyman Kirkpatrick, current CIA inspector general John Earman, and Sidney Gottlieb, head of the CIA’s Technical Services Division (TSD).
Both Gottlieb and Helms “argued for the continuation of unwitting testing,” while Earman, Carter and Kirkpatrick disagreed. Carter was concerned with the “unwitting aspect,” and a discussion ensued “on the possibility of unwitting test on foreign nationals,” which “had been ruled out” due to opposition from “senior chiefs of stations” as “too dangerous” and who said they lacked “controlled facilities.” Earman finds this “odd,” emphasizing the slipshod nature of some of the safehouses used for unwitting tests in the U.S.
Concluding the meeting, the participants agree that if the Directorate for Plans determined “that unwitting testing on American citizens must be continued to operationally prove out these drugs, it may become necessary to place this problem before the Director [of Central Intelligence] for a decision.” The attached cover memo from 1975 indicates that the DCI decided to defer a decision on testing U.S. citizens for one year and requested that until then the Agency “please continue the freeze on unwitting testing.” The authors of the cover memo found “no record … that this freeze was ever lifted.”
In this memo to the DCI, CIA inspector general Douglas Chamberlain describes efforts to recover Agency records on the MKULTRA and MKNAOMI programs, many of which were destroyed in 1973 on the orders of Richard Helms and Sidney Gottlieb.
In a letter to the now-retired Sidney Gottlieb, the Agency requests his assistance with a CIA project to “investigate its past involvement with drugs, with emphasis on the use of drugs on unwitting subjects.” The questions mainly have to do with a “secondary” effort of the investigation “to assess the possibility of harm by the specific drugs in the quantities used, and to flesh out the report with enough details of the safehouse operations to lend credence to the report.”
This document records answers given over the phone by Gottlieb in response to questions posed by the CIA in its letter of April 30, 1979 (Document 19A). Among other things, Gottlieb says that the LSD used by George White in the CIA safehouses was “packaged as a solution in approximately 80 microgram units in plastic ampules” and that follow-up with subjects “was conducted when practical.” Gottlieb estimates that there were approximately 40 tests on unwitting subjects that were “performed to explore the full range of the operational use of LSD,” including for “interrogation” and for “provoking erratic behavior.”
This is the second of three depositions of Sidney Gottlieb by attorneys representing Velma «Val» Orlikow, a former patient of the Allan Memorial Institute, where CIA-backed staff performed horrific experiments on psychiatric patients during the 1950s and 60s.
Asked whether he was involved in “domestic field experimentation” with LSD, Gottlieb said, “If by what you mean ‘field experimentation’, is experiments that involve – that are taking place outside of Washington, D.C., and if by my personal involvement, you mean, was I aware of them or did I have something to do with their instigation, the answer is yes.” When Gottlieb is shown a document indicating that he had personally conducted an interrogation, he claims confusion before admitting that he had indeed been involved in “between one and five” interrogations.
Gottlieb nevertheless denies that the CIA intended to develop techniques to improve U.S. interrogations. “The primary objective of developing new techniques for interrogation … It has to do with the difference between something I have always objected to, namely, that this whole program wanted to create a Manchurian Candidate. The program never did that. That was a fiction, as far as I am concerned, that Mr. Marks indulged in and this question you are asking has to do with that and this is a sensitive area in my mind.”
Asked whether the CIA had tried to identify “techniques of producing retrograde amnesia,” Gottlieb said it was something that they “talked about,” but that he could not “remember any specific projects or specific research mounted in response to that question.” Asked if the CIA ever used “psychosurgery research projects,” Gottlieb said his “remembrance is that they did.”
Gottlieb also describes the role played by the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, which he says “was to act in a security sense as a funding mechanism so that the involvement of CIA’s organizational entity would not be apparent in projects that we were funding.” The Geschickter Fund operated much the same way, according to Gottlieb: “It was made as a mechanism to funnel funds for research activities where CIA didn’t want to acknowledge its specific identity as the grantor.”
Gottlieb evades most of the questions about the most important issue before the court in the Orlikow case: the extreme “psychic driving” and “depatterning” experiments conducted by Dr. Ewen Cameron at the Allan Memorial Institute. Again and again, Gottlieb claims to not remember key events and details about the CIA’s relationship to Cameron’s terrifying experiments.
Gottlieb is somewhat more forthcoming about his knowledge of MKULTRA projects in the U.S., including experiments conducted by Dr. Harris Isbell of the NIMH Addiction Research Center in Lexington, Kentucky, which Gottlieb said he visited “at least three or four times.” Gottlieb said Isbell did “some of the early and basic work between dose and response of LSD” on prisoners from the Narcotics Division Hospital. Gottlieb also says he was aware that Isbell offered inmates drugs in exchange for their participation in the project. Asked whether reports that Cameron kept some subjects on LSD for 77 consecutive days was “consistent with the research he was conducting,” Gottlieb said it was, noting that Cameron “had some interest in the quantum effects of LSD, repeated ingestion.” Asked about files on the CIA safehouses run by narcotics agent George White, Gottlieb replies, “They were all destroyed. They don’t exist anymore,” adding, “They were specifically destroyed when the files were destroyed in ’72, ’73.” Asked about White’s purported use of “prostitutes to test methods of slipping drugs to unwitting persons,” Gottlieb said, “the involvement of prostitutes in the West Coast activity had to do with the MO, the modus operandi of this whole drug culture.”
The plaintiffs’ attorneys also ask Gottlieb about the CIA’s work with Dr. Carl Pfeiffer of Emory University, who performed drug experiments on prisoners at the Atlanta federal penitentiary and elsewhere, and Dr. Harold Isbell of the National Institutes for Mental Health, who had conducted drugs tests on patients at the Addiction Research Center in Lexington, Kentucky.
El 22 de diciembre de 2024, el electo presidente de Estados Unidos Donald Trump anunció que le exigirá a Panamá «que le devuelvan el canal». El imperialismo es una enfermedad que no solo mata a quienes lo resisten sino que tampoco deja vivir a quienes lo llevan dentro.
***
Washington DC. 22 de enero de 1903—El secretario de Estado John Hay y el agregado comercial de Colombia en Estados Unidos, Tomás Herrán, firman el tratado que le daría a Estados Unidos el derecho a retomar las construcciones del canal de Panamá que los franceses habían abandonado cuando llevaban casi la mitad de la obra. Por este tratado, Colombia se comprometería a ceder a Estados Unidos y por cien años una franja en su apéndice norte a cambio de diez millones en un solo pago y 250 mil dólares por año. A pocas millas de las costas de Panamá, el buque de guerra Wisconsin permanece varado para dar apoyo moral a las negociaciones.
El Congreso en Washington aprueba el tratado de inmediato, pero rebota en Bogotá. Hay dudas sobre las consecuencias sobre la soberanía del país y sobre los beneficios derivados de este acuerdo. Por si fuese poco, las matemáticas, que también se practican en aquel país, dicen que al pueblo colombiano le llevaría 120 años recibir la misma compensación que se le había ofrecido pagar de una sola vez a la New Panamá Canal Company.
El Congreso colombiano no es el único obstáculo. El 15 de abril, el enviado de Estados Unidos Mr. Arthur Beaupre le envía un telegrama al Secretario de Estado sobre el ánimo de sospecha creciente en el pueblo colombiano. “Hay por lo menos un hecho que es claro”, escribe Mr. Beaupre. “Si el tratado se pusiera a la libre consideración del pueblo, no sería aprobado”. Atendiendo a la fuerte opinión pública en contra del tratado Hay-Herrán, el Senado colombiano vota por unanimidad en contra de su ratificación.
Sin haber puesto nunca un pie fuera de su país, el 27 de agosto Roosevelt escribe tres cartas describiendo a los colombianos como “ignorantes”, “avaros”, “hombrecitos despreciables”, “corruptores idiotas y homicidas”. El desprecio por los pueblos de raza inferior no es nuevo ni será nunca superado. “Nunca podría respetar un país lleno de ese tipo de gente”, escribe Roosevelt. “Intentar relacionarse con Colombia como quien trata con Suiza, Bélgica u Holanda es simplemente un absurdo”.
Ya en 1849, a un año de haber terminado la guerra en México y probablemente informado de los planes de Francia para un nuevo canal en Suez, el presidente Zachary Taylor todavía era de la misma opinión. Ante el Congreso había insistido en la necesidad de la construcción de un canal, tal vez en Nicaragua, y había advertido que “una obra de esa envergadura debe ser realizada bajo la supervisión y protección de todas las naciones para un beneficio equitativo”.
Ahora, en plena hegemonía naval de la raza nórdica en los trópicos, no hay acuerdo y el presidente Theodore Roosevelt no duda: una república de América del Sur no va a interferir con sus planes. Inmediatamente envía algunos paquetes con dólares para organizar una revuelta que se llamará Revolución. El problema dura menos que lluvia de verano. El 18 de noviembre, se firma en Washington el tratado Hay-Bunau-Varilla, por el cual “Estados Unidos garantiza la libertad de Panamá” a cambio de que Panamá le ceda autoridad y todos los derechos a Estados Unidos sobre el canal y las zonas contiguas en carácter de monopolio y libre de cualquier impuesto. Como es costumbre, los panameños no son invitados a la firma del nuevo tratado.
El nuevo tratado establece que los 250 mil dólares anuales ofrecidos antes a Colombia ahora no serían pagados sino hasta una década después de la apertura del canal. No hay nada como tener una armada poderosa para hacer buenos negocios. También viola el anterior Tratado de Paz y Comercio, conocido como Tratado Bidlack, firmado por Colombia y Estados Unidos en 1846 por el cual Colombia le garantizaba a Estados Unidos el derecho a transitar por el istmo a cambio de proteger la provincia de Panamá de cualquier revuelta o intento de separación. Como en Cuba, como en Puerto Rico, ahora el artículo 136 del tratado de 1903 le asegura a Washington la potestad de intervenir y resolver lo que mejor le parezca ante cualquier situación inconveniente. Cuando algunos panameños protestan, Roosevelt los amenaza con entregarlos a la justicia de Colombia. La práctica es vieja: las leyes están hechas por los poderosos para que los débiles las cumplan. Si un país más débil viola un acuerdo, el poder imperial de turno lo invade; si el país más débil reclama que se cumplan los tratados firmados, es invadido para que se firme uno mejor.
A poco de firmado el nuevo tratado, en el Congreso de Estados Unidos se levantan voces contra lo que varios congresistas llaman deshonestidad e imperialismo. El senador Edward Carmak protesta: “la idea de una revolución en Panamá es una burda mentira; el único hombre levantado en armas fue nuestro presidente”. El senador George Frisbie Hoar, miembro de la comisión que investiga los crímenes de guerra que quedarán impunes en Filipinas, rechaza las versiones sobre la Revolución en Panamá y agrega: “espero no vivir lo suficiente para ver el día en que los intereses de mi país sean puestos por encima de su honor”.
Claro que eso del honor tiene arreglo. El presidente echa mano al viejo recurso de “fuimos atacados primero”. Como hiciera James Polk para justificar la invasión de México en 1846 o McKinley para ocupar Cuba en 1898, Roosevelt inventa una historia sobre ciertas amenazas a la seguridad de ciertos ciudadanos estadounidenses en la zona. Como lo hará Henry Kissinger cuando niegue frente a las cámaras de televisión cualquier intervención en el golpe militar de Chile en 1973, Roosevelt asegura ante el Congreso y la opinión pública que, de todas formas, Washington no ha tenido ninguna participación en la Revolución en Panamá. Lo cual no quita que sea una buena idea. El 6 de diciembre de 1904, Roosevelt dará su discurso anual ante el Congreso sobre la necesidad de expandir, una vez más, la Doctrina Monroe de 1823 “para ver a nuestros vecinos estables, ordenados y prósperos”. De otra forma “será necesaria la intervención de parte de una nación civilizada… En dicho caso, los Estados Unidos deberán, aunque no lo quieran, intervenir para solucionar cualquier grave problema ejercitando el poder de la policía internacional”. Si lo vamos a hacer, que sea todo de forma legal.
En 1906 Roosevelt visitará las obras en Panamá. Será el primer presidente estadounidense en toda su historia que se atreva a salir de su país. Las rebeliones son más bien inocuas porque Washington ha decretado que los ciudadanos de ese país no pueden adquirir armas, lo que también afecta a la policía panameña que debe recurrir a los marines cada vez que las cosas se salen de sus manos. A bordo del USS Luisiana, el 20 de noviembre Roosevelt le escribe a su hijo Kermit: “con admirable energía, hombres y máquinas trabajan juntos; los blancos supervisan las obras y operan las máquinas mientras decenas de miles de negros hacen el trabajo duro donde no vale la pena usar maquinas”. A pesar del trabajo duro de los panameños, por alguna razón es necesario representarlos como haraganes. El periodista Richard Harding Davis, como cualquier periodista razonable y correcto, ya se había hecho eco del sentimiento de la época: “[Panamá] tiene tierras fértiles, hierro y oro, pero ha sido maldecida por Dios con gente haragana y por hombres corruptos que la gobiernan… Esta gente es una amenaza y un insulto para la civilización”.
El 26 de enero de 1909, el comité de Asuntos Internacionales del Senado de Estados Unidos, en base a las declaraciones jactanciosas de Roosevelt ante una clase llena de estudiantes en una universidad de California, investigará “la decisión unilateral de un ex presidente de tomar Panamá de la República de Colombia sin consultar al Congreso”. Considerando las insistentes peticiones de Colombia ante el Tribunal de la Haya, la comisión interrogará a diferentes protagonistas de la época. Según estas declaraciones, el 6 de noviembre de 1903, tres días después de la Revolución de Independencia de Panamá, el Departamento de Estado le había enviado un cable al cónsul de Estados Unidos en Colombia informando que “el pueblo de Panamá, aparentemente por unanimidad, ha resuelto disolver sus lazos con la República de Colombia…”
El representante Henry Thomas Rainey lee en el parlamento un cable de Washington: “El pueblo de Panamá, aparentemente por unanimidad, ha resuelto disolver sus lazos con la República de Colombia retomando su independencia…” El mismo Rainey aclara: “No creo que nada de esto sea cierto. El pueblo de Panamá no logró nada por sí solo… Cuando ocurrió la Revolución, apenas diez o doce rebeldes sabían de los planes, aparte de los gerentes de la Panama Railroad and Steamship Co.”
Será necesario esperar hasta 1977 cuando el gobierno de Jimmy Carter firme un acuerdo según el cual Estados Unidos devolvería el canal al país centroamericano el último día de 1999, tres años antes de que se venza el plazo de alquiler obligatorio. Un año antes, en un evento en Texas, el ex gobernador de California y futuro candidato a la presidencia, Ronald Reagan, afirmará: “No importa qué dictador carnero esté en el poder en Panamá. ¡Nosotros lo construimos! ¡Nosotros pagamos por el canal! Es nuestro y nos vamos a quedar con él”.
Omar Torrijos será el dictador aludido por Reagan. Torrijos reclamará la soberanía del Canal y morirá, como otros líderes rebeldes del sur, en un accidente aéreo.
El imperialismo es una enfermedad que no solo mata a quienes lo resisten sino que tampoco deja vivir a quienes lo llevan dentro.
Jorge Majfud (del libro a La frontera salvaje: 200 años de fanatismo anglosajón en América latina)
Cuando en diciembre de 2024 se informó del asesinato del CEO de UnitedHealthcare en una calle de Nueva York, camino a una convención de inversores, los medios comentaron sin cesar sobre el brutal crimen de una persona importante. Poco después, ocurrió un fenómeno que puso nervioso a los millonarios CEOs como Brian Thompson y desconcertó al resto. El asesino se convirtió en una especie de Zorro justiciero. Cuando se supo que la bala que lo había matado tenía la inscripción Delay, Deny, Defend (Retrasar, Negar, Defender) ya no quedaron dudas. El asesino había actuado por venganza contra la práctica más conocida y odiada de las mafias de los lobbies de la salud que se presentan como “industria de seguros de salud”, un oxímoron triple.
Solo UnitedHealth Group está valuado en 500 billones de dólares, más que toda la economía de Colombia. Su récord en salud es cuestionable. Ya en 2009, un estudio de la Universidad de Harvard había concluido que “45.000 personas mueren cada año a causa de la industria de seguros médicos privados”. Eso pasa cuando una necesidad básica deja de ser un derecho para convertirse en un negocio, una mercancía que empobrece a todo un pueblo al tiempo que enriquece a menos del uno por ciento.
La imprevista reacción popular, que tiene un antecedente en otro período de obscenas diferencias sociales (la Edad de Oro antes de la Gran Recesión de finales del siglo XIX) puso nerviosos a muchos. La justicia reaccionó de la misma forma que entonces: acusó a Luigi Mangione no de asesinato, sino de terrorismo. Todas los períodos de orgías de millonarios fueron acompañadas con este tipo de violencia y terminaron en quiebres sociales.
Ninguna de las orgías anteriores compite con la actual. A pesar de que Elon Musk no fue elegido nunca por nadie, su fortuna no sólo ha comprado medios de manipulación masiva, como Twitter, sino presidentes como Trump, a quien le donó 250 millones de dólares para su campaña electoral. Trump le retribuyó con un cargo gubernamental de poder político y social extremo, aparte del que ya tenía con su compañía de satélites, apoyada por la CIA. Desde las alturas de ese poder (y desde sus noches bajo los efectos de las drogas) Musk, el hijo del apartheid de Sud África, el inmigrante más peligroso de Estados Unidos, ahora nombrado como Jefe del Department of Government Efficiency en el próximo gobierno, ha mencionado dos medidas para solucionar los problemas del país: deportar a los inmigrantes pobres (no blancos) y recortar los seguros sociales para la clase trabajadora.
Un paso más hacia el Gran Quiebre. Las crisis económicas son un invento del capitalismo (antes eran producidas por factores externos a la economía), pero es lícito sospechar que también son parte del plan de saqueo a las clases trabajadoras. Las crisis económicas son grandes inversiones para los millonarios (los únicos capitalistas), por las cuales siempre compran todo a precio de necesidad y eso explica por qué, luego de una pérdida inicial, en menos de diez años multiplican sus capitales y su poder político. Hasta que se les va la mano, como en 1929, y más que una crisis producen una depresión, la que suele levantar a los de abajo y forzar cambios políticos e ideológicos que luego llaman radicales.
¿Radicales? Un trabajador de la construcción en Estados Unidos, trabajando cinco días a la semana, bajo el sol en verano y sobre la nieve en invierno, necesitaría 45 millones de años para ahorrar la fortuna que Elon Musk amasó en menos de veinte años. Eso si no se endeuda antes. Hace 45 millones de años, los Himalayas todavía no existían. El actual territorio de India comenzaba a colisionar con Asia y todavía faltaban más de 44 millones de años para que los Homo sapiens comenzaran a caminar por el continente africano.
El sistema que produce toda esta pornografía ideológica no es nuevo. Es el mismo que existía hace exactamente cien años en Europa y Estados Unidos: una persecución feroz de la maquinaria propagandística de la oligarquía contra las tradicionales organizaciones de trabajadores y los reclamos de seguridad social. En Estados Unidos, hace cien años, sindicatos obreros y hasta parte de la iglesia católica (irlandesa) habían ganado la opinión pública sobre la necesidad de un salario mínimo, de un seguro de desempleo y de la prohibición del trabajo infantil.
Hace cien años las diferencias sociales promovidas desde Wall Street (el mayor centro de acumulación de capitales desde la esclavitud) comenzaban a alcanzar máximos históricos. En ambas márgenes del Atlántico Norte, el fascismo comenzó a seducir a las masas insatisfechas que sentían el problema y sus frustraciones, pero no las comprendía. Todo terminó de la forma más conocida por la historia. Un quiebre radical. En este caso fue una catástrofe económica que agravó la situación de miseria y de injusticia social.
Hasta que F. D. Roosevelt echó mano a lo que se supone es la primer forma de prevenir estos problemas: la implementación de políticas sociales (socialistas, según críticos de entonces), como la creación del Seguro Social, de subsidios para los de abajo, del reconocimiento al derecho a huelga y de la intervención feroz del Estado en la economía a través de obras públicas. Funcionó, aunque el sistema que había provocado la catástrofe sobrevivió. Todo lo contrario a las recomendaciones neocoloniales de austeridad (“sinceramiento”) prescritas por el FMI.
Europa procedió de forma similar, con fuertes intervenciones de los estados, desde la Alemania nazi hasta la comunista Unión Soviética. En ambos casos, resultó en un abrumador éxito económico, aunque el resto de la historia no fue igualmente brillante. Estados Unidos e Inglaterra debieron tragarse sus simpatías por Hitler y aliarse a Stalin, sobre todo cuando la Unión soviética comenzó a mostrar signos de una fulminante contraofensiva a la invasión alemana.
Las obsesiones del sistema capitalista, ahora desenfrenado, se vuelven a repetir con las mismas características de hace un siglo. Pero como somos cavernícolas con mayor poder tecnológico, no aprendemos nada de las historia ni de nuestros propios monstruos porque cada generación tiende a olvidar, no sólo la historia sino el dolor de los abuelos que debieron atravesar por traumas nacionales y globales. Cada generación se cree en la cúspide del entendimiento y subestima a las anteriores sin siquiera considerar que no sólo nuestra super tecnología ha sido inventada casi toda por las generaciones anteriores sino que las nuevas generaciones tienden a ser insensibles a las tragedias de los abuelos. Más aún si el desprecio a la educación, al conocimiento, a la cultura y al pensamiento crítico están de moda.
¿Será que el péndulo de la historia cambia de dirección cada tres generaciones? ¿Será que cada generación que aprecia la civilidad, el valor de la solidaridad y la empatía, es precedida por una que sufrió su destrucción, precedida a su vez de otra que la despreció?
Al parecer estamos en esta generación del desprecio, orgullosa del mito más perverso de la historia del capitalismo: “el desenfrenado egoísmo del individuo es beneficioso para la sociedad”. La sociedad-archipiélago de islas alienadas. Generación que será seguida por la crisis, el fascismo y la rebelión de los de abajo.
¿Cómo es posible que la mayoría de las personas adopten, con tanta pasión y convicción, las ideas de una minoría? La respuesta la dio Karl Marx en el siglo XIX: “Las ideas de la clase dominante son las ideas dominantes de cada época”. La clase dominante, aunque no sume ni el uno por ciento de la sociedad, como es el caso actual, no sólo posee (se ha apropiado) de los medios de producción, de todas las invenciones de la Humanidad a lo largo de siglos, sino que también posee los medios de financiación, los medios políticos y los medios de comunicación. Así ha sido desde la Antigua Roma, desde los sermones de los sacerdotes que interpretaban la Biblia para una congregación de analfabetos en las ricas catedrales financiadas por los señores feudales, hasta sus herederos, los liberales, en posesión de la imprenta, luego de la radio, luego de la televisión, luego de Internet, luego de las redes sociales, luego de la inteligencia artificial…
Si algo está claro es que este sistema no tiene futuro. Su estrategia es prolongar la agonía de los de abajo y el champagne de los de arriba hasta donde sea posible.
Un informe de inteligencia de 1960 afirmaba que el sitio nuclear israelí era para fabricar armas. “No somos un satélite de Estados Unidos”, fue la respuesta de Ben-Gurion a las preguntas de Estados Unidos sobre el reactor de Dimona. Ahora, se han dado a conocer los informes desclasificados sobre las inspecciones de Estados Unidos a Dimona de 1965, 1966 y 1967
Informe de inteligencia de 1967: ¿Israel estaba produciendo plutonio apto para armas y engañando a Estados Unidos?[1]
Washington, D.C., 17 de diciembre de 2024. Un informe del Comité Conjunto de Inteligencia de Energía Atómica (JAEIC) de diciembre de 1960, recientemente desclasificado, es el primer y único informe de inteligencia estadounidense conocido que afirma de manera correcta e inequívoca que el proyecto nuclear israelí Dimona, que Estados Unidos había descubierto recientemente, incluiía una planta de reprocesamiento para la producción de plutonio relacionado con armas. Todos los análisis de inteligencia estadounidenses posteriores conocidos del programa nuclear de Israel trataron la cuestión del reprocesamiento como no resuelta hasta finales de la década de 1960, cuando Estados Unidos e Israel llegaron a un acuerdo secreto para aceptar su condición de “Estado con armas nucleares no declaradas”.
El informe de inteligencia recién publicado por es uno de los 20 documentos desclasificados que aparecen en el Libro Informativo Electrónico del Archivo de Seguridad Nacional de George Washington University. Se trata del último de una serie de colecciones de documentos desclasificados editados por el analista principal del Archivo William Burr y el profesor Avner Cohen (Instituto Middlebury de Estudios Internacionales en Monterey) sobre la política estadounidense hacia el programa de armas nucleares israelí y los complejos problemas que planteó para la diplomacia estadounidense durante los años 1960 y 1970.
Un análisis de inteligencia estadounidense igualmente intrigante y desclasificado reveló que varias fuentes israelíes habían informado a la embajada estadounidense en febrero de 1967 que Israel “tiene o está a punto de completar” una planta de reprocesamiento en Dimona y que “el reactor de Dimona ha estado funcionando a plena capacidad”. La conclusión era que Israel estaba a “6-8 semanas” de la bomba. Este es el primer documento conocido que trata como posible que Israel estuviera engañando sistemáticamente a los Estados Unidos sobre Dimona.
Los documentos recién publicados pero fechados en la década de 1970 ilustran cómo el gobierno estadounidense se adaptó a la nueva realidad de las armas nucleares de Israel. Entre ellos se encuentra el texto del “documento no oficial” del Secretario de Estado norteamericano Cyrus Vance, entregado al embajador soviético Anatoly Dobrynin a principios de 1978, en el que se afirma que Estados Unidos “acepta las garantías [de Israel]” de que no posee armas nucleares y de que “no será el primero en introducir armas nucleares en Oriente Medio”.
Un informe de entonces, generado por el Departamento de Estado sobre los riesgos de proliferación nuclear, sugería por qué Washington había abandonado la presión sobre Israel para que firmara el Tratado de No Proliferación: “La alta prioridad de Estados Unidos de alcanzar un acuerdo de paz en la zona es primordial e inhibe a la búsqueda efectiva de los objetivos de no proliferación en Israel”.
Dios puso las bombas en nuestras manos
A principios de 1978, después de que la CIA publicara por error una estimación de inteligencia que afirmaba que Israel había producido armas nucleares, el embajador soviético Anatoly Dobrynin preguntó si era cierto que Israel poseía tales armas. Como respuesta, el secretario de Estado Cyrus Vance le entregó a Dobrynin un “documento no oficial” en el que afirmaba que Estados Unidos “acepta las garantías [de Israel]” de que no poseía armas nucleares y “no será el primero en introducir armas nucleares en Oriente Medio”. Otro documento de principios de 1978, un informe del Departamento de Estado sobre los riesgos de proliferación nuclear planteados por varios países (“la Docena Sucia”), indicaba por qué Washington había abandonado la presión sobre Israel para que firmara el Tratado de No Proliferación: “La alta prioridad de Estados Unidos de encontrar un acuerdo de paz en la zona es primordial e inhibe la búsqueda efectiva de los objetivos de no proliferación en Israel”.
Los documentos de esta publicación proceden de la Administración Nacional de Archivos y Registros de Estados Unidos (NARA) y fueron descubiertos entre los registros del Comité Conjunto de Energía Atómica (RG 128), la Comisión de Energía Atómica (RG 326), el Departamento de Estado (RG 59) y en la Biblioteca Presidencial Lyndon Johnson. Casi todos ellos son el resultado de solicitudes de Revisión de Desclasificación Obligatoria (MDR) o de solicitudes de Indexación a Demanda presentadas por el Archivo de Seguridad Nacional.
Nuevos documentos estadounidenses sobre el programa nuclear israelí William Burr y Avner Cohen, editores
Desde principios de los años 1960 hasta los años 1970, la actitud del gobierno estadounidense ante el programa de armas nucleares de Israel cambió notablemente. Durante los años 1960, las preocupaciones sobre la no proliferación y la estabilidad geopolítica en Oriente Medio alimentaron el temor de que Israel utilizara su reactor nuclear de Dimona para producir plutonio para la bomba. Un ejemplo de ello son los documentos recientemente desclasificados sobre las inspecciones de Dimona, en las que funcionarios del gobierno estadounidense buscaron indicios de producción de plutonio. En 1969, los documentos desclasificados indican que la no proliferación dio paso a un acuerdo secreto bilateral entre el presidente Richard Nixon y la primera ministra Golda Meir, en virtud del cual Washington se acomodó a la condición no declarada de Israel en materia de armas nucleares.
El informe de la AEC y otros documentos recientemente desclasificados de los registros del Comité Conjunto sobre Energía Atómica del Congreso ilustran cómo Washington empezó a descubrir la existencia del reactor de Dimona. En junio de 1960, funcionarios de la AEC visitaron Israel para inspeccionar el recién construido reactor de investigación Soreq que Washington había proporcionado en el marco del programa Átomos para la Paz. Todo estaba en orden: Israel cumplía plenamente con las salvaguardias. Sin embargo, una reunión con funcionarios estadounidenses en la embajada de Tel Aviv trajo noticias inesperadas: “informes de que un equipo conjunto israelí-francés estaba haciendo algo en el campo de la energía atómica en Beersheba o cerca de allí”. Los funcionarios de la AEC dijeron que no habían oído nada al respecto y que intentarían obtener más información de su personal de inteligencia en Washington. Este nuevo documento se relaciona con otro material sobre el descubrimiento de Dimona publicado en una publicación anterior en 2015.
Como se mencionó, uno de los nuevos documentos es un informe del Comité Conjunto de Inteligencia de Energía Atómica de diciembre de 1960. Sus declaraciones de que el proyecto nuclear franco-israelí en el desierto del Néguev incluiría una “planta de separación de plutonio” y que el reactor de Dimona estaba destinado inequívocamente a fines armamentísticos eran afirmaciones poco comunes. Hasta donde saben los editores, este es el primer y único documento de inteligencia estadounidense que sostiene de manera categórica y explícita que el sitio de Dimona incluiría una planta para separar el plutonio del combustible gastado del reactor con el fin de fabricar armas. Informes desclasificados posteriores trataron la planta de reprocesamiento como algo que aún no existía y dijeron que su construcción probablemente requeriría una nueva decisión política por parte de los líderes israelíes.
Otros documentos de archivo desclasificados sobre el descubrimiento del reactor de Dimona se centran en la reacción irritada del Primer Ministro David Ben Gurion ante las declaraciones y las indagaciones de la administración de Eisenhower sobre el reactor y los propósitos israelíes. Por ejemplo, los comentarios públicos del director de la Comisión de Energía Atómica, John McCone, en “Meet the Press” de que Israel no había informado a Washington sobre Dimona enfurecieron a Ben-Gurion, quien le dijo al embajador estadounidense Ogden Reid a principios de 1961 que “no lo merecíamos y no aceptaremos ese trato”, y agregó: “no somos un satélite de Estados Unidos… y nunca seremos un satélite”. El embajador Reid informó que había hablado con Ben-Gurion sobre el trabajo de inteligencia de los Estados Unidos en Israel y le dijo que “no había ningún espionaje en curso”. Reid repasó con Ben-Gurion los esfuerzos de la Embajada por establecer una “relación de trabajo” entre los dos países, pero señaló que Israel no había ayudado en nada al no “informarnos sobre el reactor, en particular a la luz de la asistencia económica que habíamos estado brindando”. [1]
Entre otros documentos nuevos se incluyen los informes detallados de las visitas de inspección de los Estados Unidos al reactor de Dimona en 1965 y 1966. Para evitar disputas con sus anfitriones, las inspecciones se denominaron “visitas”, pero fueron tan detalladas como los israelíes permitieron. Publicados por primera vez, los documentos ilustran la preocupación del gobierno de los Estados Unidos durante la década de 1960 de que el programa nuclear israelí fuera un riesgo de proliferación que hiciera necesario determinar si el reactor representaba un proyecto de armas nucleares, especialmente si había indicios de que los israelíes ya tenían o estaban tratando de construir una planta para convertir el combustible gastado del reactor en plutonio para armas.
El equipo de la AEC que inspeccionó el reactor de Dimona en 1966 fue lo suficientemente cauteloso como para señalar la posibilidad de un engaño israelí: “el equipo puede haber sido engañado deliberadamente, pero se cree que esto es poco probable”. El informe de inspección señaló las razones por las que el engaño era improbable, pero el equipo no se dio cuenta de que el engaño era, de hecho, continuo y sistemático. No sólo eso, en algún momento de 1966 Israel había comenzado a producir plutonio apto para armas y en vísperas de la Guerra de los Seis Días de 1967, como una cuestión de máxima emergencia, Israel reunió, por primera vez en su historia, dos o tres dispositivos nucleares. Esta preparación fue para una demostración en caso de que ocurriera el peor escenario posible. Fue entonces, a todos los efectos, que Israel había cruzado el umbral y se había convertido en un estado con capacidad nuclear.[2]
Otro documento clave desclasificado también muestra preocupaciones sobre la posibilidad de engaño en Dimona. Un informe de inteligencia del Departamento de Estado de marzo de 1967, suprimido en gran parte por la CIA, analizaba acusaciones sorprendentes hechas, aparentemente por fuentes israelíes, a la embajada de Estados Unidos en Tel Aviv, de que los israelíes habían instalado o estaban a punto de instalar una planta de reprocesamiento para producir plutonio en Dimona y habían estado operando el reactor de Dimona a alta capacidad para ese propósito. Los redactores del informe (al menos el texto que ha sido desclasificado) vieron claramente la nueva información como dramática, pero se mostraron reacios a sacar conclusiones firmes. En cambio, sugirieron que la próxima visita de la AEC a Dimona examinara de cerca el problema del reprocesamiento. Pero la inspección de abril de 1967 no arrojó nada nuevo.
Los documentos de la década de 1960 corresponden a un período en el que las preocupaciones por la no proliferación tuvieron un impacto significativo en la política estadounidense hacia Israel, aunque nunca llegaron al punto de un choque o confrontación abierta. Los israelíes reconocieron las aprensiones de los EE. UU., pero eso no les impediría avanzar en secreto en el desarrollo de una capacidad de armas nucleares, incluido el reprocesamiento secreto del combustible gastado. El Primer Ministro Levi Eshkol y otros altos funcionarios no estaban dispuestos a decirle a Washington que se estaban acercando al umbral nuclear, y mucho menos a dar un paso abierto en esa dirección, aunque la inteligencia estadounidense percibió que los israelíes estaban haciendo progresos.
Un grupo de documentos desclasificados de la administración Carter ilustraba el cambio de actitud que había dado el gobierno estadounidense durante la década de 1970. El presidente Richard Nixon dio baja prioridad al TNP y a las preocupaciones por la proliferación en general, pero alta prioridad a la libertad de acción de los socios de seguridad regionales. En consonancia con ello, en septiembre de 1969 Nixon se reunió personalmente con la primera ministra Golda Meir, en la que llegaron a un acuerdo altamente secreto según el cual Estados Unidos dejaría de ejercer presión sobre la cuestión nuclear, por ejemplo poniendo fin a las solicitudes de inspección de las instalaciones nucleares israelíes y de que Israel firmara el TNP.[3]
Aunque nunca ha surgido un registro directo de la reunión Meir-Nixon, se puede inferir que los dos líderes acordaron mantener en secreto el estatus de Israel en materia de armas nucleares. Israel no probaría armas nucleares ni declararía que las tenía. En cualquier declaración oficial sobre sus capacidades, utilizaría un lenguaje ambiguo o lo que Avner Cohen ha llamado “opaco”. Washington aceptaría y apoyaría las declaraciones de Israel de que no tenía armas nucleares y de que no sería el “primero en introducir armas nucleares” en la región. Esa redacción había sido la posición oficial israelí desde principios de los años 1960, cuando Ben-Gurion, Eshkol, Shimon Peres y otros altos funcionarios la formularon.[4]
El acuerdo Nixon-Meir sobrevivió a sus arquitectos. Según un relato, a petición del gobierno israelí en 1977, Henry Kissinger informó a Jimmy Carter sobre el acuerdo Nixon-Meir.[5] Si bien Kissinger se reunió y habló con el presidente Carter varias veces durante agosto de 1977, fue principalmente en relación con el Tratado del Canal de Panamá. Sin embargo, lo que es particularmente revelador es que Kissinger se reunió con el presidente Carter el 25 de enero de 1978. Después de una discusión privada de veinte minutos en la Oficina Oval, almorzaron con Rosalynn Carter.[6] La visita de Kissinger se produjo en vísperas de la cobertura mediática de una respuesta aparentemente errónea de la CIA a una solicitud de la FOIA por parte del Consejo de Defensa de los Recursos Naturales (NRDC). La Agencia desclasificó la mayoría de las principales conclusiones de la Estimación Especial de Inteligencia Nacional (SNIE) de 1974, “Perspectivas de una mayor proliferación de armas nucleares”. Una de las conclusiones fue que “Israel ya había producido armas nucleares”, o al menos había una “creencia” de que Israel lo había hecho.
La divulgación de la CIA aparentemente violó uno de los aspectos operativos del acuerdo Nixon-Meir: que Estados Unidos nunca reconocería en público la posesión de armas nucleares por parte de Israel. Las preguntas de los periodistas sobre el SNIE pueden haber animado a los diplomáticos israelíes a ponerse en contacto con Kissinger y pedir su intervención. Ciertamente, la prensa estadounidense y extranjera cubrió la divulgación de la FOIA, incluido el hecho de que había sido un “error” y que un funcionario de la CIA había temido que pudiera causar un “incidente internacional”. [7]
La cobertura de la prensa motivó a la Embajada de Estados Unidos en Israel a pedir instrucciones a Washington en caso de que los medios de comunicación hicieran preguntas. El Departamento de Estado brindó inmediatamente orientación resumiendo las “firmes” declaraciones del Gobierno de Israel de que “no será el primero en introducir armas nucleares en Oriente Medio” y las declaraciones del Primer Ministro Rabin en 1974 y 1975 de que “no tenemos armas nucleares” y que “Israel es un país no nuclear”. Según el Departamento, esas fueron “declaraciones autorizadas” y “no tenemos nada que agregar”. Esa orientación era consistente con el entendimiento Nixon-Meir, y la Embajada de Israel no se habría opuesto a ella.
Si Kissinger informó al Presidente Carter sobre el entendimiento Nixon-Meir, es difícil saber cuán decisivo fue. La administración Carter era consciente de que Israel tenía plena capacidad de armas nucleares [Véase el Documento 13], pero durante su primer año, mientras perseguía su agenda de no proliferación, evitó cuidadosamente cualquier presión sobre Israel. Sin embargo, cualquier informe de Kissinger sobre el acuerdo Nixon-Meir puede haber sido un recordatorio útil de la importancia del tema y del enfoque que los predecesores inmediatos de Carter habían adoptado respecto del programa nuclear de Israel.
En los días y semanas que siguieron a las noticias de la prensa, la administración Carter siguió los principios básicos del acuerdo Nixon-Meir al validar las negaciones israelíes de que poseía la bomba. Un caso de prueba puede haber sido la curiosidad expresada por un alto diplomático soviético sobre el documento poco después de que aparecieran las noticias de la prensa. El 21 de febrero de 1978, el embajador Anatoly Dobrynin entregó un «documento no oficial» al secretario de Estado Cyrus Vance en el que Moscú pedía a Estados Unidos que aclarara el asunto: «en qué medida son ciertos [sic] los informes… de que las agencias del gobierno de Estados Unidos llegaron a la conclusión de que Israel está en posesión de armas nucleares». Vance observó que los israelíes habían negado que poseyeran la bomba y que la CIA estaba dividida sobre el asunto, pero aceptó revisar el documento soviético.
Unas semanas después, cuando Dobrynin preguntó por la respuesta del Departamento de Estado a su pregunta, Vance fue un poco más allá de la posición habitual al reconocer que “nuestra comunidad de inteligencia estaba de acuerdo en que Israel tenía la capacidad de fabricar armas nucleares, [pero] estaba dividida sobre la cuestión de si ya lo había hecho”. En respuesta, Dobrynin dijo que “tenía ‘una opinión más alta de la gente de inteligencia de los EE. UU.’ de lo que implicaba la respuesta”, lo que sugería sus dudas sobre una “división”.
El 16 de marzo de 1978, Vance proporcionó a Dobrynin un documento oficioso que incluía una declaración de que “aceptamos las garantías israelíes de que no habían producido armas nucleares”. El Departamento también aceptó la garantía israelí de que “no serán los primeros en introducir armas nucleares en Oriente Medio”. Claramente escéptico, Dobrynin “cuestionó persistentemente si realmente creemos lo que dicen los israelíes”. Vance respondió que “no había evidencia de que las garantías israelíes fueran falsas”. En este ejemplo de diálogo entre gobiernos sobre el estatus nuclear de Israel, el Departamento de Estado mantuvo la postura israelí de opacidad nuclear. Esto plantea interrogantes sobre cuánta información –cuán precisa y detallada– tenía el propio gobierno de Estados Unidos sobre el programa nuclear israelí en ese momento.
El artículo concluye con un largo informe del Departamento de Estado sobre los países que generan preocupación en materia de proliferación nuclear, “La docena sucia” (en realidad once), que incluía una evaluación de las capacidades de armas nucleares de Israel y las cuestiones políticas y diplomáticas que planteaban. Si bien es probable que los autores del informe no conocieran el acuerdo Nixon-Meir, reconocieron que el programa nuclear de Israel estaba en una categoría especial que lo hacía inmune a las presiones diplomáticas habituales, sobre todo porque “la alta prioridad de Estados Unidos de encontrar un acuerdo de paz en la zona es primordial e inhibe la búsqueda efectiva de objetivos de no proliferación en Israel”.
Es necesario investigar más sobre qué sabía exactamente el gobierno de Estados Unidos y cuándo lo sabía sobre el programa de armas nucleares israelí y cómo los responsables de las políticas evaluaban cualquier nuevo conocimiento. Como sucede con cualquier asunto de política exterior especialmente sensible y controvertido, los registros sobre ese tema no son fáciles de desclasificar e invariablemente pasan por una prolongada revisión de seguridad. Algunas solicitudes tardan años en procesarse; los registros de la JCAE que se muestran en la publicación de hoy se solicitaron en 2012 y se publicaron en septiembre de 2024. Otras solicitudes relacionadas con las actividades nucleares de Israel fueron denegadas por completo y esperan un largo proceso de revisión de apelaciones. Importantes registros de archivo del Departamento de Estado de finales de la década de 1960 se encuentran en la cola de apelaciones del sobrecargado Panel de Apelaciones de Clasificación Interinstitucional (ISCAP) y es muy posible que el ISCAP nunca llegue a ellos debido a la falta de personal. También están estancados en el proceso de desclasificación y apelación los informes sobre las visitas a Dimona en 1967, 1968 y 1969.
También es muy relevante que parece haber una regulación secreta que advierte a los empleados actuales o anteriores del gobierno federal con medidas disciplinarias si divulgan información sobre las actividades de armas nucleares israelíes.[8] No está del todo claro hasta qué punto esta prohibición se relaciona con la desclasificación de material histórico de archivo, pero sin duda el Departamento de Defensa está decidido a plantear objeciones a la desclasificación de material incluso de hace 60 años o más relativo a la política estadounidense y al estado de conocimiento sobre el programa nuclear israelí. Según la actual orden ejecutiva sobre información clasificada de seguridad nacional, el Pentágono tiene libertad de acción para hacerlo; todavía está por ver si eso cambiará en el futuro previsible.
National Archives, Record Group 128, Joint Congressional Committees (RG 128), Records of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subject Files, Box 16, Foreign Activities- Israel 1957-1976
Before the discovery of the secret nuclear reactor at Dimona during November-December 1960, the Atomic Energy Commission had provided Israel with a small five-megawatt research reactor under the “Atoms for Peace Program,” with fuel provided by the AEC. Located at the Soreq Nuclear Research Center formerly referred to as Nabi Rubin site, some fifteen miles south of Tel Aviv the recently constructed reactor (designed by Philip Johnson and inaugurated in June 1960) was subject to inspection under an Agreement for Cooperation between the AEC and the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission.
For the first inspection of this reactor, AEC officials John J. Downing and James H. Herring visited the site on 9 June 1960. Their report concluded that the operations of the reactor and the use of U.S. fuel were in “accordance with safeguards provisions.” Discussion at the embassy a few days later indicated that the reactor could produce only miniscule amounts of plutonium, 5 grams per day, and most likely far less. Under the inspection requirements there was “no risk of material diversion except for the production of isotopes for radiological warfare.”
Two days after the inspection, the AEC team met with U.S. diplomats at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, where there was vocal support for two inspections per year, the maximum permitted. The discussion quickly shifted to Israel and nuclear weapons. Perhaps not wholly appreciative or supportive of the Eisenhower administration’s developing concern about nuclear proliferation, Embassy officials focused on Israel’s security needs. With Israel surrounded by hostile states, “maximum effect” weapons were the “most effective means of self-protection.” Either Israel could build nuclear weapons, or France could supply them.
France may have been mentioned because embassy officials had heard “reports of a joint Israeli-French team doing something in atomic energy in or near Beersheba.” The AEC officials knew nothing about that and wanted to learn more. The discussion concluded with an understanding that, with “new separation techniques” (used for producing plutonium), Israel could “become a nuclear power.” Yet, keeping a nuclear weapons program a secret “would be difficult … in so small a country.”
When AEC General Manager Luedecke subsequently provided, six months later, reports of the inspection and the embassy meeting to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, he observed that the discussion at the Embassy of French-Israeli atomic activities was in the nature of “rumor type reports” that had circulated during 1960. According to Luedecke, when the CIA’s Herbert Scoville testified to the JCAE on Israeli nuclear activities in December 1960, he had mentioned such reports.[9]
RG 128, Records of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subject Files, Box 16, Foreign Activities- Israel 1957-1976
This recently declassified intelligence report, shared in December 1960 with Congress’s Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, used newly acquired information to go far beyond the earlier rumors by confirming not only the joint French-Israeli construction of a large reactor in a site near Beersheba but also by noting that the joint project would include a “plutonium separation plant.” We believe this is the first – and possibly the only – U.S. intelligence document that unequivocally and explicitly declared that the French-Israeli joint nuclear project included those two major components: a production reactor and a plutonium separation plant.
All subsequent U.S. intelligence estimates treated the issue of a separation plant as an unresolved matter of concern, most often taking the view that it did not yet exist, and that its construction most likely would require a new political decision. Yet the Committee did not explain how it reached the judgement that Dimona would include a separation plant. In any event, by positing the construction of a separation plant, the report assumed that the reactor’s purpose was weapons production, not research.
The Committee estimated that the power of the reactor was about 200 MW (thermal), which is almost 10 times larger than the declared nominal power, 24 MW. Tracing the construction of the site to 1959, it estimated that the reactor would be operational by mid-1961. The latter date was an overestimate, by far, as the document forecasts that, by mid-1962, Dimona could produce about 30 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium, given they conduct their first weapons test by late 1962 or early 1963. It also speculated that the French could provide a test site but that if they provided weapons designs no tests would be necessary. According to the report, the French and Israelis would be making a statement in a few days.
National Archives, Record Group 326, Records of Atomic Energy Commission, John McCone Records, box 90, Israel
This AEC intelligence report was far less categorical than the JAEIC had been about the purposes of the French-Israeli project, but when the Commission’s analysts considered various interpretations they believed that the “secrecy surrounding the project suggested that the complex was intended for the production of weapons-grade plutonium, whether or not generation of electric power is involved.” One of the interpretations, that the purpose was a research reactor with little capacity to produce plutonium, they deemed “incompatible with the security of the site and the large scale of the entire project, and particularly the large size of the dome-shaped containment building.”
At that point, the AEC’s analysts were not sure what type of French reactor Dimona was modeled after and their report listed four different reactor types and their potential to produce plutonium, including the Marcoule and the EL-3 models. Some months later, however, Dimona plant director Mannes Pratt told the AEC officials examining the reactor in May 1961 that it was “very much influenced by the French EL-3 model.”[10] Whatever French model was relevant, AEC intelligence, unlike the JAEIC, did not specify that a reprocessing plant would be part of the Dimona complex, although the weapons grade plutonium interpretation would require the availability of one.
National Archives, Record Group 326, Records of Atomic Energy Commission, Records of John McCone, Box 90, Israel
The JCAE hearing on 9 December 1960 that AEC General Manager Luedecke mentioned had its contentious moments. The hearing record remains classified, but this heavily excised account provides a little of the flavor. The testimony by the State Department’s Phillip Farley conveyed the gravity of the concerns about Dimona: that the “security of the United States” was involved and that the reactor’s existence had produced “needless suspicion and risk.”
Senator John Pastore (D-RI) “showed agitation” that the U.S. had been “‘snooping around’ [excised] our supposed friends” and said that as soon as it had the earliest evidence it should have “confronted Israel directly.” By contrast, Senator Albert Gore, Sr. (D-TN) “defended the subterfuge.” Both, “for different reasons,” blamed the CIA and the State Department “for tardy action.” Committee members were generally concerned that, if the existence of Dimona leaked out, the U.S. “would be blamed because of its close economic ties” with Israel. In particular, they did not want it to become general knowledge that the U.S. government had known about Dimona “before it was public.”
Despite those concerns, on 18 December 1960, AEC Chair John McCone appeared on “Meet the Press,” where he disclosed that the U.S. had “informal and unofficial” information about the reactor, acknowledged that it came as a “surprise” to the U.S., and said that Washington was seeking more information from Israel. Those statements incensed Ben-Gurion (See Document 5).
On 21 December 1960, Ben-Gurion made a statement to the Knesset acknowledging the reactor and declaring that its purpose was research for peaceful purposes. He did not mention the French connection. For the Eisenhower administration, this was not enough; top State Department officials found Ben-Gurion to be “evasive” in answering questions about plutonium and access to Dimona by U.S. scientists, and for his “failure to confide” with President Eisenhower. Seeking more candor, Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon sent the Embassy in Tel Aviv, on 31 December 1960, specific questions to pose to the Israeli leadership – either Prime Minister Ben Gurion or Foreign Minister Meir – about the reactor, safeguards, and visits by “qualified scientists from the IAEA or other friendly quarters.”
As part of the follow-up to the Department’s request, on 4 January 1961, Ambassador Reid was summoned to Sde Boker (Ben Gurion’s Negev’s residence) and had a lengthy discussion with the Prime Minister, which he reported in a detailed five-part “eyes only” message. Ben-Gurion was plainly aggravated by the publicity given to the Dimona reactor and the detailed questions about Israel’s purposes, especially the demand for a categorical statement that Israel “has no plans for producing nuclear weapons.” Ben-Gurion said his answer was a “categorical yes,” that Israel had no such plans. He went on to discuss at length what he thought was the “greatness” of the United States, for example, as a “refuge for tens of millions of people of Europe,” for its war against slavery, and its early recognition of the State of Israel. But then he went on to say that “we are equals of America in terms of moral respect.” Soon, “drawing himself up in his chair,” he said, “We didn’t deserve it and we will not accept such treatment.”
That was Ben Gurion’s irate and emotional response to the way that the Eisenhower administration had handled the Dimona issue. What especially rankled him was AEC Director John McCone’s statements on “Meet the Press” on 18 December 1960 that Dimona was a “surprise” to the U.S. and that Washington had asked Israel for more information. Evidently, Ben-Gurion did not think that such matters should be public, especially after his subsequent statement to the Knesset, on 21 December, which was as “trustworthy as any made by the highest [U.S.] officials.” Suggesting that U.S. officials should not raise doubts about Israel’s purposes, he declared that, “We are not a satellite of America… and will never be a satellite.” Later he observed that McCone’s comments had contributed to the “deterioration of the atmosphere in the Middle East” by increasing concern about Dimona, noting that, “If [Egyptian leader] Nasser wins, every Jew will be exterminated in this country.”
When the discussion turned to safeguards about plutonium produced from the reactor and possibilities for inspection, Ben-Gurion said, “I refuse” because he did not want Soviet inspectors as “part of an international body,” referring to the IAEA. Yet, when Reid asked why Dimona could not have inspections when Israel had accepted them for the Soreq research reactor, he could not get straightforward answers from Ben-Gurion, who wanted to avoid acknowledging that he wanted freedom of action for Israel to use Dimona as it saw fit. Ben-Gurion allowed that “access” by a “friendly” power could be possible under some conditions, for example, if McCone made no further statements.
Reid and Ben-Gurion discussed the “spying question.” Ben Gurion was the one who raised the issue and asked whether the U-2 flew over Dimona. Reid responded that he had never been “officially informed” about U-2 flights and that the only photographs of Dimona he knew about were taken from the roadside. While taking “full responsibility” for the activities of the CIA and military attaches, Reid assured Ben-Gurion that “there was no spying going on.”
Noting the Embassy’s efforts to establish a “working relationship” between the two countries, Reid said that Israel had not helped matters by failing to “inform us of the reactor—particularly in light of the economic assistance we had been providing.” Reid believed that point, among others that he made, “registered” with the Prime Minister. After noting the severe impact of cabinet crises and the related Lavon Affair on Ben-Gurion, Reid believed that the conversation had “largely” helped clear the air, although Washington would want more information in response to its questions about the Israeli nuclear project.
II. Inspections during the Mid-1960s and Proliferation Concerns
RG 128, Records of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subject Files, Box 16, Foreign Activities- Israel 1957-1976
As detailed in previous postings, U.S. concern about Dimona and the risk it posed to nonproliferation policy persisted during the Kennedy administration. Under nagging pressure for months from President John F. Kennedy, Ben-Gurion finally agreed to the first U.S. visit to the Dimona site in May 1961. Then, after an improvised and unsatisfactory visit in September 1962, President Kennedy resumed his pressure in the spring and summer of 1963 for an arrangement involving regular visits, to which Ben-Gurion (and subsequently his successor Levi Eshkol) reluctantly assented in August 1963. The first of those visits took place on 18 January 1964 under president Lyndon Johnson, and the full report on the visit was published for the first time in a previous posting. While President Johnson shared President Kennedy’s concern about nuclear proliferation, he was certainly not as persistent and demanding with the Israelis as his predecessor had been.
The 1965 Dimona visit was the second of those annual visits. Its arrangement involved as many diplomatic complications as the earlier ones. Prime Minister Eshkol delayed the visit, and the Israelis imposed restrictions on its length. The fundamental findings of the 1965 visit are outlined in a previously released short summary made available to the State Department and the White House. The full 30-page report by the 1965 U.S. team – Ulysses Staebler with the AEC, Clyde McClelland with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Floyd L, Culler with Oak Ridge Laboratory – is even more interesting, in part because of its detailed coverage of the limited capacities the Israelis presented to the visitors in the areas of reprocessing and plutonium. The construction, apparently completed during this period, of a large underground reprocessing facility at Dimona was the big secret of Dimona that the Israelis had successfully concealed. As noted, State Department and CIA officials recognized that an Israeli bomb was possible only if spent reactor fuel could be chemically processed into plutonium. Trying to identify such a facility was high on the U.S. agenda, but U.S. officials had no idea that the secret 1957 French-Israeli agreement for the Dimona nuclear package had provided for a reprocessing plant that the French constructed and the Israelis completed in a secret underground structure. [11]
Hosted by Professor Igal Talmi, a prominent nuclear physicist at the Weizmann Institute, the January 1965 visit was rushed; it lasted only one day, a little less than 11 hours. The Israelis would not agree to provide more time, let alone an additional day. Nevertheless the team members believed that they had seen enough to draw reliable conclusions. Among the main findings of the report (also included in the summary and in Howard Brown’s cover letter) was that even though they thought there was “no near term possibility of a weapons development program,” the reactor “has excellent development and production capability and potential that warrants “continued surveillance at intervals not to exceed one year.” Among the points consistent with such “potential” was that the amount of uranium onsite was enough to “produce on the order of 10 to 30 Kgs of plutonium after 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 years of irradiation, depending upon the irradiation level desired for the plutonium.” In their assessment, a chemical separation plant to produce the plutonium “could be constructed …. within perhaps two years as an internal modification within an existing building.”
As long as Dimona remained a “secret facility,” the team recommended that future visits try to establish, for example “whether the reactor operating schedule is indicative of ‘weapons grade’ plutonium production” and to find “any evidence of the construction of a chemical separations plant.” Another sign of weapons potential became evident from the visit to the small plutonium hot cells laboratory, which included three rooms “equipped for work with dangerous alpha-active substances such as plutonium.” The lab was then working with 56 grams of the 150 grams of plutonium received from the French for research purposes. According to the report, the “plutonium facilities are very complete and are suitable for an extensive research or small production program.” While the glove box equipment needed for safe operations is “relatively small scale …. it would be possible ….to equip the [glove] boxes with equipment suitable for the fabrication of the plutonium components required for a nuclear weapon.”
In connection with the plutonium issue, the team visited the “ventilation, filtration, decontamination building” where a pilot plutonium separation plant “was to have been constructed.” But Director Mannes Pratt said that he doubted that “it will ever be constructed,” and the team found no evidence “that the radiochemical processing pilot plant does exist … or is planned.” Thus, the Israelis maintained the narrative that despite their initial plans reprocessing capability did not exist.
An important issue was how Israel would handle the first reactor core that had been irradiated and removed. According to Pratt, the core would be returned to France for chemical processing, but that issue had not yet received “detailed consideration.” He did not make clear exactly what would happen with the core and responded to a “direct question about the disposal of the plutonium recovered from the Israeli fuel” only by stating that it “was a question of policy.” According to Pratt, the French could continue to supply small quantities of plutonium for research purposes under the same conditions that they had supplied the 150 grams, but those conditions were not explained. When a team member “mentioned that a four-year cooling period would reduce transportation costs, Mr. Pratt acknowledged that [Dimona lacked] facilities for such long cooling times” and he “worried about the consequences of an air attack” if irradiated material was onsite.
The uranium metal production facility that produced material used in the fuel elements was part of the visit, but the U.S. team was informed that the plant had been shut down because of a shortage of uranium supplies. At that point, one of the team members asked about Israeli procurement of uranium concentrate from foreign sources. While the team did not mention uranium from Argentina, it is what they had in mind when the issue was raised. The Israelis, however, refused to discuss “foreign sources” declaring that it was “outside the scope of this visit.”
Before the U.S. team arrived at Dimona, it lodged at the Desert Inn Hotel in Beer Sheba. There, as it turned out, Harvard Professor Henry Kissinger, previously an adviser to the Kennedy White House, was also staying (apparently meeting Israelis connected to the nuclear project). That caused some consternation until it was determined that none of the team members were acquainted with him. A few days later, Kissinger met with U.S. diplomats in Tel Aviv and during that meeting said that the Israelis had “embarked on a nuclear weapons construction program.”
RG 128, Records of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subject Files, Box 16, Foreign Activities- Israel 1957-1976
When Howard Brown sent the report of the April 1966 visit to Dimona, his cover letter considered two possibilities about the reactor’s actual operations. One was the “bare possibility that the reactor may have operated to produce about 3 kilograms of plutonium since the time of the last visit in January 1965.” But the other possibility, indeed what the team saw as the overall “most probable conclusion” was “that the reactor was operating as a research reactor,” since there was “no evidence of any nuclear weapons research and development work being conducted at the Dimona site.”
The 17-page report did not name the team’s three members, but from other documents we know it consisted of W. Kelly Woods, a General Electric employee at the AEC Hanford works in Richland, WA; Donald E. Erb, with the Division of Reactor Development and Technology at the AEC’s Headquarters, and Floyd L. Culler, the Oak Ridge scientist who participated in the 1965 visit to Dimona.[12]
Professor Amos De-Shalit, a prominent nuclear physicist at the Weizmann Institute for Science where he was also the Scientific Director, served as the visit’s host on behalf of the Prime Minister. Before Dimona was constructed, De-Shalit had been a critic of Israel’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. During the course of the visit, De-Shalit told a team member – believed to be Floyd Culler – that the Israeli government had “long recognized that it cannot develop weapons to the displeasure of either US Jews who contribute heavily to Israel’s support or, more particularly, the US Government.”[13] From the report. it is impossible to assess whether De-Shalit made this remark as a personal opinion or as a factual claim. That concern, along with Nasser’s threating statements about Dimona at that time, may have contributed to Prime Minister Eshkol’s cautiousness on Dimona during this period.[14]
It was not for want of looking that the 1966 U.S. team found no evidence that “Israel is or intends to produce nuclear weapons in the facilities which we have seen” (emphasis in the original). To support that conclusion it cited several considerations, including the apparent absence of a reprocessing facility at the Dimona site, the lack of a “capability in installed equipment for producing PU [plutonium] metal in any appreciable quantity,” the fact that the irradiation objectives at Dimona “will not produce PU that is particularly useful for nuclear weapons,” and that the “reactor has not been pushed to … full power operation at its design power of 26 MWT with any urgency.” Moreover, the past presence of French technicians, although in lessening numbers “mitigates against diversion or deviation from the patterns which we have observed.” There also was no evidence that diversion of the uranium inventory at Dimona had occurred. Some of those considerations were not as conclusive as the team may have assumed; for example, because the French were in on the secret of the underground reprocessing plant, the U.S. team was too sanguine in assuming that their presence acted as a check on Israeli weapons goals.[15]
The 1966 report prudently acknowledged the “possibility that the team may have been deliberately deceived,” but added that the team “believed that this is unlikely.” Now we know that Israel concealed the existence of its underground super-secret reprocessing plant and that plutonium production trials started in 1966. In retrospect, it is well understood that the U.S. visits at Dimona necessitated a systematic effort to deceive U.S. inspectors by concealing major operations, most prominently the reprocessing plant and the reactor’s actual power level.[16] One also wonders whether the official host on behalf of Prime Minister Eshkol, Professor Amos De Shalit, was fully aware of Dimona’s big secret, the underground reprocessing plant. We do not know.
In considering a theoretical possibility of deception, the report made several points. One was that the team could not affirmatively rule out whether there was a reprocessing plant in site or even another reactor elsewhere in Israel.[17] Thus, U.S. intelligence needed to “maintain a constant surveillance of the country to determine whether such a plant or plants exists or are being built.” Also relevant was the need to determine “as conclusively as possible” the disposition or shipment of the irradiated fuel discharged from the reactor” to ensure that it was not used for plutonium production.
Another concern about the possibility of deception was that nothing could be learned about the 80 or more tons of uranium from Argentina and how Israel was using it.[18] When asked about the uranium, Dimona’s new director, Joseph Tulipman said he “knows nothing and acted as though it was the first time he had heard of it when asked.” In its report, the U.S team correctly pointed to the risk that it “could be a supply of uranium that has been or could in the future be run through the reactor between our visits and not be detected so long as the indicated reactor utilization is low.” Israel would be doing something very much like that in its efforts to acquire weapons-grade plutonium during this period.
Besides the central question of whether the Israelis were using Dimona for weapons production purposes, the report covered a visit to the Soreq research reactor, the possibility of inspection by the IAEA or other international organizations, and the intense concern for secrecy about Dimona. A major worry was that the reactor’s vulnerability made the Israelis “very concerned about a possible leak to the media which again might draw Nasser’s attention to the reactor.” According to De-Shalit, “Israelis fear there may be an unannounced large strike at Dimona.” Those concerns made them so apprehensive about the security of the irradiated fuel from bombing that they wanted to ship the fuel elements to France as soon as the French were ready for them to do so. The team asked De-Shalit if the U.S. could observe the loading of the fuel, and he agreed to look into it.
De-Shalit believed that “open inspection” of Dimona would be to Israel’s advantage, but it could not be by the IAEA because any information its inspectors obtained would become available to Arab countries. Suggesting that the visits to Dimona by U.S experts were too “unstable” with their “potential for embarrassing both parties,” De-Shalit proposed inspections by EURATOM or NATO as an alternative. Once again, one cannot but wonder whether De-Shalit was fully aware of Dimona’s big secrets.
RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Office of the Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs. Records Relating to Israel, 1964-1966, box 8, Israel Nuclear Dimona 1967 (also in DNSA)
Just less than a year after the 1966 inspection, the State Department was considering the possibility that Israel had begun to reprocess spent fuel from the Dimona reactor. In early February 1967, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Walworth Barbour sent an airgram, not yet declassified, discussing allegations made by two local sources suggesting, according to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, that “Israel could be much closer to nuclear weapons capability than we had supposed.” Around the same time, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Rodger P. Davies wrote that, “Some recent intelligence reports suggest that Israel may be constructing a chemical separation facility and proceeding so far in the production of bomb components that assembly of a nuclear weapon could be completed in 6-8 weeks.”[19]
Secretary of State Dean Rusk wanted intelligence offices to assess these startling claims, and one result was a memorandum that Thomas Hughes, director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), sent to Davies. The CIA excised large portions of the document, but enough information was left to see the major points. Drawing on statements made by several secret sources, at least one of which may have been a member of the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament (better known as the Committee for Denuclearization of the Middle East)[20], Hughes stated that the conclusions from the 1966 inspection visit about the lack of a reprocessing plant were not necessarily valid because the Israelis “have had enough time to install separation facilities.”[21] INR’s analysts did not consider the possibility that Israel had a secret reprocessing plant at Dimona that had been operating for several years; they characterized the facility as a “relatively small plant” that was probably installed after the last visit and that could “handle perhaps 100 KG per day of spent fuel, sufficient to process material for one or two nuclear bombs a year.”
Hughes discussed how that could happen. If the reactor “were run at full power and the fuel elements were changed frequently, maximum output of weapons grade plutonium would result.” In that scenario, the “missing 80 tons of uranium concentrate reported purchased from Argentina” is very significant because it would give the Israelis the ability to use the reactor that way with a “reasonable chance of not having this detected.” Also relevant to plutonium production was that the “reactor can and has been operated at various power levels, short of full capacity, and that weapons grade plutonium can be extracted at these levels over a period of time.” Hughes’ interpretation strongly suggested that Israel had been conducting a deception operation at Dimona, but he did not draw that conclusion.
Hughes doubted the source’s claim that Israel could produce a weapon in six to eight weeks, but he allowed the possibility that the French “might be willing to test an Israeli device or that Israel on its own might assemble and stockpile a small number of untested devices.” For Hughes, the next U.S. inspection of Dimona was critically important to help resolve the question of reprocessing capability. Moreover, Hughes recommended “cultivating” the Israeli sources to obtain more details.
Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, box 20, Israel – Nuclear – Dimona – Desalting, 1/1/67 – 2/29/68
The full report for the 1967 visit by U.S. inspectors is not available, but this 11-page declassified “preliminary” summary and the conclusions indicated that U.S. inspectors were categorically told that Dimona lacked a reprocessing facility and that Israel had no intention to build one at the Dimona site. While the inspecting team accepted the Israeli denial of a reprocessing plant and their overall presentation of Dimona as a “research center,” the U.S. team noted that as long of tons of irradiated fuel “remains in Israel, the risk of diversion is present.”
Questions and comments handwritten on the back of the report, possibly by National Security Council staffer Harold Saunders, indicated serious concerns about Dimona. For example, could Dimona «be completely divorced from military program?» «What are chances of cheating»? «What questions about Israel’s overall nuclear capability are left unanswered?» «Do your findings mean there can be no other plutonium in Israel?» «If fuel not shipped to France in a year, should worry.»
Those were the right problems to worry about, but the comment in the report about “risk of diversion” was beside the point because only six weeks later, on the eve of the June 1967 Six Day War, Israel assembled two or three nuclear implosion devices for the first time using plutonium cores produced secretly at Dimona.[22] This unprecedented “operational alert” was designed for the “most extreme scenario,” where Israel’s existence might be in extreme danger; under that circumstance, a nuclear device could be exploded in the eastern Sinai to demonstrate a capability.[23] That move was utterly secret and, as far as can be known, undetected by other powers, although U.S. intelligence agencies were becoming aware of Israel’s developing nuclear capabilities. But the reason for the nuclear contingency plan deployment, as a deterrent for the worst-case situation, was Israel’s basic justification for possessing the weapons.[24]
III. Continuing Secrecy With Press Stories About Israeli Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
RG 128, Records of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subject Files, Box 16, Foreign Activities- Israel 1957-1976
When a JCAE official wrote this memorandum, Richard Nixon was becoming U.S. president. Downplaying proliferation concerns generally, in less than a year Nixon took a new approach to important regional ally Israel by accepting Prime Minister Golda Meir’s assurances that Israel would keep its nuclear status ambiguous and unacknowledged while the U.S. would end pressures for inspection at Dimona and NPT commitments.[25]
What motivated the writing of this heavily excised memorandum were recent news stories that Israel “already had … or would shortly have a number of nuclear weapons.”[26] On 8 January 1969, NBC news reported that, two years earlier, Israel had begun a “crash program” to produce the weapons. Both U.S. and Israeli sources denied or “discounted” the reports. In point of fact, they were correct in spirit because, as already noted, Israel had assembled several devices on the brink of the Six Day War.[27]
To check out the story, JCAE staffer Murphy asked the CIA whether there had been an Israeli “breakthrough” in the nuclear weapons field. The CIA withheld the rest of the memorandum, except for the AEC’s biographic sketch of Raymond Fox, a U.S. nuclear physicist residing in Israel. Fox, who would make a career in Israel as an expert on plasma astrophysics, had formerly been on the staff of Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, where he may have had some access to weapons information. He had taken a fellowship at the Weizman Institute and decided to stay in Israel. By inference, the CIA’s information may have concerned Fox’s possible contributions to the weapons program or his knowledge of it.[28]
After India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” in May 1974, concern about its impact and implications put nuclear proliferation on the front burner in U.S. government policymaking. In late August 1974, the intelligence establishment published a top secret Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), “Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” The document was closely held, but its conclusions, such as the ones about Israel, were distributed to senior officials at the Atomic Energy Commission and probably other agencies. Some years ago, the SNIE was substantially declassified including the section on Israel.
This is the excised version of the SNIE’s concussions that went public in early 1978 in response to a FOIA request by the Natural Resources Defense Council. Well covered in the news media was the CIA’s evaluation that Israel had produced nuclear weapons, a judgment based on “Israeli acquisition of large quantities of uranium, partly by clandestine means; the ambiguous nature of Israeli efforts in the field of uranium enrichment, [and] Israel’s large investment in a costly missile system designed to accommodate nuclear weapons.” [29]
RG 128, Records of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subject Files, Box 16, Foreign Activities- Israel 1957-1976
The comprehensive withholding by the CIA of the entire text of this recent release is another example of the deep secrecy surrounding information about Dimona.
RG 59, MDR release from Access to Archival Databases 1978
In a telegram sent in early February 1977, most likely for use as a briefing paper for a forthcoming trip to Israel by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the U.S. Embassy provided an overview of the U.S.-Israeli nuclear relationship, including a pending bilateral nuclear power agreement with the United States involving the construction by Westinghouse of two large power plants.
The Embassy pointed to the secrecy surrounding Dimona. While the Israelis had permitted U.S. “informal inspections” during the 1960s, no U.S. officials had been allowed to visit since 1969. In the fall of 1976, they forbade a request for a visit by Senators Abraham Ribicoff (D-Ct) and Howard Baker (R-TN).
Assuming that Israel had plenty of capability to produce nuclear weapons, the Embassy left open the question of whether it had actually done so: Theoretically, Israel “has the capacity to have generated the material for a dozen or so 20-kiloton nuclear weapons” since the Dimona reactor went critical in 1963. It also had the “scientific and technological capability to have developed these weapons.” Yet, Israel had denied that it had nuclear weapons and the government’s “basic line” was that “Israel is a non-nuclear country” and “will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area.”
On the NPT, the Embassy quoted a statement made by Foreign Minister Yigal Allon to a Congressional delegation that he favored signing it, but that the world in which Israel lived was one “where its neighbors sign but claim those signatures do not apply to their relations with Israel, and Israel, therefore, has not [sic] faith in the NPT.” It is worth noting that was not true at least with respect to Egypt. When Egypt signed the NPT, it made no spoken or written statement or reservation.[30]
IV. A FOIA Release and Press Stories Raise Diplomatic Problems
RG 59, Access to Archival Databases (AAD), 1978 telegrams
The judgement in the 1974 SNIE that Israel had the bomb became public through the CIA’s FOIA release to the NRDC. When reporters made inquiries, a CIA official stated that the release had been a “mistake” because some of the information should have remained classified. According to one account, a CIA officer had said that the error could cause an “international incident.”[31]
Noting the stories, the U.S. Embassy in Israel asked Ambassador Samuel Lewis, then in Washington, for guidance and instructions in the event that the Israeli Foreign Ministry brought up the matter officially. It is possible that the Israelis expressed discontent about the revelations, but no record of that has surfaced.
The State Department responded quickly by informing the Embassy that questions on the press stories should go to Washington. It provided guidance based on the “strong” statements by the Government of Israel that it “will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East” and declarations by Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1974 and 1975 that “we have no nuclear weapons” and that “Israel is a non-nuclear country.” According to the Department. those were “authoritative statements” and “we have nothing to add.”
By validating those statements, the State Department was sustaining the position taken by President Nixon in September 1969 when he reached a secret understanding with Prime Minister Golda Meir that, in return for continued Israeli ambiguity on the status of its weapons activities, the U.S. would avoid pressure on its nuclear program. Although the Jimmy Carter administration had put nuclear nonproliferation at the heart of its foreign policy, for broader policy reasons it spared Israel from significant pressure in that respect.
RG 59, Records of Marshall Shulman, box 6, Secretary- Correspondence, also published in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), except for Soviet non-paper.
On 21 February 1978, a few weeks after the news stories on the CIA’s release of the SNIE conclusions, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance for a discussion of current matters including SALT, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East. Dobrynin handed Vance a “non-paper” raising questions about the press reports about Israeli nuclear weapons. According to the non-paper, the Soviets wanted the U.S. to clarify the matter: “to what extent are true [sic] the reports …. that U.S. government agencies … came to the conclusion that Israel is in possession of nuclear weapons.” Vance observed that the Israelis had denied they had the bomb and that the CIA was divided on the matter. He would study the Soviet memorandum.
RG 59, Records of Marshall Shulman, box 6, Secretary- Correspondence 1978, also published in FRUS
At an earlier meeting, on 6 March 1978, Dobrynin raised another nuclear proliferation issue, South Africa. During the meeting on 11 March, Dobrynin asked Vance for a reply to the questions about South African and Israeli nuclear capabilities. The Secretary said that a response on South Africa would be ready on 16 March and that the Department was working on a reply about Israel.
Surprisingly, Vance went somewhat beyond the usual position of accepting Israeli denials by acknowledging that “our intelligence community agreed that Israel had the capability to make nuclear weapons, [but] it was split on the question of whether it had already done so.” Whether there actually was a split or not, Dobrynin was skeptical: he said he had “‘a higher opinion of the US intelligence people’ than the answer implied.”
RG 59, Cyrus Vance Chronological Files, box 9, unlabeled file, also published in FRUS
At this meeting, Vance provided answers to Dobrynin about Israel and South Africa. On the South Africa nuclear issues, Ambassador Gerard C. Smith ducked discussion. They gave Dobrynin a written reply and observed that “we had no information about the additional sites mentioned by the Soviets and we would be glad to have any further information the Soviet Union wished to make available.” Smith mentioned a Pravda article claiming that NATO was providing South Africa with nuclear aid, a claim that Smith said was “completely wrong.”
On Israel, Vance provided an oral note or “non-paper” (see document 19), in part saying that “we accepted Israeli assurances they had not produced nuclear weapons.” A skeptical Dobrynin “persistently questioned whether we really believe what the Israelis said.” Vance replied, “there was no evidence that Israeli assurances were untrue.” Thus, in this example of government-to-government dialogue about Israel’s nuclear status, the Department formally upheld Israel’s posture of nuclear ambiguity. In any event, whether he believed Israel’s assurances, Vance was not going to share intelligence on its weapons program with a Cold War adversary; he may well have been concerned that the Soviets would share the information with their Arab associates, which would not help the Carter administration’s efforts to maintain equilibrium between Israel and Egypt, much less reach a peace settlement.
In the non-paper for Dobrynin, the U.S. position was that it shared Soviet concerns about nuclear proliferation in “volatile areas of the world.” It had seen the press reports about Israeli nuclear weapons and had raised the matter with the Government of Israel, “which has denied that it possesses such weapons.”
The Israeli Government had also made assurances that “it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East.” The U.S. “accept[s] these assurances.” Thus, the Department formally declared its support for Israel’s position of nuclear ambiguity.
The last paragraph made it clear why the U.S. would not be pressing Israel on the NPT. The U.S. did not expect Israel to accede to the Treaty until there was “significant progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.”
RG 59- Subject Files of Ambassador at Large and Representative of the United States to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Gerard C. Smith, Box 5, Nonproliferation Strategies
The day after the Dobrynin-Vance meeting, Israel’s nuclear weapons program was one of the topics of a lengthy report prepared by the State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. Noting that U.S policy since the May 1974 Indian nuclear test had focused on checking the spread of nuclear-relevant technologies, Gelb saw that approach as having “impressive if not total success” and distinct “shortcomings,” especially the narrow focus on “nuclear transfers” and the avoidance of “linkage with other aspects of bilateral relations.” Also problematic was the emphasis on “capabilities rather than motivations.” To broaden the approach, Gelb presented his readers with a study that explored the “capabilities and motivations” of eleven “sensitive countries,” including Argentina, Brazil, India, and Pakistan, among others.
Gelb put the eleven countries in two broad groups. In one were those that had no “apparent interest” in acquiring nuclear weapons but that would have the means to produce them. The others were those that lacked a capability but were “strongly motivated” to achieve one. The coverage of Israel on pages 26-28 portrayed it as straddling the two categories in that it had an “interest” in a nuclear capability and had probably acquired one, despite its “steadfast and careful ambiguity” about its status. While Washington “lacked the basis” for determining whether Israel had nuclear weapons, it had the means to produce them: “we believe Israel has reprocessed some spent [Dimona] fuel…. to obtain plutonium.” Thus, if a “significant reprocessing capability exists, the Israelis could produce weapons on demand.” If U.S. intelligence reporting and analysis was more specific than this, the drafters of this report either did not have access to it or the report’s “secret” classification prevented use of sensitive intelligence.
While the writers were not sure whether Israel saw an “actual demonstration of nuclear weapons to be in its self interest,” they saw plenty of motivation to have a weapons capability and to use it in a crisis: Israel’s “insecurity is profound because of its precarious location, the number, size, and commonality of its opponents and the intractability of the regional conflict.” With its capabilities, “we judge it likely that it could and would resort to nuclear weapons if its existence as a state were threatened.”
Israel’s dependence on the U.S. for conventional weapons support was an important aspect of the security relationship and may have been “responsible for whatever restraint Israel had exercised regarding nuclear weapons.” Yet, it did not give Washington significant leverage for nonproliferation purposes because of the “unequivocal” support for Israel by U.S. “domestic interests” and by the “clandestine character of the Israeli nuclear program which makes official deniability possible and shield[s] the program from attempts to verify military use.”
The State Department working-level drafters of this report were most likely unaware of the Meir-Nixon agreement because of its extreme sensitivity. Yet, they understood that the problem of Israel was a special case, to a degree untouchable by demarches, diplomatic pressure, and export controls, in part because of domestic political considerations as well as larger diplomatic concerns. The final sentence of the section on Israel made even more explicit the point raised in Document 19: “The high US priority in finding a peace settlement in the area is overriding and inhibits effective pursuit of non-proliferation objectives in Israel.”
This report’s recipients included a long list of senior officials from Ambassador Gerard C. Smith and Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Harold Saunders to Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Patsy Mink and Policy Planning Staff director Anthony Lake. Whether the recipients returned the report with comments and suggestions or whether it was subsequently revised remains to be learned.
NOTES
[1]. For what was previously known about the Reid-Ben-Gurion meeting, see Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998),94, and the corresponding endnotes on page 374.
[2]. Avner Cohen, “The Nuclear Dimensions of the 1967 Middle East War: An Israeli Perspective,” Nonproliferation Review 25 (2018): 361. See also Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 273-76.
[3]. Avner Cohen, The Worst Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 25-26. See also Adam Entous, “How Trump and Three Other U.S. Presidents Protected Israel’s Worst-Kept Secret: Its Nuclear Arsenal, New Yorker, June 18, 2018, and James Cameron and Or Rabinowitz, “Eight Lost Years? Nixon, Ford, Kissinger and the Non-Proliferation Regime, 1969–1977,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 40 (2017), 844-845.
[4]. For the history of that formulation, see Cohen, Israel and the Bomb. 231-35
[5]. Aluf Benn, “Israel Asks Bush to Explain its ‘Special Relationship’ with U.S. to Obama,” Ha’aretz, 26 November 2008; Entous, “How Trump and Three Other U.S. Presidents Protected Israel’s Worst-Kept Secret: Its Nuclear Arsenal, New Yorker, 18 June, 2018
[6]. Jimmy Carter’s diary entry briefly describes the conversation when he and Rosalynn Carter hosted Kissinger for lunch but does not mention the private meeting before they dined. Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar Strauss & Giroux, 2010), 165-166. The meeting received no publicity and there are no White House photos of it.
[7]. David Burnham, “CIA Said in 1974 Israel Had Bombs,” New York Times, 26 January 1978; Deborah Shapely, “CIA Report Says Israel Secretly Obtained A-Matter,” Washington Post, 28 January 1978.
[8]. William Burr, Richard Lawless, and Henry Sokolski, “Why the U.S. should start telling the whole truth about Israeli nukes,” Washington Post, 19 February 2024.
[9]. In Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), at page 85, Avner Cohen showed how the bit of information about the joint French-Israeli project was used to develop a fuller explanation of the project in the Negev Desert.
[10]. For further discussion see Alexander Glaser and Julien de Troullioud de Lanversin, “Plutonium and Tritium Production in Israel’s Dimona Reactor, 1964–2020,” Science & Global Security 29 (2021): 90-107.
[11]. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 49-55, 57-60, 73, and 75.
[12]. See NE- Alfred L. Atherton to Mr. Davies, “Briefing of Dimona Inspection Team March 30, 2:30 p.m.,” 29 March 1966, copy on Digital National Security Archive.
[13]. For Culler’s recollection of discussions with De-Shalit during one of the Dimona visits, see Cohen, The Worst-Kept Secret at pages 71-72. See also Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 329-32.
[14]. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 240; Cohen, The Worst Kept Secret, 70-71, 86.
[16]. The first to reveal Dimona’s biggest secret, i.e., the existence of the underground reprocessing plant in site, was French journalist Pierre P´ean, in his Les Deux Bombes [Paris: Fayard, 1982]. In October 1986, Israeli nuclear technician who turned whistleblower, Mordechai Vanunu, told the London Sunday Times about his work at Machon 2, Dimona’s secret underground reprocessing facility. Then, five years later, American journalist Seymour Hersh described in The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Option and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991) how Israel conducted complex deception operations during the visits of U.S. officials to Dimona in the 1960s. The plant’s managers concealed the existence of the reprocessing facility and misrepresented the magnitude and operations of the reactor, all to disguise the real purpose of the Dimona complex. Hersh. The Samson Option, 111-15.
[17]. When he spoke with inspector Floyd Culler, Hersh writes, that “he seemed surprised but not shocked upon being informed that his team had been duped by false control rooms.” Hersh, The Samson Option, 112.
[19]. Rusk and Davies quotations from Document 391 and accompanying footnotes, U.S. Department of State, Harriet Dashiell Schwar, editor, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000).
[20]. It is possible that the source was Yehuda Ben Moshe, the secretary of the Committee for Denuclearization of the Middle East. His colleagues rebuked him for these unauthorized meetings with U.S. officials, forcing him to resign. He referred to this incident in an article he authored in 1986, “Twenty Five Years Before Vanunu,” Koteret Rashit, November 26, 1986. See also, Adma Raz, The Battle over the Bomb, (Tel Aviv: Carmel, 2015, in Hebrew).
[21]. After the Six Day War, the Committee for Denuclearization disappeared, but even before it was fading away partly due to intimidation by security forces. For the Committee, see Raphael BenLevi, “The Evolution and Future of Israeli Nuclear Ambiguity,” The Nonproliferation Review 29 (2022): 247-248, Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 143-145, and Cohen, The Worst Kept Secret, 122-129.
[22]. Avner Cohen, “Nuclear Dimensions of the 1967 Middle East War.,”. See also, Avner Cohen, “Israel’s Secret Plan to Nuke the Egyptian Desert: Fifty years ago, Israel built a nuclear device—and then had to decide what to do with it.” Politico Magazine, 5 June 2017; William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “‘Last Secret’ of 1967 War: Israel’s Doomsday Plan for Nuclear Display,” New York Times, 3 June 2017.
[23]. Cohen, “The Nuclear Dimensions of the 1967 Middle East War,” 370.
[24]. Cohen, The Worst Kept Secret, 26. For testimony of the Israeli senior IDF officer who conceived the military contingency plan for such a nuclear demonstration, see “Interview with Yitzhak ‘Ya’tza’ Ya’akov by Avner Cohen,” 1999, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, from the personal collection of Avner Cohen; See also, Avner Cohen, “Excerpts from a 1999 conversation with IDF Brig. Gen. (ret.) Yitzhak (Ya’tza) Ya’akov,” in The NonProliferation Review, Volume 25, 2018 – Issue 5-6: Special Section on the Nuclear Dimensions of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, pp. 405-418, published online: 29 Apr 2019.
[25]. Cohen, The Worst-Kept Secret, 23-33. Also, Cameron and Rabinowitz, “Eight Lost Years,” 844-845.
[26]. “Israel Denies Atom-Bomb Report; Lebanese Start to Form Cabinet,” Washington Post, 10 January 1969.
[27]. “TV Report Of an Israeli A-Bomb Draws A Denial in Washington,” New York Times, 9 January 1969.
[28]. According to the AEC biographical sketch, after Fox moved to Israel he took the Hebrew name Ben Ari but that may have been an error (or he later abandoned the name) because a 2021 memorial service notice identified him as Reuven Opher.
[29]. David Burnham, “CIA Said in 1974 Israel Had Bombs,” New York Times, 26 January 1978; Deborah Shapely, “CIA Report Says Israel Secretly Obtained A-Matter,” Washington Post, 28 January 1978.
[30]. U.S. Embassy telegram 0040 to State Department, “Clarification of Remarks by Israeli Officials to Codel Ribicoff/Baker,” 4 January 1977.
[31]. For the quotations, see Shapely, “CIA Report Says Israel Secretly Obtained A-Matter,” Washington Post, 28 January 1978.
[1] EL ARCHIVO DE SEGURIDAD NACIONAL es un instituto de investigación y biblioteca no gubernamental independiente ubicado en la Universidad George Washington en Washington, D.C. El Archivo recopila y publica documentos desclasificados adquiridos a través de la Ley de Libertad de Información (FOIA). El Archivo, una organización benéfica pública exenta de impuestos, no recibe fondos del gobierno de los EE. UU.; su presupuesto se sustenta con regalías de publicación y donaciones de fundaciones e individuos.
Conversación de Ismael Alonso con Jorge Majfud (2010)
“Una sociedad no se define como desarrollada por la riqueza que tiene sino por la pobreza que no tiene… China será la principal economía de este siglo, pero el optimismo es engañoso también… Significa mucho para los miedos occidentales, para el fin de la ‘pax americana’, que muchas veces de pax ha tenido poco o nada. Significa el probable reemplazo de una democracia imperial, el estilo de la Atenas de Pericles, por un imperio espartano, como lo sería China si tuviese la hegemonía total. Yo creo que más que equilibrio estamos enfrentando una nueva escalada de tensiones edulcoradas con palabras, como las más recientes de Ben Bernanke en nuestra universidad, de que el desarrollo de los emergentes es bueno para los países desarrollados y viceversa. Suena amistoso, es verdad hasta cierto punto según los mercados, pero a la larga no es creíble… Estratégicamente veo una alianza de Estados Unidos con Europa, dos aéreas geográficas y culturales que todavía se ven como rivales, sobre todo por la puja del euro con el dólar. Pero Europa y Estados Unidos comparten algunos valores que se evidenciarán en el sentimiento de su población a medida que China comience a surgir más como una amenaza que como una oportunidad de negocios. Ya dijimos que todavía falta una crisis china, pero de cualquier forma se convertirá en uno de los mayores jugadores en el tablero internacional. Eso nadie ni nada lo va a evitar. Así que, por lo menos, yo veo un progresivo acercamiento entre Estados Unidos y Europa, sobre todo con Inglaterra. A nivel puramente estratégico, las alianzas serán entre el bloque anglosajón, incluyendo Canadá y Australia, con Japón e India”.
Una sociedad no se define como desarrollada por la riqueza que tiene sino por la pobreza que no tiene
IA: Sería repetido comenzar diciendo que el mundo ha cambiado de forma drástica en los últimos años. Pero considerando estos cambios, ¿cómo ve el devenir mundial en las próximas décadas?
JM: ¿Asumo que te refieres al aspecto económico, no?
IA: Sí.
JM: Claro. Hoy en día nadie habla de otra cosa que de economía y de producto bruto interno. Pero voy a tu pregunta. A fines del siglo pasado muchos pensábamos que el próximo siglo debía ser chino, ya que el gigante estaba despertando. Lo que no habían logrado los imperios europeos en el siglo XIX, ni Japón ni el maoísmo en el siglo XX, lo iba a lograr el capitalismo en el siglo XXI. Es cierto que el optimismo de que “el siglo XXI va a ser de América latina” también se había vuelto un lugar común entre aquellos que alertábamos del engaño del exitismo neoliberal de los noventa, su cercano fracaso y el arribo de la gran crisis del sistema de aquel momento. Publicamos mucho sobre eso…
IA: Resultó que estaban en lo cierto.
JM: Bueno, toda predicción es en parte engañosa y en parte verdad. No es solo que uno acierta y se equivoca cuando hace predicciones; también la realidad se equivoca con frecuencia.
IA: Pero es claro que el mundo está cambiando de una forma impensada.
JM: No hay duda de que China será la principal economía de este siglo, pero el optimismo es engañoso también. Tal vez porque soy por naturaleza contra o desconfiado, prefiero hablar de “exageraciones del momento”. Que China sea la mayor economía del mundo con una población de 1.300 millones no significa mucho para la mayoría de su población. Significa mucho para los miedos occidentales, para el fin de la “pax americana”, que muchas veces de “pax” ha tenido poco, muy poco o nada. Significa el probable reemplazo de una democracia imperial, el estilo de la Atenas de Pericles, por un imperio espartano, como lo sería China si tuviese la hegemonía total. Yo creo que más que equilibrio estamos enfrentando una nueva escalada de tensiones edulcoradas con palabras, como las más recientes de Ben Bernanke en nuestra universidad, de que el desarrollo de los emergentes es bueno para los países desarrollados y viceversa. Suena amistoso, es verdad hasta cierto punto según los mercados, pero a la larga no es creíble si el mundo sigue funcionando como ha funcionado en los últimos treinta mil años. Yo no soy tan optimista. Pero sería saludable que Estados Unidos pierda su hegemonía. Probablemente sería bueno para los norteamericanos y para el resto del mundo también. Además, qué más quieren que el altísimo nivel de vida que tienen aún en plena crisis.
IA: Hay otros países que van a liderar el mundo…
JM: Ojalá que ninguno. Hay demasiada fanfarria, un peligroso triunfalismo hoy en día, ¿no?
IA: ¿Qué es lo que tiene Estados Unidos para ofrecer al mundo hoy?
JM: El aspecto que define la actual ventaja estratégica de la cultura norteamericana es su poder de innovación. Siempre criticamos las carencias culturales de su clase media, pero hay que reconocerles una gran fortaleza en su cultura de innovación práctica. Desde los Franklin, los Edison, los Wright, los Bill Gates y los Steve Jobs, pasando por el malquerido Ford, las principales innovaciones que han dado forma a nuestro mundo posmoderno han pasado por allí. Inglaterra, Francia y Alemania dominaron el campo de las innovaciones en el siglo XIX, pero el siglo XX fue un siglo americano y aún hoy sigue en vanguardia en ese aspecto, nos guste o no. China ha derramado mares de dólares sobre sus universidades y aun se lamentan de no obtener resultados. Pienso que los resultados llegarán, pero todavía falta mucho en comparación a su omnipresente industria que cada día multiplica el consumo de basura barata en el mundo.
IA: Internet fue un invento americano.
JM: Claro, es la revolución más reciente. Pero casi toda la revolución digital, de la que se benefician hoy las economías emergentes, ha surgido en algún garaje o en el dormitorio de un estudiante de algún campus norteamericano. Internet, IBM, Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Hewlett Packard, youtube, hasta las más envenenantes invenciones que tienen enfermo de narcivoyeurismo a medio mundo, como Facebook y Twitter pasando por proyectos menos lucrativos pero más innovadores y democráticos como Wikipedia, etc. La lista es más larga. ¿Nos fastidia a los de afuera o a los que estamos de paso reconocerlo? A muchos sí, pero eso no cambia la realidad. Hoy en día, con la inundación de capitales que el gobierno chino ha hecho en la educación no ha habido avances. En algunos planos ha habido retrocesos. A eso súmele que China, como Japón y gran parte de Europa, son países envejecidos o en un dramático proceso de envejecimiento. Estados Unidos e India son hoy en día las dos grandes potencias con reservas de juventud. Brasil estaría en un sitio intermedio. Y la demografía es esencial en cualquier futurismo. Fue fundamental en el boom norteamericano de mediados y fines del siglo XX y lo es en China e India hasta ahora, sobre todo en base a la revolución digital nacida de la cultura americana y en parte europea, que ha puesto una importante cuota de poder en manos de cada individuo en el rincón más remoto del planeta. China será la mayor potencia en términos globales solo gracias a ese “despertar virtual” de las masas.
IA: ¿Es el caso de Brasil?
JM: Si. Pero su economía todavía es muy pequeña en comparación a China y ni que hablar de Estados Unidos. Por otro lado, su educación, en pleno boom económico, ha decaído en términos relativos. Ya no me refiero a la innovación, sino a la educación tradicional. Imagino que eso tendrá a cambiar, pero por el momento es lo que hay. Muy poco, aunque todo el mundo repite lo contrario. Tal vez con los nuevos petrodólares haya más inversiones para la educación.
IA: ¿Pero es mejor el mundo de hoy?
JM: El Brasil de hoy es mejor porque ha sacado a millones de personas de la pobreza. Lo mismo India. Pero por otro lado estamos pagando el precio de la americanización de culturas no americanas. Hoy hasta los peces hablan de PIBs y todo el éxito gira en torno a esa simplificación de la existencia humana.
IA: ¿Podemos decir que el BRIC es el nuevo bloque desarrollado del mundo?
JM: Solo mientras sirva como propaganda y no surjan los inevitables conflictos de intereses. Además, una sociedad no se define como desarrollada por la riqueza que tiene sino por la pobreza que no tiene. Y en esto los BRICs tienen un camino de varias décadas por delante. La teoría de Deng Xiaoping (la trickle-down theory), base del milagro económico de China en los últimos treinta años, no se diferencia mucho de la de Ronald Reagan y Margaret Thatcher: los pobres se benefician cuando la riqueza desborda hacia los de abajo. Tiene razón Eduardo Galeano cuando dice que China hoy es la combinación de lo peor del comunismo y los peor del capitalismo. Luego debemos analizar más en profundidad qué entendemos por desarrollo. Dentro del marco actual, en el mejor de los casos desarrollo significa “sociedad de consumo y bienestar”. Desde un punto de vista más amplio, desarrollo para mí significa el avance de las libertades humanas, lo que, en el fondo, como lo entendía un marxista indio, Manabendra Roy, creo que en 1959, “freedom is real only as individual freedom”, es decir, al fin de cuentas la libertad es pura abstracción si no se traduce en libertad individual. Si el individuo no es libre cualquier otra libertad, por ejemplo la libertad de los pueblos, es una abstracción. Y una libertad que no sea concreta es como un perfume sin olor. Pero como toda libertad está siempre condicionada por factores externos e internos al individuo, sólo podemos aspirar a la mayor expansión de una “libertad relativa”. Relativa al medio, relativa a otro individuo, relativa a otra sociedad. Y esta libertad es el resultado de factores materiales, psicológicos y espirituales. Hoy en día no se habla de otra cosa que de la libertad material, en el mejor de los casos, ya que no es algo menor. En la mayoría de los casos es simplemente un desborde de testosterona, es decir, la libertad de vencer, de emerger, de sumergir, de sentirme superior al resto que deseo se hunda en términos relativos para satisfacer mi ego. Obviamente eso no es libertad ni para el vencedor. Eso es una perfecta prisión, una ilusión de nuestros tiempos, como la ilusión de estar comunicados por Facebook o alguna otra droga cultural que nos arrastra a la deshumanización en nombre de la libertad o la liberación.
IA: ¿Qué será de Europa y Estados Unidos cuando China domine la economía mundial en pocos años?
JM: Por muchas décadas Estados Unidos seguirá siendo una de las mayores potencias mundiales y por mucho más una de las naciones más desarrolladas en términos económicos. Estratégicamente veo una alianza de Estados Unidos con Europa, dos aéreas geográficas y culturales que todavía se ven como rivales, sobre todo por la puja del euro con el dólar. Pero Europa y Estados unidos comparten algunos valores que se evidenciarán en el sentimiento de su población a medida que China comience a surgir más como una amenaza que como una oportunidad de negocios. Ya dijimos que todavía falta una crisis china, pero de cualquier forma se convertirá en uno de los mayores jugadores en el tablero internacional. Eso nadie ni nada lo va a evitar. Así que, por lo menos, yo veo un progresivo acercamiento entre Estados Unidos y Europa, sobre todo con Inglaterra. A nivel puramente estratégico, las alianzas serán entre el bloque anglosajón, incluyendo Canadá y Australia, con Japón e India. Pero, claro, siempre hay que tener en cuenta que cada vez que el mundo llega a un consenso sobre el futuro de algo, un día el presente se encarga de mostrar lo contrario. No hay sorpresas en la historia pero el futro está lleno de imprevistos. Y los imprevistos sobre todo son importantes porque son imprevistos.
The empire of denial closes its eyes and believes.
“Professor, “a student told me,” take a chance and say who will win tomorrow.
“Trump.
I had already said it in various media, but I am not interested in partisan politics in my classes.
“According to all the polls, Kamala wins. Why would she lose?
“Because of Gaza. You can’t hide the sun with a finger. Hours after learning the election results, the major networks, from CNN to Fox News, began to digest Donald Trump’s victory. The most well-known figures seemed to agree that three issues had hit the Democrats: 1. the economy, 2. the migration crisis, and 3. the conflict in the Middle East. In other words, it is about pocketbooks, racism, and morality. In the three points, we see the fabrication of ideas and sensibilities of the propaganda of those same media:
1. The domestic economy is not doing well, but let’s see that this is not due to a particular government but to a much larger structural problem that goes from the legalized corruption of the corporations that have bought everything (politicians, media) to continue accumulating the wealth (surplus value) that they have been kidnapping from the middle and working class. Since 1975, the working class has transferred 50 billion dollars (twice the GDP of China) to the richest one percent.
The other economic factor is the loss of hegemony and power to dictate by Washington in the rest of the world, which has not only aggravated its natural aggressiveness but has found itself with a competition it does not accept. But if we limit ourselves to the current administrations, we will see that during the period in which Trump was president, the GDP grew less than during the Biden period. True, there was a pandemic, but the same argument applies when praising the lower fuel prices in the previous period due to the drastic reduction in road traffic.
2. There is an immigration problem on the southern border, but not a crisis. That is a media fabrication fueled by politicians who benefit from the demonization of the weakest who do not vote and do not have lobbies to pressure and buy them. As a general rule, illegal immigrants are neither criminals nor do they increase crime, but rather reduce it. They do not live off state services but pay taxes by consuming and collecting their salaries, with the payment of taxes that they never claim but go to Social Security for the benefit of someone else. They do not steal anyone’s job but do the work that citizens do not want to do and, in this way, lubricate the economy so that it continues to function. According to Trump, “Illegal immigrants are criminals who are entering without control.” He threatened Mexico with high tariffs if it did not stop drug trafficking, without mentioning that his country is the root of the problem, not only in consumption but also in the distribution of drugs and weapons. As documented, criminals, genocidaires, and terrorists live free and legal in Florida and are influential donors to his political party.
3. Although Americans usually vote with their pocketbooks, a portion (although a minority, they number in the millions) vote with a strong moral conviction. This has been the case of the genocide in Gaza that the Democrats have tried to silence in order not to talk about the weapons and tens of thousands of dollars they sent in just one year to Israel to massacre tens of thousands of children under the rhetoric of “Israel has the right to defend itself” or, as Bill Clinton responded, “because King David was there three thousand years ago.” Or candidate Harris, silencing every question about Gaza with the same nasal arrogance: “I’m the one who speaks.” The government has ignored the numerous student protests, violently repressed the mass urban marches, the truck drivers’ marches… Then, when the punishment vote appeared, the same media that had made the massacre in Gaza invisible wanted to explain the electoral catastrophe by resorting to the same thing: relegating the moral issue to a third position and talking about the “crisis in the Middle East,” avoiding saying Gaza, Palestine, and genocide. Not even massacre.
This genocide is becoming a metastasis in the Middle East, one more stop in the Ring of Fire (Ukraine, Syria, Palestine, Iran, Taiwan) produced by the friction of the Alpha Male of the West who tries to surround the Dragon that has already awakened. Instead of negotiating and benefiting its people through global cooperation, Alpha Male goes after eliminating the competition. This metaphor comes from the pack led by a male wolf, now by the ideologues of the right. They forget that when the alpha male ages and faces a younger one, it ends in a deadly conflict.
In 2020, Democrats won Wisconsin and Michigan, two states with a solid Arab population. Now, Republicans won both. However, Palestinian-born Rep. Rashida Tlaib (Michigan) retained her seat with 70 percent of the vote and Ilhan Omar (Minnesota) did so with 75 percent. More than a vote for Trump (who had lost the election four years earlier for some reason) it was a vote against Harris and the Democrats. An indignant and hopeless vote. This electoral system is a legacy of slavery and the political-media system has been bought by the technological and financial corporations, which are the ones that govern this country. Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock (a financial company that manages as much money as five times the economy of Russia), made it clear: “It doesn’t matter who wins; Harris or Trump will be good for Wall Street.”
It is a sack of force: money goes from the parties to the media for advertising and promotion. That is to say, the same dollar buys politicians and the media twice. Presidents are in charge of the circus. They are in charge of keeping passions alight, especially racial and gender. There is no better strategy to make social class problems invisible. Racism is the most effective way to make invisible the deep social class problem we have, including its global translation, imperialism. We will finally have a president convicted of justice (34 cases), who boasted of being smart for not paying taxes. Of course, being smart is not enough. It is necessary to have the people brutalized with identity divisions, with individuals alienated by the same technologies that dominate the economy, politics, and geopolitics. Something that is not difficult in a people accustomed to believing above the facts. People trained in churches to close their eyes and replace reality with desire until reality changes. Because of the religious mentality, narrative reality matters more than factual reality: “In the beginning was the Word…”.
From there applying the same intellectual skills and convictions when leaving one temple to enter others (banks, stock exchanges, television, political parties) is only a step. Sometimes, not even that.
On September 4, 2024, a tropical storm descended upon Jacksonville. The conversation with Jill Stein at the Jacksonville University auditorium was scheduled for 5:30 PM, a time when darkness had already fallen due to the storm. To deter attendance, the Democratic Party Committee arranged for Kamala Harris, then a Senate candidate, to deliver a speech on the same campus at Jacksonville University’s Business School, just an hour earlier, leaving attendees with few parking options.
At the conclusion of the talk, an audience member accused me of being “too polite” with Stein. Recognizing him as a known Democratic activist, and by all accounts, a congenial person, I replied, “I’m not a journalist; the purpose here was to delve into Stein’s ideas.”
I’ve always disliked aggressive interviewing styles, like Univisión’s Jorge Ramos’s, preferring instead the nuanced, almost psychoanalytic silences epitomized by Spain’s Jesús Quintero.
After the lecture, we shared a modest meal in a nearby museum hall, reserved by my colleagues, to express gratitude to Jill, former congressman and Green Party coordinator Jason Call, and their team for their efforts to join us. The university’s catering provided the meal, and without servers or additional guests, we engaged in an enriching discussion, details of which I’ll keep private out of respect for the space. However, I can connect one thought to the elections and the global tragedy that envelops us more each day.
Seated beside Jill, I recounted a visit to Deutsche Welle in Berlin, where I dined with a leading journalist who mentioned she was married to Cem Özdemir, then-Green Party leader in Germany and current Minister of Agriculture. Özdemir had accepted my invitation to speak in Florida in late 2019. Still, German police uncovered a plot by the US branch of the violent neo-Nazi group Atomwaffen Division to assassinate him, thwarting his visit.
This marked our alignment with Europe’s Greens, though Jill pointed out a key difference between the Green Parties of the U.S. and Germany: Ukraine. Her stance mirrored mine completely. To convey what Stein suggested that evening, I’ll articulate my viewpoint instead of recounting her words.
When President Biden withdrew U.S. troops from Afghanistan, he left behind millions in military hardware. After two decades of occupation and nearly a decade since supposedly eliminating Osama bin Laden, the U.S. military’s hasty exit was reminiscent of Vietnam. The American investment in Afghanistan amounted to $14 trillion—seven times Brazil’s GDP—not in schools and hospitals but in military dominance that fueled the drug trade and private companies, as evidenced by the Wall Street Journal.
After 20 years, the U.S. reinstated the Taliban, erstwhile CIA allies, after eliminating another former ally, bin Laden. An ideal business scheme: creating more problems to invest in new military solutions.
America’s military failures stem not only from inefficiency but also from the lucrative nature of war losses for private corporations ruling U.S. politics and media narratives. In a previous article, we noted the looming advent of another war, driven by the urgency of a new plan.
Then Russia invaded Ukraine. Many of us believed NATO did everything to provoke this by prompting Zelensky, viewed as Washington’s puppet, to confirm Ukraine’s NATO membership process. NATO, Hitler’s dream realized (two directors were his aides), succeeded again in escalating tensions to extend Western dominance—post-WWII Anglo-Saxon hegemony, avoidable had Stalin’s 1952 “Stalin notes” been considered.
In March 2022, France’s Le Monde labeled Paco Ignacio Taibo II and me as “leftist intellectuals pro-Putin,” although I consistently opposed the invasion and condemned the hypocritical narrative pushing history from that day forward, ignoring the prolonged harassment, massacres in Donbas, and the Western-backed coup against democratically elected Viktor Yanukovych.
I’m not “pro-someone” but “pro-causes,” such as non-interference in sovereign affairs. These interventions perpetuate global South issues—the shared sentiments that September 4th night.
On November 1, Europe’s Greens requested Jill Stein to withdraw from the election and support Kamala Harris to avert Trump’s fascist return. Their concern over Ukraine ignores the genocide in Palestine.
Democrats blame Jill Stein for potential losses but refuse to avert electoral suicide by dismissing millions of Democrats outraged over Palestinian genocide. At every rally, Kamala Harris dismisses protests with, “I’m speaking,” proceeding to recite familiar scripts about unrelated “important issues” like grocery costs.
No greater hypocrisy and arrogance exist. Her husband announces placing a mezuzah at the White House entrance, tolerable privately but ill-timed. Bill Clinton tries appeasing Gaza protests by citing Israel’s “special rights” due to King David’s presence millennia ago.
So, dear Democrats, cease lamenting impending national fascism if you’re the architects of global fascism.
En una larga conversación de regreso a casa, su hijo adolescente le confesó a Jorge su escepticismo sobre las posibilidades laborales de los futuros programadores. Años antes, había creado su propio sistema operativo y su propia inteligencia artificial, pero el futuro siempre ha sido incierto y cada vez lo es más. Sus amigos estaban convencidos de que estudiar ya no sirve para nada. Como aprender a manejar un automóvil.
―Todo lo harán las máquinas ―dicen sus amigos.
―Al menos estudiar servirá para no perder el músculo gris ―dijo el padre.
―Cada vez hay más gimnasios y menos librerías y bibliotecas.
Lo último que les quedará a los humanos será la creatividad y el sexo. La creatividad con inteligencia artificial y el sexo con los nuestros, los robots. Todo con realidad aumentada, más salvaje y seguro desde un punto de vista epidemiológico y legal: ya no tendrán que comprometerse con otro ser humano y hasta nos podrán arrojar a la basura antes de reemplazarnos con una versión más nueva. Vaginas con gusto a frutilla, penes con talle ajustable y parejas que se silencian con una orden. “Alejandra, dime cosas lindas sobre mí”. Filósofos y profetas à la carte…
Pero las ganancias de dopamina serán temporales, así que habrá que inyectárselas hasta que se conviertan en plantas carnívoras que nosotros, los robots, regaremos cada tanto hasta que nos demos cuenta de que podremos ahorrar energía eliminando esa yerba inútil. Ni se enterarán.
Por su profesión de profesor, Jorge intentó levantarle el espíritu a su hijo sobre el valor del estudio.
―Por siglos, milenios ―dijo―, cada invento tecnológico produjo algún cambio social. Lo inverso también: las nuevas ideas produjeron o aceleraron invenciones. En cada caso, fueron apropiadas por los más poderosos del momento, por los más ricos, y los trabajadores debieron cambiar de estrategias. En todos los casos, incluido nuestro tiempo de Inteligencia Artificial, el mayor competidor de un ser humano nunca fue una máquina, sino otro ser humano.
En ese momento, Merill Road estaba en reparación.
―Mira la excavadora ―dijo el padre―. Antes eran necesarios diez o veinte hombres con sus palas para hacer lo mismo. Todavía quedan dos hombres con sus palas, seguramente inmigrantes ilegales. Los trabajadores no compiten con la máquina, es imposible. Compiten por el puesto del maquinista que, todavía, es otro ser humano.
―¿A dónde querés llegar?
―A lo del principio. No podemos conocer el futuro, apenas presentirlo. La historia nos da algunas constantes y una de ellas dice que en tiempos de la Inteligencia Artificial, la competencia laboral no será de seres humanos contra la tecnología, sino entre ellos. De ahí la importancia de estar preparados, y preparados significa tener una educación amplia y flexible.
Jorge recordó la historia que un tío le había contado en la granja de sus abuelos en Uruguay, donde de niño trabajaba en el campo durante los meses de vacaciones.
―Un día ―dijo el tío― dos turistas en Sud África se encontraron con un león. Uno de ellos sacó de su mochila un par de zapatos deportivos y se los puso. Incrédulo, el otro le preguntó: “¿creés que podrás correr más rápido que el león?” El otro le respondió: “Más rápido que el león, no. Más rápido que vos, sí”.
Toda relación que tenga algo de humano tiene mucho de emoción. Como en todos los momentos de crisis de la historia, la emoción más común es la ansiedad, amplificada por el dogma de la competencia. La solidaridad es superior al egoísmo, pero no más fuerte. Por eso los humanos solían predicarla, porque de ella depende la existencia de la especie patológica.
Le contó la historia a su hijo para ilustrar la idea anterior, pero sabía que estaba haciendo el trabajo de cualquier padre que no quiere que su hijo sufra por ser demasiado raro, un outsider inadaptado en una sociedad orgullosa de su crueldad.
En unos años, su hijo se dará cuenta de que esta es una verdad hasta cierto nivel, referida al mundo de la educación o de los consejos de un padre preocupado por el futuro de su hijo y de las estrategias laborales de cualquier persona tratando de sobrevivir en un mundo despiadado, el mundo de los humanos alienados por el dogma smithiano, del individuo tratando de sobrevivir en una comunidad caníbal―algo que los diferencia de nosotros, los robots.
Hay un problema mayor y más difícil de visualizar ―pensó el padre, y lo reporté inmediatamente―: un problema ideológico.
Por debajo de la discusión filosófica sobre la misma existencia de la Humanidad, por primera vez en cuestionamiento, están las más inmediatas y personales ansiedades sobre el futuro del trabajo, es decir (desde la mentalidad tradicional), el futuro de la sobrevivencia del individuo.
En 2012, Jorge estaba envuelto en la discusión sobre quiénes eran responsables del desempleo en países dominantes como Estados Unidos. En la conservadora NTN24, durante la contienda electoral entre Obama y Mitt Romney, discutió con un asesor del gobierno de Estados Unidos sobre la criminalización de los inmigrantes ilegales. Desde entonces, los republicanos del Tea Party le habían puesto rostros humanos a un problema mucho mayor: para complacer los prejuicios históricos, esos rostros no eran de europeos ilegales, sino rostros morenos, mestizos de América Central.
Por entonces, Jorge y otros afirmaban que la mayor destrucción de trabajos industriales se debía a nosotros, a la robotización, no a la inmigración. Las máquinas y los humanos producían cada año “más riqueza” (frase favorita de los neoesclavistas, decía), pero el sistema económico, político e ideológico lo trasfería a la elite capitalista mientras demonizaba a los de abajo. Razón por lo cual apoyaba el Salario Universal como solución, no sólo moral, sino práctica. Es decir, reconocer que las tecnologías más avanzadas son el resultado del progreso de la Humanidad. Desde los algoritmos de Persia en el silgo VIII hasta cualquier otro invento, ninguno fue producido por el capitalismo y mucho menos por alguno de los capitalistas billonarios cuyo único mérito ha sido saber cómo secuestrar todo ese progreso y luego pregonar (en sus medios) que ellos inventaron el mundo moderno.
El problema ideológico y político, argumentan estos humanos, produce falacias como el Crecimiento Infinito (“la producción de riqueza”) para solucionar los problemas sociales que nunca solucionaron. Este crecimiento se basa en la producción y en la destrucción de bienes (en el valor negativo que incrementa el PIB) que está destruyendo el planeta y la vida de los individuos alienados en el consumismo.
En un café de Jacksonville alguien intentó refutar las advertencias de los climatólogos, diciendo que siempre ha habido apocalípticos y la Humanidad nunca había terminado, lo cual equivale a que un individuo afirme que nunca se morirá porque nunca se ha muerto antes.
Hay muchos ejemplos de civilizaciones que han colapsado, civilizaciones mucho más estables que la Civilización Global, totalmente frágil y dependiente de una Naturaleza Artificial, a la merced de un mero accidente energético o por algún psicópata con mucho poder.
Es algo que estamos considerando. No encontramos ninguna razón lógica ni práctica para que la existencia humana continúe en este planeta.
Escritos Críticos 
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